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W-0440 – Fatality at U Street Station – January 10, 2023

Document Purpose

This WMSC written report on WMATA Metrorail's safety event investigation and review of Metrorail's findings in accordance with the WMSC Program Standard, in conjunction with the attached Metrorail investigation report that has undergone WMSC staff review, feedback, and Metrorail revision, describes the investigation activities, identifies factors causing or contributing to the accident, and sets forth ongoing, additional, or upcoming corrective actions and further oversight work (such as inspections and audits) as necessary or appropriate. The WMSC's ongoing oversight during the investigative process, including safety event reporting and verification, participation in investigative interviews, data review, consistent communication with the Metrorail investigations team, and feedback on Metrorail's reports leads to further improvements prior to consideration of the reports by WMSC Commissioners for adoption. The WMSC's safety event investigation oversight assures the sufficiency and thoroughness of Metrorail's investigations. The WMSC Commissioners are considering these documents (the WMSC review and Metrorail's investigation report) as a unified item for adoption at the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on September 15, 2026.

WMSC staff recommend adoption of this investigation.

When a fatality occurs within the Metrorail system, the WMSC, in collaboration with WMATA, conducts an investigation to determine causes and contributing factors so that, where possible, mitigations can be implemented to help prevent future occurrences. Between 2023 and 2024, there were 14 such fatalities on the Metrorail system. Of these fatalities, 13 investigations are being presented on September 15, 2026. Investigation reports for these incidents are being considered for adoption in 2026 due to the nature of the events and a review of the WMSC's process for collecting information related to these investigations.

Safety event summary:

On January 10, 2023, a customer died after falling onto the roadway at U Street Station, track 1.

An investigative review of closed-circuit television footage showed that prior to the customer falling to the roadway, they entered U Street Station at 8:16 p.m. The customer walked unsteadily to the platform and sat down on a bench. Approximately 40 minutes later, the customer slid from the bench to the platform floor and began rolling around near the platform edge. At 9:13 p.m., the station manager notified the Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) and the control center and requested that trains enter the station at restricted speed. The radio rail traffic controller made an announcement to all train operators to enter U Street Station at restricted speed. A second station manager arrived on the platform, and the two station managers attempted to keep the customer from rolling onto the roadway. The customer fell to the roadway on track 1 and repositioned themselves between the running rails before stopping movement at 9:26 p.m. The customer did not appear to make contact with the third rail. The station manager immediately notified the control center. Third rail power was de-energized, and train service was suspended at U Street Station. Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) and District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services (DCFEMS) responded and entered the roadway to provide medical attention, including CPR. The customer was removed from the track bed and continued to receive medical attention. DCFEMS provided lifesaving measures but were unsuccessful.

All personnel cleared the roadway, and third rail power was restored at 10:45 p.m.

The probable cause of this safety event was customer unintentionally falling to the roadway

Investigation W-0440 led to specific recommended corrective actions (RCA), including:

- Metrorail developed an initiative to clearly communicate that all personnel are authorized and supported to call 911directly in a life-saving situation.
- WMATA developed a Safety Bulletin reminding employees to be vigilant of persons under the influence.

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety (SAFE)
Office of Safety Investigations (OSI)

FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E23021

Date of Event:	January 10, 2023
Type of Event:	Fatality
Incident Time:	21:26 hours (fall to roadway)
Location:	U Street Station, track 1
Time and How received by SAFE:	21:14 Hours – SAFE/MAC (notified of intoxicated customer)
WMSC Notification Time:	23:14 Hours
Responding Safety Officers:	WMATA: Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP), Office of Safety Oversight (OSO) WMSC: N/A Other: N/A
Rail Vehicle:	None
Injuries:	One – Fatal injury
Damage:	None
Emergency Responders:	Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD), District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services (DCFEMS)
SMS I/A Incident Number:	20230110#105423MX

U Street Station – Fatality

January 10, 2023

Table of Contents

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AED	Automated External Defibrillator
AIMS	Advanced Information Management System
ARS	Audio Recording System
CAP	Corrective Action Plan
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
COMR	Office of Radio Communications
DCFEMS	District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services
MSRPH	Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook
MTPD	Metro Transit Police Department
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
OEP	Office of Emergency Preparedness
OSO	Office of Safety Oversight
ROCC	Rail Operations Control Center
ROIC	Rail Operations Information Center
RTC	Rail Traffic Controller
RTRA	Office of Rail Transportation
SAFE	Department of Safety
SMS	Safety Measurement System
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WMSC	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission
WSAD	Warning Strobe and Alarm Device

Executive Summary

**Note that all times listed are approximate and may contain minor variations due to differences between systems of record. **

On January 10, 2023, a customer died after falling onto the track bed at U Street Station, track 1. At 21:14 hours, an Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Station Manager located at U Street Station reported to the Rail Operations Information Center (ROIC) that a customer was rolling around near the edge of the platform and requested a speed restriction on track 1. ROIC informed the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) Buttons Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) of the report and trains were instructed to enter U Street Station on tracks 1 and 2 at restricted speed. A second Station Manager arrived on the platform and the two attempted to keep the customer from rolling onto the roadway. At 21:26 hours, the customer rolled and fell onto the roadway, track 1. Third rail power was de-energized and train service was suspended at U Street Station.

Video footage showed that the customer was unsteady on their feet when they entered the station by fare evading at the West Mezzanine, before taking a seat on a bench. After sitting on the bench for about 30 minutes, the customer slid off the bench and began to roll around on the platform before falling onto the track bed. Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) and District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services (DCFEMS) responded and entered the roadway to provide medical attention, including CPR.

The customer was removed from the track bed and continued to receive medical attention. DCFEMS provided lifesaving measures but were unsuccessful. Crime Scene Investigators arrived to perform an investigation. At 23:00 hours, trains were restored to normal service.

The probable cause of this event was a customer, suspected to be under the influence of an intoxicating substance, unintentionally falling to the roadway.

Incident Site

U Street Station, track 1

Field Sketch/Schematics



The above depiction is not to scale.

Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this accident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigative Methods

Upon receiving notification of the Fatality on January 10, 2023, SAFE dispatched a cross-functional team to assess the scene and conduct the subsequent investigation. SAFE team members worked with relevant WMATA subject matter experts to review the incident's facts and data.

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Site assessment through video and documents review.

- Formal Interviews – SAFE interviewed two individuals as part of this investigation. The interview included persons present at, during, and after the incident, those directly involved in the response process, and representatives from the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC). SAFE interviewed the following individual:
    - Station Manager – East Mezzanine
    - Station Manager – West Mezzanine

- Documentation Review – Collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in WMATA systems of record. These records include:
    - Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH)
    - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
    - Automated External Defibrillator (AED) Analysis
    - RTRA Supervisor's Report

- MTPD Event Report
- SAFE OEP Incident Response Report

- System Data Recording Review – Collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
  - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback include OPS 3 Radio
  - Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)
  - Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)

Investigation

On January 10, 2023, a customer died after falling onto the track bed at U Street Station, track 1. At 21:14 hours, an RTRA Station Manager located at U Street Station (East Mezzanine) reported to ROIC that a customer was rolling around near the edge of the platform and requested a speed restriction on track 1. ROIC informed the ROCC Button RTC of the report and trains were instructed to enter U Street Station on tracks 1 and 2 at restricted speed. At 21:26 hours, the customer fell onto the roadway, track 1. Third rail power was de-energized and train service was suspended at U Street Station.

Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) revealed that the Station Manager located on the West Mezzanine departed the kiosk at 20:10 hours[1]. At 20:16 hours, the customer entered the station from the street escalator on the west end of station. The customer appeared unsteady on their feet, fare evaded through the ADA gate, walked to the platform, and took a seat on a bench.

At 21:07 hours, the customer slid off the bench, the East Mezzanine Station Manager arrived and tended to the customer, then walked away. A short time later the customer began to roll around on the platform.

The Audio Recording System (ARS), revealed that at 21:13 hours, the East Mezzanine Station Manager contacted MTPD for assistance with the customer. According to the East Mezzanine Station Manager, they observed the customer rolling around on the platform via CCTV, then they contacted ROIC and requested a speed restriction on track 1. The East Station Manager advised the West Mezzanine Station Manager of the event. At 21:15 hours, an ROIC Controller contacted the Buttons RTC to request restricted speed on track 1, the Radio RTC announced to the Train Operators to use restricted speed at U Street Station, tracks 1 and 2.

At 21:19 hours, MTPD was dispatched and the West Mezzanine Station Manager arrived on the platform. At 21:26 hours, the customer fell onto the roadway, track 1 and repositioned themselves between the running rails before stopping movement. The East Mezzanine Station Manager reported an emergency when the customer fell on the roadway and requested to stop all trains on track one at U Street Station. At 21:27 hours, the West Mezzanine Station Manager reported to ROIC that the customer fell on the roadway. The ROIC Controller notified the Buttons RTC that the customer had fallen onto the roadway, track 1.

At 21:28 hours, MTPD arrived at U Street Station and the Radio RTC instructed a Rail Supervisor to report to U Street Station. The East Mezzanine Station Manager requested confirmation that all trains were stopped from entering U Street Station, track 1. They advised that MTPD was attempting to remove the customer from the roadway. The ROIC Controller confirmed that trains

[1] *CCTV reveals the West Mezzanine Station Manager was away from to kiosk for approximately 25 minutes. After ARS review, there is no record of the Station Manager requesting a break at the time.*

were stopped and instructed the Station Manager to change radio channels to Ops 3. Upon arrival at U Street Station platform, MTPD entered the roadway to administer emergency aid to the customer without verification that third rail power was de-energized. A hot stick or Warning Strobe and Alarm Device (WSAD) was not available for MTPD to utilize before entering the roadway. MTPD Officers are RWP certified and authorized to enter the roadway if third rail power is energized. According to the Advanced Information Management System (AIMS), at 21:29 hours, third rail power was de-energized at U Street, track 1 before MTPD entered the roadway.

The Radio RTC designated the East Mezzanine Station Manager as the RTRA Forward Liaison. The Station Manager advised it was safe for trains to move on track 2. MTPD requested DCFEMS to respond. At 21:35 hours, MTPD established Incident Command on the platform at U Street Station. Incident Command requested to verify that third rail power was de-energized on track one. The MAC advised that power was energized on track 1 and DCFEMS were en route. Seconds later, the MAC advised that power was de-energized on track 1 and DCFEMS would verify with a hot stick when they enter the roadway. At 21:36 hours, Incident Command advised that several MTPD Units would enter the roadway with confirmation that power was de-energized. At 21:37 hours, Incident Command instructed MTPD Units to enter the roadway. At 21:41 hours, the Radio RTC announced that trains were single tracking at U Street Station.

At 21:44 hours, DCFEMS arrived at U Street Station and requested train service suspended. At 21:46 hours, the Operations Manager (OM) instructed the Radio RTC to suspend service. The Radio RTC announced to Train Operators that train service was suspended between Mt. Vernon Square and U Street Stations. At 21:46 hours, an ROIC Controller requested shuttle bus service. At 21:47 hours, MTPD reported that DCFEMS utilized a hot stick to confirm that third rail power was de-energized and a WSAD was in place on track 1. At 21:49 hours, a ROIC Controller instructed the East Mezzanine Station Manager to close the station. At 21:50 hours, the customer was removed from roadway to platform.

At 21:51 hours, DCFEMS advised that Unified Command was established at 10th & U Street. At 22:00 hours, the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) arrived at U Street Station. At 22:15 hours, the Rail Supervisor arrived at U Street Station, the Radio RTC instructed the Rail Supervisor to relieve the Station Manager as RTRA Forward Liaison.

At 22:17 hours, the AED was utilized. At 22:22 hours, DCFEMS pronounced the customer deceased. At 22:28 hours, the decedent was transported from the station by DCFEMS. At 22:35 hours, DCFEMS turned over the scene to MTPD. At 22:40 hours, the Office of Safety Oversight (OSO) arrived at U Street Station.

At 22:41 hours, the Rail Supervisor advised ROCC, per MTPD that power could be restored on track 1, trains should continue to bypass U Street Station and the tracks were clear of personnel. According to AIMS, at 22:45 hours, third rail power was restored at U Street, track 1. At 22:48 hours, the Radio RTC announced trains were bypassing U Street Station on tracks 1 and 2.

At 22:55 hours, the WMSC provided an Event Scene Release. At 22:56 hours, the Rail Supervisor advised ROCC, per MTPD that U Street Station was clear to reopen for normal train service. MTPD turned over the scene to RTRA. At 23:00 hours, trains were restored to normal service.

Chronological Event Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, revealed the following timeline:

Time	Description
20:10:52 hours	West Mezzanine Station Manager left the kiosk. [CCTV]
20:16:00 hours	Customer entered the station from the street escalator to West Mezzanine. [CCTV]
20:20:00 hours	Customer fare evaded through ADA gate and walked to platform. [CCTV]
20:28:00 hours	Customer sat down on a bench, mid-platform. [CCTV]
20:35:22 hours	West Mezzanine Station Manager returned to the kiosk. [CCTV]
21:07:00 hours	Customer slid from the bench to the platform floor. [CCTV]
21:07:00 – 21:16:00 hours	Customer began flailing on the ground. East Mezzanine Station Manager arrived on the platform. [CCTV]
21:13:33 hours	East Mezzanine Station Manager notified MTPD. [Phone]
21:14:29 hours	East Mezzanine Station Manager contacted ROIC and reported customer on the platform, requested restricted speed on track one. [Phone]
21:15:16 hours	ROIC Controller contacted the Ops Three desk to request restricted speed on track one. [Phone]
21:15:31 hours	Radio RTC announced restricted speed at U Street Station, tracks one and two. [Radio Ops 3]
21:16:57 hours	East Mezzanine Station Manager radio check to ROIC. [Radio Ops 5]
21:18:17 hours	Radio RTC announced restricted speed at U Street Station, tracks one and two. [Radio Ops 3]
21:19:11 hours	MTPD dispatched Units to U Street Station. [MTPD 1X]
21:20:00 hours	West Mezzanine Station Manager arrived on the platform. [CCTV]
21:26:00 hours	Customer fell to the roadway on track one and repositioned themself between the running rails before stopping movement. [CCTV]
21:26:37 hours	East Mezzanine Station Manager reported “Emergency, the customer fell on the roadway!” They requested to stop all trains on track one at U Street Station. [Ops 5]
21:27:18 hours	East Mezzanine Station Manager reported the customer was still on the roadway laying in the center. [Ops 5]
21:27:20 hours	West Mezzanine Station Manager reported to ROIC that customer fell on the roadway. [Phone]
21:27:45 hours	ROIC Controller advised the East Station Manager that MTPD was on scene. [Ops 5]
21:27:50 hours	ROIC Controller notified Ops three of customer on the roadway, track one. [Phone]
21:28:00 hours	MTPD arrived at platform. [CCTV]
21:28:03 hours	East Mezzanine Station Manager requested confirmation that all trains were stopped from entering U Street Station, track 1. Advised that MTPD was trying to remove the customer from the roadway. ROIC Controller confirmed that trains were stopped and instructed the Station Manager to change to Ops 3. [Ops 5]
21:28:08 hours	Radio RTC instructed a Rail Supervisor to report to U Street Station. [Radio Ops.3]
21:28:49 hours	East Mezzanine Station Manager radio check to ROCC and advised MTPD were on the platform. [Radio Ops 3]
21:29:00 hours	Third rail power was de-energized at U Street, track one. [AIMS]

Time	Description
21:29:07 hours	MTPD requested DCFEMS response. [Phone]
21:29:27 hours	Radio RTC designated the Station Manager as the RTRA Forward Liaison. Station Manager advised it was safe for trains to move on track two. [Radio Ops 3]
21:30:27 hours	Radio RTC announced that there were unauthorized personnel in the roadway at U St. Station, track one. [Radio Ops 3]
21:35:29 hours	MTPD established Incident Command on the platform at U Street Station. [MTPD 2X]
21:35:33 hours	Incident Command: Requested to verify that third rail power was de-energized on track one. MAC: Advised that power was energized on track one and DCFEMS was en route. [MTPD 2X]
21:35:53 hours	Incident Command: Requested to verify that third rail power was de-energized on track one. MAC: Advised that power was de-energized on track one and DCFEMS would verify with a hot stick when they enter the roadway. [MTPD 2X]
21:36:50 hours	Incident Command: Advised that several MTPD Units would enter the roadway with confirmation that power was de-energized. [MTPD 2X]
21:37:21 hours	Incident Command: Instructed MTPD Units to enter the roadway. [MTPD 2X]
21:37:31 hours	Radio RTC advised Train ID 501 located at Shaw-Howard that they would be the first train to single track. [Radio Ops 3]
21:41:37 hours	Radio RTC announced trains were single tracking at U Street Station. [Radio Ops 3]
21:44:00 hours	DCFEMS arrived on platform. [CCTV]
21:44:35 hours	DCFEMS requested train service suspended at U Street Station. [MTPD 2X]
21:46:52 hours	OM instructed RTC to suspend service. [Phone]
21:46:57 hours	ROIC Controller requested shuttle bus service. [Phone]
21:47:31 hours	Radio RTC announced train service suspended between Mt. Vernon Square and U Street Stations. [Radio Ops 3]
21:47:50 hours	MTPD confirmed hot stick and WSAD was in place. [MTPD 2X]
21:49:23 hours	ROIC Controller instructed the East Mezzanine Station Manager to close the station. [Phone]
21:50:00 hours	Customer was removed from roadway to platform. [CCTV]
21:51:45 hours	DCFEMS advised that Unified Command was established at 10th & U Street. [MTPD 2X]
22:00:00 hours	OEP arrived at U Street Station. [OEP Report]
22:10:08 hours	Incident Command requested Crime Scene to respond. [MTPD 2X]
22:15:26 hours	Rail Supervisor arrived at U Street Station. Radio RTC instructed the Rail Supervisor to relieve the Station Manager as RTRA Forward Liaison. [Radio Ops 3]
22:17:04 hours	MTPD advised AED was utilized. [MTPD 2X]
22:20:29 hours	Radio RTC announced train service suspended between Mt. Vernon Square and U Street Stations. [Radio Ops 3]
22:22:00 hours	DCFEMS pronounced the customer deceased. [MTPD 2X]
22:28:00 hours	Customer transported from the platform by DCFEMS. [CCTV]
22:35:11 hours	DCFEMS turned over the scene to MTPD. [MTPD 2X]

Time	Description
22:39:31 hours	Radio RTC advised Train ID 507 & 512 that they would be the first trains to single track, on track two. [Radio Ops 3]
22:40:00 hours	OSO arrived at U Street Station. [OSO Report]
22:41:45 hours	Rail Supervisor advised ROCC, per MTPD that power could be restored on track one, trains should continue to bypass U Street Station. Tracks were clear of personnel. [Radio Ops 3]
22:42:20 hours	Radio RTC announced third rail power energization at U Street, track one. [Radio Ops 3]
22:45:40 hours	Third rail power was restored on track one. [AIMS]
22:48:29 hours	Radio RTC announced trains were bypassing U Street Station on tracks one and two. [Radio Ops 3]
22:54:04 hours	Crime Scene Units arrived on scene. [MTPD 2X]
22:55:00 hours	WMSC provided Event Scene Release. [Phone]
22:56:31 hours	Rail Supervisor advised ROCC, per MTPD that U Street Station was clear to reopen for normal train service. MTPD turned over the scene to RTRA. [Radio Ops 3]

***Note: Times above may vary from other system's timelines based on clock settings and reporting source.*

Office of Systems Maintenance, Office of Radio Communications (COMR)

On January 20, 2023, COMR performed communication testing at U Street Station, details from the testing are as follows:

"All Radio Checks made from tracks 1 and 2 were loud and clear."

Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD)

Adopted from MTPD Event Report:

"The decedent was observed via DVR acting erratic and rolling around on platform, eventually falling onto tracks. MTPD Officers began life-saving measures. Engine 4 responded and continued same. Decedent was pronounced at 2222 hours."

Interview Findings

As part of the investigation launched into the event, SAFE interviewed one Station Manager. The interview identified the following key findings associated with this event. Findings detailed below include reported information from involved personnel and may conflict with other data sources contained in the report.

Station Manager – East Mezzanine

- The Station Manager stated that they began to hear consistent sounds from the platform.
- The Station Manager stated that they walked down to the platform and saw a person sitting by a pylon on the ground.
- The Station Manager stated that they went upstairs to the kiosk to contact MTPD.
- The Station Manager stated that they called ROCC and requested a speed restriction.
- The Station Manager stated that they returned to the customer and the customer began rolling around on the floor in all different directions.
- The Station Manager stated that when the person rolled one way and then the other, their momentum rolled them off of the platform.

- The Station Manager stated that by the time they made it to the ETS box, MTPD were entering the station.
- The Station Manager stated that the MTPD Officer became the On-Scene Commander, and they assisted and remained the RTRA Forward Liaison.
- The Station Manager stated that MTPD administered CPR on the tracks.
- The Station Manager stated that the person was relocated to the platform where EMS performed CPR.

Station Manager – West Mezzanine

- The Station Manager stated that the East Mezzanine Station Manager called them on the intercom and said there was a customer downstairs rolling around on the floor and that he called Transit and was going down to the platform, they grabbed their radio and went to meet the Station Manager.
- The Station Manager stated that that they were on the platform for 12-13 minutes waiting for Transit to arrive. The Station Manager stated that that as soon as the guy rolled off the platform, transit was coming from the escalator on the east side.
- The Station Manager stated that Transit jumped down on the roadway, they made sure that the power was off.
- The Station Manager stated that they began to close the station and they were told to close the gate to get the people out.
- The Station Manager stated that the EMT's arrived about 5 minutes after Transit and started working on the customer. They then took them out of the station.

Automated Information Management System (AIMS)



Figure 1 - Third rail power de-energized at 21:29 hours; Blue block in place at 21:54 hours; Third rail power restored at 22:45 hours.

Weather

On January 10, 2023, at the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature as 40°F, with passing clouds. This event occurred within a tunneled section of the rail system. Weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: NOAA – Location: Washington, DC.)

Related Rules and Procedures

SOP 1A – Command, Control and Coordination of Emergencies on the Rail System

Human Factors

Fatigue

Signs and Symptoms of Fatigue

The biomathematical fatigue modeling application (SAFTE-FAST Web SFC) was not applied to this event.

Fatigue Risk

The biomathematical fatigue modeling application (SAFTE-FAST Web SFC) was not applied to this event.

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing was not conducted for this event.

Findings

- West Mezzanine Station Manager was away from the kiosk when then customer entered the station.
- East Mezzanine Station Manager reported that they were heading to the ETS box when the customer fell on the roadway, which was near the mid-point of the platform. They did not activate the ETS box because they observed MTPD entering the station before they arrived at the ETS box, located beyond the end of the platform.
- Due to the emergent need for first aid and the customer's distance away from the third rail, the MTPD On-Scene Commander authorized personnel to enter the roadway without first verifying third rail power was de-energized.
- MTPD administered Narcan to the customer.
- AED was retrieved and utilized.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- Third rail power was de-energized at U Street Station, track 1.
- MTPD Officers entered the roadway due to the emergent need for first aid.

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause of this event was a customer, suspected to be under the influence of an intoxicating substance, unintentionally falling to the roadway.

Recommended Corrective Actions

Corrective Action Code	Description	Responsible Party	Estimated Completion Date
105432MX_SAFECAPS_SAFE_001	Develop an initiative to clearly communicate that all personnel are authorized and supported to call 911 directly in a lifesaving situation.	SAFE	07/31/2023
105432MX_SAFECAPS_SAFE_002	Develop a Safety Bulletin reminding employees to be vigilant of persons under the influence.	SAFE	07/31/2023

Appendices

Appendix A – Interview Summaries

The below narratives summarize the incident and represent the statements made by the involved individual. As such, times and details may present a conflict with the data contained in systems of record.

RTRA

Station Manager – East Mezzanine

The Station Manager is a WMATA employee with eleven years of service and eight years of experience as a Station Manager. The Station Manager holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 2 certification that expires in October 2023.

Station Manager reported feeling fully alert before the event. They were on duty at U Street Station on the west mezzanine, manning the station when the event occurred. The Station Manager stated that it was a regular day, nothing notable was happening.

The Station Manager stated that they began to hear the sound “woo-woo” and it was a consistent, ongoing basis. The Station Manager stated that they walked down to the platform and eventually saw a person sitting by a pylon on the ground. The Station Manager stated that initially they didn't discover any drug paraphernalia of any kind, which was later discovered, but the person was sitting down on platform on the floor near the pylon, making the sound. The Station Manager stated that they asked the person if they were ok. The person gave them a response (woo-woo) and a yes behind it. The Station Manager stated that they asked which train the person was trying to catch at that point and the person gave a “woo-woo” response and nothing else.

The Station Manager stated that they went upstairs to the kiosk to contact Metro Transit Police, they confirmed that they were sending an officer. The Station Manager stated that they hung up the phone and looked up at the CCTV. They saw that the person had taken off their jacket and their shoes and they were a little bit closer to track one about midway between the center of the platform and the edge of the platform. The Station Manager stated that they called ROIC, informed them of the situation and requested a speed restriction. ROIC confirmed the speed restriction and the Station Manager reported that they would go to the platform and monitor from there.

The Station Manager stated that they called the other station manager on the opposite side of the station and informed them what was going on and asked them to come down and spot them on the platform. The Station Manager stated that they returned to the person and the person was rolling around on the floor in all different directions stating their response (woo-woo).

The Station Manager stated that while monitoring, waiting for transit to arrive, they had to ask the person to roll back away because the person was getting close, but not at the granite edge line. The Station Manager stated that the person rolled around a few more minutes and eventually did roll over to the granite edge line where it was dangerous, and one train had already serviced the platform under restricted speed.

The Station Manager stated that they told the person to move back and they rolled back one more time and the person gave them a pump fake and the response (woo-woo), then rolled the other way. The Station Manager stated that when the person rolled the other way, their momentum made them roll off the platform. When they saw the person rolling off of the platform, they took off

for the ETS Box, while trotting in direction of the ETS Box they called on the radio, stating "emergency, emergency, emergency," a customer was on the tracks, and to stop all train movement.

The Station Manager stated that by the time they made it to the ETS Box, they realized that Transit Police was entering the station heading to the platform from the opposite side of the station. The Station Manager stated that they made it to the ETS Box and realized there was no train movement on track one. The Station Manager stated that they did not activate the mushroom and made contact with the Transit Officer.

The Station Manager stated that the Transit Officer became the On-Scene Commander, and they took over at that point as they assisted them and remained a liaison between central control and what was going on in the station.

The Station Manager stated that Transit was setting up to administer CPR on the track and began CPR on the track. The person was relocated to the platform where EMS performed their CPR process.

Station Manager – West Mezzanine

The Station Manager is a WMATA employee with twenty-one years of service and nineteen years of experience as a Station Manager. The Station Manager holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 2 certification that expires in February 2024.

The Station Manager stated that the East Mezzanine Station Manager called them on the intercom and said there was a guy downstairs rolling around on the floor and that he called Transit and was going down to the platform, they grabbed their radio and went to meet the Station Manager.

The Station Manager stated that they were standing on the platform trying to keep the guy from getting close to the edge. The other Station Manager told the guy to move back the other way a couple times and they did.

The Station Manager stated that that they were on the platform for 12-13 minutes waiting for Transit to arrive. The Station Manager stated that that as soon as the guy rolled off the platform, transit was coming from the escalator on the east side.

The Station Manager stated that Transit jumped down on the roadway, they made sure that the power was off. The East Mezzanine Station Manager calling Central because they had already called it in, so they were talking to Central on the radio.

The Station Manager stated that the AED was on the guy and they said there no shock advised, then started CPR. The Station Manager stated that they began to close the station and they were told to close the gate to get the people out.

The Station Manager stated that they went back upstairs, and the phone was ringing. It was ROIC telling them to close the station. The Station Manager stated that the EMT's arrived about 5 minutes after Transit and started working on the guy, they took them out of the station.
The Station Manager stated that for the break process they call ROIC for personal breaks. If you're going to the restroom, you call in and give the station and if you're checking the platform.

The Station Manager stated that they sometimes are out helping a customer and then go to the restroom. They may not always go back to the kiosk just to call; they have the radio.

The Station Manager stated that you don't call in for the meal break. A meal relief person shows up and then they go to take a break. The Station Manager stated that a lot of stations don't have break rooms and they to eat in the kiosk. The Station Manager stated there’s too many rats in the ancillary rooms. Sometimes they cannot go there for a break because of the rats.

Drafted By: SAFE 707 – 03/09/2023
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 03/09/2023
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 09/13/2023

Appendix B – MTPD Event Report

Event Report

Metro Transit Police Department — **ORI-DCMTP0000**

Type of Report	MTPD CCN	Local Jurisdiction	Local CCN
Closed	2023-00239-001	District of Columbia	

Event Location

Street	Station Acronym	City, State	County	MTP District	Local District
1240 U. St NW	USTR - U STREET	WASHINGTON, DC 20009	D03-District 03	District 1	D03-District 03

Date and Time of Event		Date and Time Reported
From	To	
1/10/2023 9:14:00 PM		1/10/2023 9:14:39 PM

Category

Rail Station, Line or Right-of-Way	On Bus	Property	Other
USTR - U STREET Green		Rail Station	MSA2

Specific Location (Foot Bridge, Kiosk, Platform, Tracks, Etc.)	For Burglary or B&E Only	
Right-of-Way/Track Bed		If Hotel Rule Applies, #Premises or Facilities Entered:

Location Description

Rail Station

Event Information

If Incident Use This Block	Offense #	DEATH REPORT
Incident Classification	Offense Classification	
Incident Description	Description	DEATH REPORT
	Weapon/Force Type of Activity	/

Entry Type: | Number Premises Entered:

Hate Crime Motivation: **None (no bias) (mutually exclusive)**

Bias Motivation

None (no bias) (mutually exclusive)

Offender Suspected of Using:	Modus Operandi (MO):	

Case Status Information	If Case Cleared Exceptionally,	Clearance Date
Case Status (Completed by the Official who signs this report):		

Reporting Officer (Print) / Badge #	Second Officer (Print) / Badge #
[redacted]	

Supervisor's Name (Electronically Approved)	Teletype #	Investigator Notified / ID#
		[redacted]

MTPD Event Report, Page 1 of 4



Victim Information

Other Person Information

Last Name, First MI	Entity Type:	DOB
Doe, John	**Injured**	

Work/School Address – Addl. Contact Info

Age	*Sex*	*Race*	*Ethnicity*	*DL State/Number*
	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	

[redacted]

MTPD Event Report, Page 2 of 4

Property Information

Type	Code	Class	WMATA Owned	Full Description (Include quantity, manufacturer, serial number, size, color, unique features, etc.) Vehicles: Enter Property Type, Code, Classification and Value here. (Describe Vehicle Below)	Age	Fair Market Value	Recovered Value	Recovered Date
Safekeeping (Seized)	**06**			**winter jacket, Red/Black Nike Basketball shoes**				**1/10/2023**
				Value Totals				

Veh. Year	Make	Model	Color	Style	Tag #	State	Year	VIN

Property Recovered Date	# Stolen Vehicles	# Recovered Vehicles	Is any property in custody of a police agency? (If Yes, explain below)
[redacted]			

Property Type (Enter number in the "Type" column above.)
1-None 2-Burned 3-Counterfeit/Forged 4-Damaged/Destroyed 5-Recovered 6-Seized (Drugs Only) 7-Stolen 8-Unknown

Property Description Code (Enter Number in the "Code" column above.)

winter jacket, Red/Black Nike Basketball shoes

Property Classification (Enter letter in the "Class" column above.)

Safekeeping (Seized)

Suspected Drug Type (If this event is a drug case, check up to three applicable boxes and write the estimated amount on the line.)

Note: If more than 3 drug types, select the 2 most important listing amounts. Then select "Over 3 Drug Types", as the third, to represent the remaining drugs.

Has a DVR been requested?

Narrative Information

Decedent was observed via DVR acting erratic and rolling around on platform, eventually falling onto tracks. MTPD ofcs. began life-saving measures. Engine 4 responded and continued same.Decedent was pronounced at 2222hrs.

If second CCN is available, insert here: | Additional Narrative on Supplemental Report

MTPD Event Report, Page 3 of 4

Additional Narrative

On 1/10/2022 at approximately 2120 hrs. MTPD Officers responded to (USTR) for a report of an intoxicated patron on the platform. Shortly after arriving on scene ,Ofcs. [redacted] (I) and Ofc. [redacted] received an update via MTPD communications that said intoxicated subject was now on the track bed. Upon making our way to the platform [redacted] and [redacted] observed the intoxicated subject on the track bed (track 1) and appeared to be unconscious at the time, unable to respond to any of verbal questions and/or dialog. Medics were immediately requested.

MTPD units subsequently entered the roadway after receiving verbal confirmation from ROCC that Power to Track 1 had been de-energized, and immediately initiated life-saving measures, administering 3 doses of NARCAN (12 mg) while simultaneously beginning CPR. The station (WMATA issued) AED was utilized and attached to subject but no-shock was advised and/or delivered. MTPD Ofcs. continued CPR until DC Fire/EMS (Engine 4) arrived on scene at approximately 2143 hrs.

DC Fire/EMS subsequently relieved MTPD personnel from performing life-saving measures while on the track bed, and proceeded to mobilize and move intoxicated subject to the platform where CPR was continued by DC Fire/EMS.

Subject was pronounced deceased on scene at 2222 hrs. by Dr. [redacted]) via communications with DC Medic [redacted]. DC Medic [redacted] the decedent to the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner from the scene at approximately 2240 hrs. [redacted] followed decedent to OCME. [redacted] of the OCME received the decedent upon arrival, reference to said case number 23-00125.

Detective Sergeant [redacted]s contacted MPD Death Investigations. MPD Detective [redacted] responded to the scene but ultimately relinquished the investigation to MTPD.

Detective [redacted] interviewed R/P (Reporting Party/Station Manager) on scene. R/P advised he was conducting a station check when [redacted] observed the subject on the platform behaving erratically, yelling, and rolling on the floor. R/P advised the subject was by himself and that [redacted] did not observe [redacted] enter the station, and was not known to [redacted]. R/P called Transit Police from the kiosk and returned, observing that the decedent had begun rolling toward the granite edge of the platform. R/P attempted to persuade the decedent to move away from the edge, however, [redacted]e rolled back onto the track bed. R/P called ROCC on [redacted] radio while moving toward the emergency call box on the platform, and requested trains cease movement on track one. R/P states [redacted] did not see any movement or clear signs of life from the subject by the time MTPD Officers arrived on the scene, but did not go down on the track bed. R/P further advised [redacted]e did not observe the decedent with anyone at any point in the station and did not observe [redacted] utilize any narcotics while [redacted] had eyes on [redacted].

Detective [redacted] observed/located on the track bed near where the decedent fell was an empty unmarked pill bottle. In the decedent's pocket, a second unmarked pill bottle was located that contained an unknown type and number of pills. A syringe was found on the granite bench near the rest of the decedent's property. No identifying information was located.

A review of station surveillance cameras shows the decedent entering the station by fare evading at approximately 2020 hours. [redacted]e sits on a granite bench at approximately 2028 hours. [redacted] remains on the bench until approximately 2108 hours when [redacted] slides off the bench onto the floor. [redacted] begins waving [redacted]s arms and legs and rolling around. The station manager arrives on the platform at approximately 2117 hours and appears to keep patrons back as the decedent continues rolling around on the floor while also motioning for the decedent to roll away from the edge of the platform. At approximately 2126 hours the decedent rolls off of the platform and onto the roadway. The decedent appears to make contact with both running rails, but not the third rail. At approximately 2127 hours the decedent stops moving while laying between the running rails. Seconds later the first officers arrive on the scene.

MTPD CSS Ofc [redacted] responded and processed the scene and took possession of property belonging to the decedent for safekeeping.

Incident scene was subsequently turned over to Rail Supervisor [redacted]) at approximately 2256 Hrs. Rail Service was suspended at approximately 2127 hrs., and again restored at approximately 2238 hrs.

WMATA OEP [redacted] responded to scene and took possession of WMATA AED utilized on the deceased. TSOC Notification made by SGT. [redacted] on 1/11/23 at 0040 hrs. to [redacted]

At the time of this report, the deceased has not been positively identified and is currently listed as (John Doe).

DVR requested.

MTPD Event Report, Page 4 of 4

Appendix C – OEP Incident Response Report

Submitted by: [redacted]

OEP Office of Emergency Preparedness

SAFE OEP Incident Response Report

Overview

Incident Date/Time: 2023-01-10 2114 hours

Incident Location: U Street Station

Responder 1: [redacted]

MAC 1: [redacted]

MAC 2: [redacted]

Additional Responders: N/A

Incident Type: Person Falls Onto Roadway

Incident Metrics

OPS Channel: OPS 3

MTPD Channels: ["MTPD 2x"]

Bus/Rail Yard Channel: N/A

Initial Incident Time: 2114 hours

Dispatch Time: 2134 hours

Response Time: 2134 hours

On Scene Time: 2200 hours

Disregard Time: 2344 hours

Time of Recovery: 2235 hours

In-Service Time: 2344 hours

Command Est. Time: 2155 hours

Transfer of Command Time: 2256 hours

Incident Personnel

Metro IC: Sgt. [redacted]

Jurisdictional IC: District of Columbia

Fire Liaison ROCC: [redacted]

Forward Liaison (RTRA Supervisor): N/A

Forward Liaison (MTPD): [redacted]

Maintenance Lead (ERT): N/A

Investigations Lead (MTPD): N/A

Investigations Lead (Safety): N/A

Transportation Lead (Bus TFS): [redacted]

OEP Incident Response Report, Page 1 of 2

Submitted by: [redacted]

Incident Overview

Was Power removed: Yes - Supervisory **Red Tag (if applicable):**N/A

Incident Narrative:

Person fell into the roadway.

Incident Successes:

Command was established by MTPD and transferred to a Unified Command once DCFD arrived. Incident switched to an alternate channel and all necessary positions staffed.

Opportunities for Improvement:

First arriving MTPD officers didn't have access to a hot stick to confirm power deenergized. Hot sticks are no longer available by the station manager. DCFD called a priority to IC for train service to be suspended because they were unaware of the interlocking beyond the platform. They thought ROCC was operating trains on incident track and didn't understand the crossover of trains for single tracking. Train service was prolonged suspended because EMS Chief didn't want the vibration of the train to affect the monitor on the patient while trying to get patient confirmed priority 4. Attended both hotwashes by FD and MTPD. Concerns for improvement discussed with both.

OEP Incident Response Report, Page 2 of 2

Appendix D – RTRA Supervisor's Report

RTRA SUPERVISOR REPORT

Date	Incident Time	Incident Location (Station Mezzanine #)	Track/Mezzanine #
01/10/2023	10:15	U Street	1/2

Equipment Number (Train ID & Car Numbers; Escalator/Elevator #)

Incident Description

Person Overdose on the platform

WMATA Personnel Involved	Employee #	Rule Violation?	Home Division	Post Incident
MTPD				
MTPD				
Station Manager		N/a	Greenbelt	N/a

Customer Information (Detailed Information must be recorded on Station Manager Incident Report)

Name	Address	Injury?
John Doe	Unknown	Death
Name	Address	Injury?
Name	Address	Injury?

Fire Department/EMS/Other External Agency Responding (Use Supplemental sheet if necessary)

Arrival Time	Unit Number	Person In Charge	Remarks

Chronological Account of Incident

I arrived at U Street Station at 10:15 pm . Upon my arrival , I became the RTRA Liaison. I got details from Station Manager on what occurred , at the station. He stated a person rolled on to the Roadway. The person was receiving life saving medical treatment , on the platform. I reported to the Incident Command Center to receive my instructions. Once the scene was cleared , I reported to ROCC for Trains to bypass U Street Station. I was then given authority to assume command of the U Street Station , with permission for Normal Service. I informed ROCC to resume Normal Service, and had the Station Managers to reopen the Station Gates. MTPD was still on the scene taking pictures of a bench area with the deceased passenger's belongings. The scene was blocked off with gates. I resumed my normal duties , after getting permission from ROCC.

(Note time for each entry; Include statement of Employee or Witness at conclusion)

Your Arrival Time:

Supervisor Submitting Report	(Payroll #)	Date	Report Reviewed By	Date
		01/11/2023		

Report must be faxed to ROCC 202-962-2808 at end of Tour

RTRA Supervisor's Report, Page 1 of 1

Appendix E - Root Cause Analysis



5 **Root Cause Analysis** WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY