



W-0438 – Improper Rail Vehicle Movement at Shady Grove Station – January 22, 2026

Document Purpose

This WMSC written report on WMATA Metrorail's safety event investigation and review of Metrorail's findings in accordance with the WMSC Program Standard, in conjunction with the attached Metrorail investigation report that has undergone WMSC staff review, feedback, and Metrorail revision, describes the investigation activities, identifies factors causing or contributing to the accident, and sets forth ongoing, additional, or upcoming corrective actions and further oversight work (such as inspections and audits) as necessary or appropriate. The WMSC's ongoing oversight during the investigative process, including safety event reporting and verification, participation in investigative interviews, data review, consistent communication with the Metrorail investigations team, and feedback on Metrorail's reports leads to further improvements prior to consideration of the reports by WMSC Commissioners for adoption. The WMSC's safety event investigation oversight assures the sufficiency and thoroughness of Metrorail's investigations. The WMSC Commissioners are considering these documents (the WMSC review and Metrorail's investigation report) as a unified item for adoption at the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting September 15, 2026.

WMSC staff recommend adoption of this investigation.

Safety event summary:

On January 22, 2026, at 9:05 a.m., an improper rail vehicle movement occurred at Shady Grove Station, track 2 involving Train 124. Prior to the improper rail vehicle movement, the Shady Grove Terminal Supervisor authorized Train 116 to depart the platform in the direction of Shady Grove Yard at 8:47 a.m. Train 116 was instructed to contact Shady Grove Tower in order to enter the yard at signal A99-28 but remained stopped there after the train operator was unable to reach the interlocking operator via radio. The operator of Train 116 attempted to contact Shady Grove Tower multiple times using both the train console radio and a handheld radio, but no response was received. The train operator then keyed down Train 116 and disembarked in another attempt to establish communication with Shady Grove Tower by handheld radio. The Shady Grove Interlocking Operator did not receive any transmissions from the train operator requesting entry into the yard.

The Shady Grove Terminal Supervisor authorized Train 124 to leave the platform and proceed toward signal A99-28 without confirming Train 116's location, reducing separation between the trains. Train 124 entered stop and proceed mode¹ and moved a total of 306 feet without speed commands. Train 124 entered the interlocking and stopped after the train operator observed Train 116 ahead, maintaining approximately 100 feet of separation from the trailing car.

Train 124 notified the terminal supervisor that there was a train ahead of them. The terminal supervisor called the Shady Grove Interlocking Operator to inquire why Train 116 was still at signal A99-28, and the interlocking operator stated that they were not aware the train was there and had not received any radio transmissions.

At 9:10 a.m., Train 116 established communication with the interlocking operator using the handheld radio and was instructed to key up the train and enter the yard. At the same time, the terminal supervisor instructed another train

¹Stop and Proceed: A mode that allows a train to be moved in manual mode with Automatic Train Protection when no speed or door commands are being received.



operator to board the trailing end of Train 124 and move it back to the platform. This action was contrary to established operating procedures for train movement, including the prohibition of train movement against the normal flow of traffic. The terminal supervisor notified the rail traffic controller in the control center of the event and added that the sun glare on the interlocking display affected visibility of Train 116 at signal A99-28.

The train operator of Train 116, the terminal supervisor, and Train 124 were removed from service in accordance with Metrorail policy. WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Program determined that the train operators and the terminal supervisor complied with the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program Policy.

The probable cause and contributing factors leading to this safety event include:

- The Terminal Supervisor's failure to follow established procedures requiring confirmation of track occupancy before authorizing train movement. Train 116 remained stopped at signal A99-28 for an extended period, but its occupancy was not recognized before Train 124 was authorized to move. As a result, the track was treated as clear when it was occupied
- Reduced visibility of the interlocking board due to sun glare, which affected the terminal supervisor's ability to identify Train 116 at signal A99-28.

Investigation W-0438 led to specific recommended corrective actions (RCA), including:

- The train operator of train 124 attended reinstruction training on verifying a clear track before moving the train.
- The terminal supervisor attended reinstruction training on rail vehicle movement through interlockings.
- A shade was installed to stop the glare in the terminal window.



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety
Office of Safety Investigations

FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E26341

Date of Event:	January 22, 2026
Type of Event:	O-7: Improper Rail Vehicle Movement
Incident Time:	09:05 Hours
Location:	Shady Grove Tail Track, Track 2
Time and how received by Safety:	11:29 Hours (SIO) Safety Information Officer
Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC) Notification Time:	15:43 Hours
Responding Safety Officers:	None
Rail Vehicle:	Train ID 124 (L6127-26x6049-48x6072-73T)
Injuries:	None
Damage:	None
Emergency Responders:	None
Safety Universal Data System (SUDS I/A) Number	20260202#135355

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Approved By: SAFE 707 – 05/07/2026

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Shady Grove – Improper Rail Vehicle Movement

January 22, 2026

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIMS	Advanced Information Management System
ARS	Audio Recording System
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
CMNT	Office of Car Maintenance
CMOR	Office of the Chief Fleet Officer
IO	Interlocking Operator
IIT	Incident Investigation Team
MICC	Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center
MOR	Metrorail Operating Rulebook
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
ROS	Rail Operations Supervisor
RTC	Rail Traffic Controller
RTRA	Office of Rail Transportation
RVO	Rail Vehicle Operator
SAFE	Department of Safety
SPOTS	System Performance On-Time Summary
TS	Terminal Supervisor
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WMSC	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

Executive Summary

**Note that all times listed are approximate and may contain minor variations due to differences between systems of record.*

On Thursday, January 22, 2026, at 09:05 hours, an Improper Rail Vehicle Movement event occurred at Shady Grove Station involving Train ID 116 and Train ID 124 on Track 2 when the Terminal Supervisor authorized Train ID 124 to depart the platform and proceed toward signal A99-28 without confirming the location of Train ID 116, resulting in reduced separation between the two trains. Train ID 116 had previously been granted permission to depart the platform and contact Shady Grove Tower at signal A99-28 but remained stopped at the signal after being unable to establish communication with the Interlocking Operator (IO).

Train ID 124 entered the interlocking and stopped after the Rail Vehicle Operator (RVO) observed Train ID 116 ahead, maintaining a separation distance of approximately 100 feet from the trailing car.

At 09:10 hours, the Terminal Supervisor instructed a Gap RVO to move Train ID 124 back to the platform without confirming the switch position. Train ID 124 was later rerouted from Track 2 to Track 1 and transported to Shady Grove Yard.

The Button Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) contacted the Terminal Supervisor regarding the incident. The Terminal Supervisor reported that the sun glare on the interlocking board contributed to not identifying Train ID 116 at signal A99-28. The event did not result in a collision or impact on revenue service, and no injuries or damage were reported.

In adherence to Rail Transportation Standard Operating Procedure 102-01-02, which outlines the protocol for removing an employee from service for involvement in an operational safety event, the Director of Rail Transportation dispatched a Rail Operations Supervisor (ROS) to relieve the RVO and Terminal Supervisor from duty for post-incident testing.


In accordance with the Office of the Chief Fleet Officer – Rail, Standard Operating Procedure 102.04, and Operations Administrative Policy 102.06, the Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center (MICC) initiated the removal of Train ID 124 from service for Incident Investigations Team investigation procedures.

The probable cause of the Improper Rail Vehicle Movement event at Shady Grove Station on January 22, 2026, was the Terminal Supervisor not following established procedures requiring confirmation of track occupancy before authorizing train movement. Specifically, Train ID 116 remained stopped at signal A99-28 for an extended period, and this occupancy was not recognized before authorizing Train ID 124 to move. The interlocking was therefore treated as clear when it was, in fact, occupied. A contributing factor was reduced visibility of the interlocking board due to sun glare, which affected the Terminal Supervisor's ability to identify Train ID 116 at signal A99-28.

Incident Site

Shady Grove Station Tail Track, Track 2 (Signal A-15-38)

Field Sketch/Schematics



The above depiction is not to scale.

Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this accident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigative Methods

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Site Assessment through video and document review
- Formal Interviews – Safety interviewed three (3) individuals as part of this investigation. The interviews included people present at, during, and after the incident, those directly involved in the response process, and representatives from the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC). Safety interviewed the following individuals:

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- Train ID 116 (RVO #1)
 - Train ID 124 (RVO #2)
 - Terminal Supervisor
- Informal Interviews – Collected through conversations with individuals during the investigation to provide background and supporting information. Written statements were reviewed from personnel present during the event.
 - Documentation Review – A collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in Metro systems of record. These records include:
 - Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR)
 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
 - RVO #2 Training Procedures & Records
 - RVO #2 Certification Records
 - RVO #2 30-Day Work History
 - Rail Transportation – Investigation Data
 - Office of the Chief Fleet Officer – Incident Investigation Team Investigation Data
 - System Data Recording Review – Collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
 - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback
 - Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)
 - Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)

Investigation

On Thursday, January 22, 2026, at 08:41 hours, the Audio Recording System (ARS) playback indicated that the RVO #1 contacted the Terminal Supervisor and advised that the train had arrived at Shady Grove Station on Track 2. The Terminal Supervisor instructed RVO #1 to clear the train of customers in preparation for movement to Shady Grove Yard.

At 08:47 hours, ARS playback indicated that RVO #1 was granted permission to depart Shady Grove Station platform on Track 2 and instructed to contact Shady Grove Tower at signal A99-28. Train ID 116 remained stopped at signal A99-28, and no radio transmissions were received by the IO.

During a formal interview, RVO #1 stated that multiple attempts were made to contact the Tower using both the train console radio and a handheld radio without receiving a response. After receiving no response, the RVO keyed down the train and disembarked to establish communication with Shady Grove Tower via handheld radio. The IO stated that no transmission was received from RVO #1 requesting entry into the yard. The investigation determined that no post-event radio checks were conducted to assess radio functionality in the area following the occurrence.

At 08:59 hours, ARS playback indicated that the RVO #2 contacted the Terminal Supervisor and advised that the train had arrived at Shady Grove Station on Track 2. The Terminal Supervisor instructed RVO #2 to clear the train of customers in preparation for movement to Shady Grove Yard.

At 09:05 hours, ARS playback indicated that RVO #2 advised the Terminal Supervisor that the train was clear of customers. The Terminal Supervisor then instructed RVO #2 to depart Shady Grove Station platform on Track 2 and contact Shady Grove Tower at signal A99-28. At that time, Train ID 116 remained stopped at signal A99-28.




Figure 1 - (Green Arrow) Train ID 116 stopped at A99-28 signal. (Yellow Arrow) Train ID 124 in the interlocking pass A15-38 signal.

During a formal interview, the Terminal Supervisor stated that sun glare on the interlocking display affected the visibility of Train ID 116 at signal A99-28.

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Photo 1 - (left) forward-facing view of control board. (right) - Angle view of control board with sun glare.

At 09:10 hours, RVO #1 established communication with the IO using a handheld radio and was instructed to key up the train. At the same time, the Terminal Supervisor instructed a Gap RVO to board Train ID 124 and move the train back to the platform. AIMS data confirmed that Train ID 124 returned to Shady Grove Station platform on Track 2. This action was contrary to established operating procedures for the movement of a train following the reported condition.

At 09:12 hours, the Interlocking Operator granted Train ID 116 an absolute block from signal A99-28 and instructed the RVO to secure the train in Shady Grove Yard.

At 09:14 hours, the Terminal Supervisor advised RVO #2 that Train ID 124 would be rerouted to Track 1. At 09:15 hours, RVO #2 was granted a permissive block and instructed to contact the Tower. AIMS data confirmed that Train ID 124 departed Shady Grove Station on Track 1 toward Shady Grove Yard.

The Operations Manager (OM) notified Metro 1 of the incident via email. Metro 1 then collaborated with Rail Transportation to investigate the matter. After completing their investigation, the OM notified the Safety Information Official (SIO) about the incident. Following their findings, Rail Transportation (RTRA) decided to remove the personnel involved from service. However, by the time this decision was reached, those employees had already finished their shifts and gone home. Consequently, on January 23, 2026, upon reporting for their next scheduled shift, the employees involved were removed from service.

WMSC was not notified within the required two-hour notification window due to an outage affecting the Everbridge notification system. Upon identifying the issue, an email notification was sent to the WMSC Investigation Team at 15:44 hours. The delayed notification was attributable to the communication system outage and not a determination to withhold notification.

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Chronological Event Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, revealed the following timeline:

Time	Description
08:41:11 hours	Train ID 116 arrived at Shady Grove Station on Track 2. [Radio SG-YD1]
08:47:35 hours	<u>Terminal Supervisor</u> : Granted a permissive block to Train ID 116 from signal A15-38 to signal A99-28. Instructed RVO to contact the Shady Grove Tower at signal A99-28. <u>Train ID 116</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio SG-YD1]
08:59:40 hours	Train ID 124 arrived at Shady Grove Station on Track 2. [Radio SG-YD1]
09:05:31 hours	<u>Train ID 124</u> : Reported the train was clear of customers. <u>Terminal Supervisor</u> : Granted a permissive block to Train ID 124 from signal A15-38 to signal A99-28. Instructed to contact the Shady Grove Tower at signal A99-28. [Radio SG-YD1]
09:06:20 hours	Train ID 124 departed Shady Grove Station platform on track 2. [AIMS]
09:06:53 hours	<u>Terminal Supervisor</u> : Stated, "Come on, move the train." [Radio SG-YD1]
09:07:02 hours	<u>Train ID 124</u> : Responded, "Keep going? The man is getting off the train" [Radio SG-YD1]
09:07:47 hours	<u>Train ID 124</u> : Advised the Terminal Supervisor that there was a train ahead of them and requested confirmation on where they were going. [Radio SG-YD1]
09:09:01 hours	<u>Terminal Supervisor</u> : Contacted Shady Grove Yard IO and inquired why Train ID 116 was being held at signal A99-28. <u>IO</u> : Responded that they did not know why the train was holding and that the RVO did not contact them. [Phone A99 Yard]
09:09:12 hours	<u>Terminal Supervisor</u> : Instructed Train ID 124 to key the train down. [Radio SG-YD1]
09:09:43 hours	<u>Terminal Supervisor</u> : Advised the Button RTC that they would be removing someone from service, and they would call back. [Phone Ops1]
09:10:12 hours	<u>Train ID 116</u> : Contacted the Tower and advised them that they were trying to contact them. <u>Terminal Supervisor</u> : Advised that they never received a transmission from Train ID 116. [Radio SG-YD2]
09:10:26 hours	<u>Terminal Supervisor</u> : Instructed a Gap Operator to key the train up on the Glenmont Station end and pull the train back to the platform. [Radio SG-YD1]
09:10:50 hours	Train ID 124 moved back to the platform at Shady Grove Station on track 2. [AIMS]
09:10:56 hours	<u>IO</u> : Instructed the Operator of Train ID 116 to key up. [Radio SG-YD1]
09:11:35 hours	<u>Button RTC</u> : Instructed the IO to make an announcement for the Terminal Supervisor to contact the MICC. [Phone Ops 1]
09:11:57 hours	<u>Button RTC</u> : Contacted the Terminal Supervisor to find out what happened. <u>Terminal Supervisor</u> : Responded, "The Operator was sitting back there for 20 minutes. I couldn't see the speck on the board due to the sun glare, and I did not notice the train back there. I set a lunar; the Operator said that there was a train at the signal, so we're good." <u>Button RTC</u> : Inquired if anyone moved the train. <u>Terminal Supervisor</u> : Responded, "The train is moving into the yard." <u>Button RTC</u> : Inquired about the train at signal A15-36.

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Time	Description
	<u>Terminal Supervisor</u> : Responded, "It's going into the yard." <u>Button RTC</u> : Inquired if the signal was fledted the entire time. <u>Terminal Supervisor</u> : Responded, "Yes." <u>Button RTC</u> : Advised that it looks like they ran a red signal. <u>Terminal Supervisor</u> : Responded, "No." [Phone Ops 1]
09:12:09 hours	<u>Interlocking Operator</u> : Granted an absolute block to Train ID 116 from signal A99-28 to secure the train on track 16. [Radio SG-YD2]
09:14:15 hours	<u>Terminal Supervisor</u> : Advised that Train ID 124 would be rerouted to Track 1. [Radio SG-YD1]
09:15:11 hours	<u>Terminal Supervisor</u> : Granted a permissive block to Train ID 124 from signal A15-38 crossing over from track 2 to track 1 to signal A99-24. Instructed to contact the Shady Grove Tower at signal A99-24. [Radio SG-YD1]
09:16:00 hours	Train ID 124 departed Shady Grove Station platform on track 2. [AIMS]
10:35:00 hours	Rail 1 emailed files to Metro 1 regarding the incident at Shady Grove Station. [Email]
11:19:58 hours	<u>Rail 1</u> : Notified the SIO of the event. [Phone]
11:29:00 hours	Rail 1 emailed the SIO files regarding the event at Shady Grove Station. [Email]
15:44:00 hours	SIO emailed WMSC a notification of the event via Everbridge.

Note: Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings.

Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)




Figure 2 - (circle) depicts Train ID 124 entering the interlocking behind Train ID 116 at 09:09 hours.

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Figure 3 - (circle) depicts Train ID 124 pulled back on the platform, Track 2 at Shady Grove Station at 09:10 hours.




Figure 4 - (circle) depicts Train ID departing Shady Grove Station crossing from Track 2 to Track 1 towards Shady Grove Yard at 09:16 hours.

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Operations

Rail Transportation

The personnel involved received disciplinary action and completed reinstruction training.

Fleet

Office of the Chief Fleet Officer (CMOR) – Incident Investigation Team (IIT) Investigation Data

IIT completed an analysis of the data collected from this incident. Based on the data, the railcar operated as designed and responded to the commands entered through the Master Controller. The train operated in manual mode at the 8-car marker of Shady Grove Station Track 2. The train serviced the station, stop and proceed mode was entered, and the Master Controller was placed in the power position. The train traveled 293 feet, passing signal A15-38, stopped, then the train was placed in power once more and moved another 12 feet for a total of 306 feet in the direction of Shady Grove Yard, entering the switch point.

The train then reversed operating ends and was placed back on the platform.

TIMELINE OF EVENTS


Time	Description of Events
9:05:14 hours	The Train entered stop-and-proceed mode after servicing Shady Grove Station Track 2.
9:05:17 hours	The master controller was placed in a power mode, and the train started moving towards Shady Grove yard.
9:05:45 hours	The train stopped after moving 293 feet. At that point, the train had already passed signal A15-38.
9:06:56 hours	The master controller was placed in a power mode, and the train moved another 13 feet, for a total of 306 feet toward Shady Grove Yard.
9:10:42 hours	The train reversed operating ends, traveled 332 feet, and was placed back on the platform.

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RAILCAR 6127 GRAPH



Interview Findings and Written Statements

As part of the investigation launched into the event, Safety interviewed three (3) people. The interviews identified the following key findings associated with this event. The findings detailed below include reported information from involved personnel and may conflict with other data sources contained in the report.

RTRA

RVO #1

- The RVO was supposed to lay up their train in Shady Grove Yard upon exiting the mainline.
- The RVO stated that they attempted to contact the IO numerous times through the console and handheld and did not get any answers.
- The RVO stated that after they could not get in contact with the IO, they attempted to contact the Terminal Supervisor and Ops 1 with no response.
- The RVO stated they walked through the train and disembarked, attempting to contact the IO with the handheld.
- The RVO stated they could hear but could not get a response from communications (handheld, console).

RVO #2

- The RVO stated that they proceeded from the platform towards Shady Grove Yard once they saw the lunar signal, but noticed the train in front of them.

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- The RVO stated they were mindful of the train ahead, so they moved cautiously, and only continued to move because of instructions by the TS.
- The RVO stated that the Terminal Supervisor repeated to them why they were not moving.
- The RVO stated they saw a RVO getting off the train ahead, walking towards them.
- The RVO stated that the Terminal Supervisor had someone board their train from the trailing end to pull it back to the platform.
- The RVO stated that after they were pulled back to the platform, a lunar was set, and they were sent into the yard.

Terminal Supervisor

- The Terminal Supervisor stated that they gave Train ID 116 permission up to signal A99-28, the last signal before entering the yard from the main line.
- The Terminal Supervisor stated they put the panel in automatics so the trains would fleet once they cleared the track circuit.
- The Terminal Supervisor stated that they walked out of the terminal and confirmed that there was a train ahead of them.
- The Terminal Supervisor stated that they looked at the control panel after it was reported to them and saw the track occupied by Train ID 116.
- The Terminal Supervisor stated that there was a glare from the sun in the terminal and could not see the train initially.
- The Terminal Supervisor stated they instructed the Gap RVO to board the trailing end of Train ID 124 and pull it back to Shady Grove platform.
- The Terminal Supervisor contacted the Button RTC later and advised them that the train had passed the signal.

Weather

On Thursday, January 22, 2016, at the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature as 25°F, with cloudy skies, winds of 25 mph, and 35% humidity. Weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: NOAA) – Shady Grove, Maryland

Related Rules and Procedures

Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR)

3.4 Improperly Lined Switches

3.4.1 Rail vehicles shall not be operated through improperly aligned track switches

3.4.2 If a rail vehicle runs through an improperly aligned track switch, the Rail Vehicle Operator shall stop the vehicle immediately and report the occurrence to the Rail Traffic Controller or the Interlocking Operator. All parties shall treat the situation as if the vehicle has derailed, and the vehicle shall not be moved. Subsequent movement of the affected rail vehicle shall not be undertaken until investigated and determined to be safe by authorized personnel.

3.4.3 Rail Vehicle Operators who inadvertently accept a route for other than the intended destination, they shall immediately stop and contact the Rail Traffic Controller for instructions.

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Any subsequent turn back move shall be accomplished in compliance with rule outlined in this rulebook, and only after receiving authorization from the Rail Traffic Controller.

10.1 Rail Vehicle Movement Through Interlockings

10.1.2 Field personnel shall report to Rail Operations Control Center when:

10.1.4 Changing operating directions in an interlocking is prohibited except when authorized by the Rail Traffic Controller or the Interlocking Operator, and then only when an Office of Rail Transportation Supervisor or an Automatic Train Control Maintenance crew is on the scene to ensure that the move can be made safely.

Human Factors

Fatigue

Signs and Symptoms of Fatigue

Terminal Supervisor

Safety evaluated signs and symptoms of fatigue that may have been present at the time of the incident. No signs or symptoms of fatigue were detected from the available data. Video of the incident was reviewed for signs of Terminal Supervisor fatigue. No signs or symptoms of fatigue were evident from the video. The Terminal Supervisor reported feeling very alert at the time of the incident. The Terminal Supervisor reported experiencing no symptoms of fatigue in the time leading up to the incident.

Rail Vehicle Operator

Safety evaluated signs and symptoms of fatigue that may have been present at the time of the incident. No signs or symptoms of fatigue were detected from the available data. Video of the incident was reviewed for signs of RVO's fatigue. No signs or symptoms of fatigue were evident from the video. The RVO reported feeling very alert at the time of the incident. The RVO reported experiencing no symptoms of fatigue in the time leading up to the incident.

Fatigue Risk

Terminal Supervisor

Safety evaluated incident data for fatigue risk factors. Risk factors for fatigue were not present. The incident time of day did not suggest an increased risk of fatigue-related impairment. The Terminal Supervisor reported keeping a regular sleep schedule in the days leading up to the incident. The employee worked the day shift in the days leading up to the incident. The Terminal Supervisor was awake for over 16 hours at the time of the incident, which can increase the likelihood of impairment due to fatigue. The Terminal Supervisor reported a short sleep duration of 5 hours in the 24 hours leading up to the incident. This was less than the Terminal Supervisor's usual workday sleep duration. The off-duty period was 11 hours, which provides an opportunity for 7-9 hours of sleep. The Terminal Supervisor reported no issues with sleep.

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Drafted By: SAFE 711 - 04/05/2026
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Rail Vehicle Operator

Safety evaluated incident data for fatigue risk factors. Risk factors for fatigue were not present. The incident time of day did not suggest an increased risk of fatigue-related impairment. The RVO reported keeping a regular sleep schedule in the days leading up to the incident. The RVO worked the day shift in the days leading up to the incident. The RVO was awake for under 16 hours at the time of the incident, which can increase the likelihood of impairment due to fatigue. The RVO reported a sleep duration of more than 6 hours in the 24 hours leading up to the incident. This was less than the employee's usual workday sleep duration. The off-duty period was 62 hours and 43 minutes, which provides an opportunity for 7-9 hours of sleep. The RVO reported no issues with sleep.

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Program determined that the RVO complied with the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program Policy 7.7.3/7.

WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Program determined that the Terminal Supervisor complied with the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program Policy 7.7.3/7.

Findings

- The Terminal Supervisor authorized Train ID 124 to depart Shady Grove Station platform on Track 2 and proceed toward signal A99-28 while Train ID 116 remained stopped at signal A99-28.
- The Terminal Supervisor did not verify track occupancy before authorizing Train ID 124 to traverse the same route as Train ID 116.
- Train ID 116 remained stopped at signal A99-28 after unsuccessful attempts by the RVO #1 to establish communication with the IO.
- The RVO of Train ID 124 observed Train ID 116 ahead and stopped the train within approximately 100 feet of the trailing car, preventing further reduction in separation. Sun glare affected the Terminal Supervisor's ability to identify track occupancy on the interlocking display.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- The Terminal Supervisor instructed Train ID 124 to key down and directed a Gap RVO to return the train to the platform.
- The Interlocking Operator issued an absolute block to Train ID 116 and directed the train into Shady Grove Yard.
- Train ID 124 was rerouted from Track 2 to Track 1 and safely moved into Shady Grove Yard.
- RTRA removed involved personnel from service following the event.

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause of the Improper Rail Vehicle Movement event at Shady Grove Station on January 22, 2026, was the Terminal Supervisor not following established procedures requiring confirmation of track occupancy before authorizing train movement. Specifically, Train ID 116 remained stopped at signal A99-28 for an extended period, and this occupancy was not

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recognized before authorizing Train ID 124 to move. The interlocking was therefore treated as clear when it was, in fact, occupied. A contributing factor was reduced visibility of the interlocking board due to sun glare, which affected the Terminal Supervisor's ability to identify Train ID 116 at signal A99-28.

Recommended Corrective Actions

Corrective Action Code	Description	Responsible Party	Estimated Completion Date
135355_SAFE CAPS_RTRA_ 001	The RVO will attend re-instruction training on verifying a clear track before moving the train.	RTRA SRC	Completed
135355_SAFE CAPS_RTRA_ 002	The Terminal Supervisor will attend reinstruction on Rail Vehicle Movement Through Interlockings in accordance with MOR 10.1.4 (July 1, 2025)	RTRA SRC	Completed
135355_SAFE CAPS_RTRA_ 003	Install shade to divert the glare in the terminal window.	RTRA SRC	Completed

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Appendices

Appendix A – Interview Summaries

The narratives below summarize the incident and represent the statements made by the involved individual. As such, times and details may present a conflict with the data contained in systems of record.

RTRA

Terminal Supervisor

The Terminal Supervisor is a WMATA employee with 15 years of service and 7 years of experience as a Terminal Supervisor. The Terminal Supervisor holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 2 certification that expires in August 2026

During the formal interview, the Terminal Supervisor stated that they gave Train ID 116 permission to go to A- 99-28 signal, which is the last signal going from the main line to the yard. There were trains still coming in and out of the yard. When Train ID 124 approached the platform, they made sure their train was clear of all customers. The Terminal Supervisor put the panel in automatics so the trains would re-fleet once they cleared the track circuit.

The Terminal Supervisor gave train ID 124 a permissive block to signal A99-28 signal, as train ID 124 moved the train, then stopped, and the Terminal Supervisor questioned why they stopped. The RVO advised them that there was a train ahead of them. At that time, the Terminal Supervisor stated that they walked out of the terminal and confirmed that there was a train ahead of them.

The Terminal Supervisor stated they went back into the terminal to look at the panel and confirmed occupancy by Train ID 116. The Terminal Supervisor also mentioned that there is a glare that comes from the sun into the terminal, which affects their vision to see the train. They stated that the glare is an ongoing thing, in which there are work order tickets that have been generated.

The Terminal Supervisor stated that if they had known the train was in occupancy, they would have crossed the trains over to avoid the incident. Once recognizing the issue, the Terminal Supervisor had a Gap Operator board at the opposite end of train 124 and pulled it back to the Shady Grove platform.

Upon initially asking the RVO of Train ID 124 if they passed the signal, the Terminal Supervisor stated the RVO said they did not pass the signal, which they advised the Button RTC. The Terminal Supervisor, upon asking the RVO of Train ID 124 again, stated they thought they did pass the signal but never touched the switch point. The Terminal Supervisor contacted the MICC and spoke with the Button RTC and advised them of the incident.

RVO #1 (Train ID 116)

RVO#1 is a WMATA employee with 24 years of service and 4 months of experience as an RVO. The RVO holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 2 certification that expires in March 2026.

RVO #1 stated that everything was status quo. They pulled in from their trip from Glenmont and were scheduled to lay up the train. The Terminal Supervisor had personnel board the train to verify it was clear of customers. Once that was completed, the train was confirmed clear.

After verifying the train was clear, the RVO was granted an absolute block, no closer than 10 feet to signal A99-28, with instructions to contact Shady Grove Tower at that location, consistent with normal layup procedures. The train was scheduled to lay up at the same time each day, and the same process was followed on this date. The RVO proceeded to the signal; however, no response was received from Shady Grove Tower. The RVO attempted to contact Shady Grove Tower first, then attempted to contact the Interlocking Operator (IO) who issued the block, but no response was received. The RVO then attempted to contact the mainline via OPS 1, but was unable to establish communication. After receiving no response, the RVO keyed down the train and disembarked to establish communication with Shady Grove Tower.

The RVO utilized stop and proceed after receiving the absolute block. Signal A99-28 displayed a red aspect upon arrival and remained red. Signal A15-38, leaving the Shady Grove platform toward Shady Grove Yard, displayed a lunar aspect.

The RVO stated that radio transmissions could be heard; however, neither the handheld nor the train console radio transmitted outgoing communication. The RVO stated that no responses were received to any transmissions and that both the handheld and console emitted a beeping sound. The RVO attempted to contact Shady Grove 2, Shady Grove 1, and OPS 1 without success.

The RVO stated that they were later advised by an Assistant Superintendent at Shady Grove that alternate train consoles could have been used to address communication issues. The RVO stated they were not familiar with that option and would retain that information moving forward. The RVO also stated that they observed another train approach and stop approximately one to one-and-a-half car lengths away. The RVO stated they were advised that, in an emergency, a cell phone could have been used to contact the Terminal or Shady Grove Tower; however, they were accustomed to not using a cell phone based on prior bus operations rules.

RVO #2 (Train ID 124)

RVO# 2 is a WMATA employee with 7 years of service and 3 years of experience as an RVO. The RVO holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 2 certification that expires in April 2026.

The RVO stated that they came to the terminal like normal, and they are scheduled layup their train on Thursday and Friday. So, they got to the 8 - car marker. They serviced the platform and closed the doors. They waited for the platform personnel to let me know that they had walked through their train with instructions from the blockhouse. They stayed keyed up; the train was clear.

They received their block from the Terminal Supervisor. They verified the lunar in front of them from signal 38 to 28, and there's already another schedule layup in front of their train. They knew there was another train in front of them now, and they knew that we were moving. So, they proceeded because they had a lunar, but then they noticed that there was a train in front of me, so they started to creep up because I'm moving with caution.

The RVO contacted the Terminal Supervisor and told them they had stopped, and the Terminal Supervisor was like, "Why are you not moving?" And I was like, there's a train in front of me. And

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they were like, " Why are you not moving?" So, the RVO was like, OK, so maybe they were in the wrong. The RVO stated that maybe they read the rail alignment wrong. So, the RVO, I was like, OK, well, maybe I did not turn out.

So, the RVO proceeded a little bit more, and then I realized that RVO #1 was getting off the train, walking towards them. The RVO was like, OK, so maybe I am turning out. But then I was like, no, I'm not turning out. When the RVO looked through the bunk head door again, and was like, I am not going straight. The RVO contacted the Terminal Supervisor again and was like hey.

The RVO contacted the Terminal Supervisor and advised them that they cannot proceed. There's a train in front of me. The RVO thought the Terminal Supervisor did not hear them again because he was like, "Why are you not moving"? What is going on? The RVO stated, "There's a train in front of me, I cannot move". The RVO stated that I guess that's when they came and saw that the train was still sitting at 28, and he told me to key down, and reset their lunar.

The RVO stated that the Terminal Supervisor had pulled them back, and then they came to their window, and they were sorry. They didn't know that there was a train at 28 signals, and then he reset their lunar, and then they went into the yard.

The RVO stated that this was their regular run for this day, and they were aware that the train had to be laid up. The RVO stated they started to proceed on their block because they knew the Terminal Supervisor would not give them a lunar directly into another train on purpose. The RVO did not have any radio issues. The RVO stated that the A15 - 38 signal was a lunar at the time of the incident, and they were about 100 feet from the other train, about two trains. The RVO stated they did not go past the interlocking, just the signal. The RVO stated that you lose speed commands prior to traversing into the yard, and that's at the 8 – car marker.

The RVO stated that when RVO # 1 got off the train, they were walking towards them. So they had already stopped their train when I saw them walking. They asked RVO # 1, where are they going? RVO #1 stated, I have no radio communication; I've been sitting here trying to get a hold of the tower. The RVO advised RVO #1 that they would need to get back in their train. The RVO stated that RVO# 1 was a new operator. I told them they needed to get back in their lead cab because these trains are laying up.

And advised RVO #1, letting them know that nobody knows you're on the roadway. And if you're on the radio, then you need to try to, you know, walk your whole train. You know how they say you're supposed to chirp your radio throughout the train. The RVO advised them that you have to get back on the train because they're probably trying to call you or want you to move into the yard, since you were also laying up.

The RVO believed that RVO #1 was walking back towards the Terminal to speak with the Terminal Supervisor at that time.

Appendix B – RTRA Reports

WMATA/RTRA Incident/Accident Report (Other than Motor Vehicle) Page ____ of ____			
Incident Information: This page must be completed for all incidents			
Date: 1/22/2026	Incident Time: 9:00 PM	Time Reported: 9:00 PM	Reported by: Customer ☐ Employee ☐ ROCC ☐ Other ☐
Location			
Station	Mezzanine #	Track #/Destination	Chain Marker/Signal Number
TYPE OF INCIDENT			
☐ Property Damage	☐ Smoke	☐ Fire	☐ Customer Complaint
☐ Customer Injury	☐ Customer Illness	☐ Employee Injury	☐ Employee Illness
☐ Criminal Activity	☐ Elevator Entrapment	☐ Rail Vehicle Incident	☐ Other (Explain in description of incident)
WEATHER		LIGHT CONDITIONS (natural lighting)	
Clear ☐ Rain ☐	Dawn/Dusk ☐ Daylight ☐	LIGHTING (artificial lighting)	
Snow ☐ Sleet/Ice ☐	Dark ☐ Tunnel/Underground ☐	Lights On ☐ Lights Off ☐	
Lights Not Working ☐			
STATION INCIDENTS: Always include equipment number you use for MOC/AFC/EOC			
Elevator/Escalator#:	AFC #:	Room Number/Location:	
Failure Number(s):			
Parking Lot ☐ Paid Area ☐ Free Area ☐ Garage ☐ Station Entrance ☐ Stairway # ____ ☐ Platform ☐ Ancillary Room ☐			
Injury/Illness reported aboard Train ☐ Other ☐			
Name of Responding Supervisor:		Name/Department of PLNT/AFC or other WMATA responder	
TRAIN INCIDENTS			
Train ID	Destination	Car Numbers (list all cars in consist):	Lead Car:
Name: [Redacted]	Supervisor: [Redacted]	Name/Department of CMNT/TRST or other WMATA responder	
DESCRIBE THE INCIDENT: Include what you did to correct the problem and who you notified and when.			
Describe any property damage and the extent of any injuries.			
After clearing my train, I got a block from 35 to 28. I proceed forward then I realized the train was at 28 without moving. So I stopped my train and told it. He asked me why I wasn't moving and I said it's because there is a train in front of me. I thought maybe I was trying and my train was trying not to move. But once I saw the operator get off the train ahead and wave towards me. I told it again I can't move because of the train ahead. I did go over the switch.			
Employee Completing Report			
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	Date: 1/22/2026	
Shady Brown	Run #	Block #	Assigned Days:
To Be Completed By Reviewing Manager			
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	Date: 1/22/2026	
SMS Number: 20260202#135355			
50.753A 09/11 White Copy: Division or Supervisor Yellow Copy: For any incident involving escalators or elevators; remains in kiosk for use of elevator/escalator inspectors			

Figure 5 - Employee Statement. (page 1 of 4)

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Drafted By: SAFE 711 - 04/05/2026
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 - 04/30/2026
Approved By: SAFE 707 - 05/07/2026

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WMATA/RTA Incident/Accident Report (Other than Motor Vehicle) Page ____ of ____

Incident Information: This page must be completed for all incidents

Date: 1/22/26 Incident Time: 9: AM Time Reported: 9:20 AM Reported by: Customer ☐ Employee ☒
 ROCC ☐ Other ☐

Location

Station: Shady Grove Mezzanine #: _____ Track #/Destination: 2 Chain Marker/Signal Number: A99/28

TYPE OF INCIDENT

☐ Property Damage ☐ Smoke ☐ Fire ☐ Customer Complaint
☐ Customer injury ☐ Customer Illness ☐ Employee Injury ☐ Employee Illness
☐ Criminal Activity ☐ Elevator Entrapment ☒ Rail Vehicle Incident ☐ Other (Explain in description of incident)

WEATHER **LIGHT CONDITIONS (natural lighting)** **LIGHTING (artificial lighting)**

Clear ☒ Rain ☐ Dawn/Dusk ☐ Daylight ☒ Lights On ☒ Lights Off ☐
 Snow ☐ Sleet/Ice ☐ Dark ☐ Tunnel/Underground ☐ Lights Not Working ☐

STATION INCIDENTS: Always include equipment number you use for MOC/AFC/EOC

Elevator/Escalator #: _____ AFC #: _____ Room Number/Location: _____

Failure Number(s): _____

Parking Lot ☐ Paid Area ☐ Free Area ☐ Garage ☐ Station Entrance ☐ Stairway # _____ Platform ☐ Ancillary Room ☐
 Injury/Illness reported aboard Train ☐ Other ☐

Name of Responding Supervisor: _____ Name/Department of PLNT/AFC or other WMATA responder: _____

TRAIN INCIDENTS

Train ID: _____ Destination: Shady Grove Yard Car Numbers (list all cars in consist): 4370 Lead Car: 7370
 Name of Responding Supervisor: _____ Name/Department of CMNT/TRST or other WMATA responder: _____

Include what you did to correct the problem and who you notified and when.

Describe any property damage and the extent of any injuries.

No Radio communication on hand held or console. Disembarked to get clarification

Employee Completing Report

Employee Name (print): _____ Date: 1/22/26
 Division: Shady Grove Run #: 22 Block #: 116 Assigned Trays: 35

To Be Completed By Reviewing Manager

 Date: 1/22/2026

SMS Number: 2026 0202-#135355
SD 753A 08/11 White Copy: Division or Supervisor Yellow Copy: For any incident involving escalators or elevators; remains in kit for use of elevator/escalator inspectors

Figure 6 - Employee Statement (page 2 of 4).

Incident Date: 01/22/2026 Time: 09:05 hours
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 Approved By: SAFE 707 – 05/07/2026

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WMATA/RTA Incident/Accident Report (Other than Motor Vehicle) Page 3 of 4

Incident Information: This page must be completed for all incidents

Date: 1-23-26 Incident Time: 9:00 am Time Reported: _____ Reported by: Customer ☐ Employee ☐
ROCC ☐ Other ☐

Location

Station: Shady Grove Mezzanine #: _____ Track #/Destination: 2 Chain Marker/Signal Number: _____

TYPE OF INCIDENT

☐ Property Damage ☐ Smoke ☐ Fire ☐ Customer Complaint
☐ Customer Injury ☐ Customer Illness ☐ Employee Injury ☐ Employee Illness
☐ Criminal Activity ☐ Elevator Entrapment ☐ Rail Vehicle Incident ☐ Other (Explain in description of incident)

WEATHER **LIGHT CONDITIONS (natural lighting)** **LIGHTING (artificial lighting)**

Clear ☒ Rain ☐ Dawn/Dusk ☐ Daylight ☒ Lights On ☐ Lights Off ☐
Snow ☐ Sleet/Ice ☐ Dark ☐ Tunnel/Underground ☐ Lights Not Working ☐

STATION INCIDENTS: Always include equipment number you use for MOC/AFC/EOC

Elevator/Escalator #: _____ AFC #: _____ Room Number/Location: _____

Failure Number(s): _____

Parking Lot ☐ Paid Area ☐ Free Area ☐ Garage ☐ Station Entrance ☐ Stairway # _____ Platform ☐ Ancillary Room ☐
Injury/Illness reported aboard Train ☐ Other ☐

Name of Responding Supervisor: _____ Name/Department of PLNT/AFC or other WMATA responder: _____

TRAIN INCIDENTS

Train ID: _____ Destination: Shady Grove Car Numbers (list all cars in consist): 6127 6049 6072 6127 Lead Car: 6127
Name of Responding Supervisor: _____ Name/Department of CMNT/TRST or other WMATA responder: _____

DESCRIBE THE INCIDENT: Include what you did to correct the problem and who you notified and when.

Describe any property damage and the extent of any injuries.

I was working the platform yesterday morning clearing customer from the train because the train was going to the yard. After letting the terminal supervisor know that the train was clear of customer. I was told to reboard the train and pull it up to the eight car marker.

Employee Completing Report

Employee Signature (print): _____ Employee #: _____ Date: 1-23-26
Division: Shady Grove Run #: 22 Shift: G/S

To Be Completed By Reviewing Manager

Supervisor Name (print): _____ Supervisor Signature (print): _____ Employee #: _____ Date: 1-23-2026

SMS Number: 20260202-135555

90.753A 04/12 White Copy: Division or Supervisor Yellow Copy: For any incident involving escalators or elevators; remains in kiosk for use of elevator/escalator inspectors

Figure 7 - Employee Statement (page 3 of 4).

Incident Date: 01/22/2026 Time: 09:05 hours
Final Report – Improper Rail Vehicle Movement
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Approved By: SAFE 707 – 05/07/2026

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WMATA/RTRA Incident/Accident Report (Other than Motor Vehicle) Page 4 of 4

Additional Information- Complete this page for any incident where the information is available and when additional space is needed for incident description.

Customer Involved ☐ **Employee Involved** ☐ **Witness** ☐

[Redacted] [Redacted]

Date of Birth: 11/03/1987 Sex: [Redacted] Home Phone: [Redacted] Work Phone: [Redacted]

Home Address: [Redacted] Email Address: [Redacted]

Nature of Injury/Illness: [Redacted]

Assistance Offered: Accepted ☐ Declined ☐

If Transported:

Hospital: [Redacted] Ambulance Number: [Redacted] Arrival: [Redacted] Departure: [Redacted]

Customer Involved ☐ **Employee Involved** ☐ **Witness** ☐

Last Name, First Name: [Redacted] Employee #: [Redacted]

Date of Birth: [Redacted] Sex: [Redacted] Home Phone: [Redacted] Work Phone: [Redacted] Cell Phone: [Redacted]

Home Address: [Redacted] Email Address: [Redacted]

Nature of Injury/Illness: [Redacted]

Assistance Offered: Accepted ☐ Declined ☐

If Transported:

Hospital: [Redacted] Ambulance Number: [Redacted] Arrival: [Redacted] Departure: [Redacted]

Police/Fire/Other Agencies Involved

Jurisdiction/Arrival Time	Name	Badge/Unit Number

DESCRIBE THE INCIDENT (continued or witness statement): include what you did to correct the problem and who you notified and when. Describe any property damage and the extent of any injuries.

because I thought I was trying call.

JTB 22 11:15

Employee Completing report

[Redacted] Date: 11/22/2026

[Redacted] /rescalator inspectors

Figure 8 - Employee Statement (page 4 of 4).

Incident Date: 01/22/2026 Time: 09:05 hours
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Appendix C – Reinstruction Completion Documents RTRA



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Form No. SARE-05-0177
Rail Training Request Form
Rev 0, 05/02/2025



Rail Training Request Form

Use this Form for Reinstruction and Return to Duty

Please Print/Type all information

Employee Name:	Employee Number:	Division:	Assigned Days:	Last Day Worked:
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	A99	T/W	January 22, 2026
RTD Date:	Incident Date:	Incident Type:		
January 30, 2026	January 22, 2026	Improper Rail Movement		
MOR Rule/Violation:	Post Incident (Y/N):	Date Cleared Medical:		
	Yes	January 29, 2026		
Last MICC/Train Certification Date:	RWP Expiration Date:			
August 1, 2025	April 30, 2026			
Requestor's (Name): [REDACTED]				
Brief Synopsis of Incident or Reason Out				
RVO [REDACTED] was involved in an improper rail vehicle movement at Shady Grove platform. The RVO was given a permissive block by the terminal supervisor to go from A38 signal to A28 signal and to contact the interlocking operator. RVO [REDACTED] moved [REDACTED] train and stopped once [REDACTED] noticed that the train in front of [REDACTED] was not moving, already at A28 signal. RVO [REDACTED] contacted the terminal supervisor in the blockhouse via radio and stated that there was a train ahead of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] could not go any further. RVO [REDACTED] moved [REDACTED] train to close to the train ahead and by doing so did not read [REDACTED] alignment correctly, which resulted to [REDACTED] removal of service. Please instruct RVO [REDACTED] that when leaving the terminal into the yard to wait until the train ahead has already moved before moving [REDACTED] train.				

Area Below for Rail Training Personnel Use Only

Date Reported:	Number of Days Trained	Location of Training
02/05/2026	1	CTF
Instruction Provided:		
RVO [REDACTED] was reinstructed on verifying clear track before moving train.		
Trainee:	[REDACTED]	Date: 02/05/26
Instructor:	[REDACTED]	Date: 02/05/26
Rail Training Manager:	[REDACTED]	Date: 2/6/2026
Trainee's Manager:	[REDACTED]	Date: 2/6/2026

This form must be emailed to [REDACTED] immediately upon employees' notification to report to Rail Training.

*Insert N/A to all non-applicable fields

Figure 9 - RVO reinstruction training form.

Incident Date: 01/22/2026 Time: 09:05 hours
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Drafted By: SAFE 711 - 04/05/2026
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 04/30/2026
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 05/07/2026



Rail Training Request Form

Use this Form for Reinstruction and Return to Duty

Please Print/Type all Information

Employee Name:	Employee Number:	Division:	Assigned Days:	Last Day Worked:
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	A99	S/S	January 22, 2026
RTD Date:	Incident Date:	Incident Type:		
January 30, 2026	January 22, 2026	Improper Rail Vehicle Movement		
MOR Rule/Violation:	Post Incident (Y/N):	Date Cleared Medical:		
10.1.4	Yes	January 29, 2026		
Last MICC/Train Certification Date:	RWP Expiration Date:			
September 16, 2024	August 31, 2026			
Requestor's (Name): [REDACTED]				
Brief Synopsis of Incident or Reason Out				
ROS [REDACTED] instructed the gap RVO to move the train in the opposite direction behind the interlocking back onto the platform. ROS [REDACTED] did not receive permission from MICC, as a result of this action the switch was trailed and, he was removed from service.				

Area Below for Rail Training Personnel Use Only

Date Reported: 02/04/2026	Number of Days Trained: 1	Location of Training: CTF
Instruction Provided: ROS [REDACTED] was reinstructed on Improper Rail Vehicle Movement through an interlocking in accordance with MOR 10.1.4.		
[REDACTED]	Signature: [REDACTED]	Date: 02/04/26
[REDACTED]	Signature: [REDACTED]	Date: 02/04/26
[REDACTED]	Signature: [REDACTED]	Date: 2/6/2026
[REDACTED]	Signature: [REDACTED]	Date: 2-6-2026

This form must be emailed to [REDACTED] immediately upon employees' notification to report to Rail Training.

*Insert N/A to all non-applicable fields

Figure 10 - Terminal Supervisor re-instruction training form.

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Drafted By: SAFE 711 - 04/05/2026
Reviewed By: SAFE 710 – 04/30/2026
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 05/07/2026

Appendix D – Why-Tree Analysis




Figure 11 - Why Tree.

Incident Date: 01//22/2026 Time: 09:05 hours
Final Report – Improper Rail Vehicle Movement
E26341

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