



W-0442 – Collision near Judiciary Square – April 3, 2023

Document Purpose

This WMSC written report on WMATA Metrorail's safety event investigation and review of Metrorail's findings in accordance with the WMSC Program Standard, in conjunction with the attached Metrorail investigation report that has undergone WMSC staff review, feedback, and Metrorail revision, describes the investigation activities, identifies factors causing or contributing to the accident, and sets forth ongoing, additional, or upcoming corrective actions and further oversight work (such as inspections and audits) as necessary or appropriate. The WMSC's ongoing oversight during the investigative process, including safety event reporting and verification, participation in investigative interviews, data review, consistent communication with the Metrorail investigations team, and feedback on Metrorail's reports leads to further improvements prior to consideration of the reports by WMSC Commissioners for adoption. The WMSC's safety event investigation oversight assures the sufficiency and thoroughness of Metrorail's investigations. The WMSC Commissioners are considering these documents (the WMSC review and Metrorail's investigation report) as a unified item for adoption at the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on September 15, 2026.

WMSC staff recommend adoption of this investigation.

When a fatality occurs within the Metrorail system, the WMSC, in collaboration with WMATA, conducts an investigation to determine causes and contributing factors so that, where possible, mitigations can be implemented to help prevent future occurrences. Between 2023 and 2024, there were 14 such fatalities on the Metrorail system. Of these fatalities, 13 investigations are being presented on September 15, 2026. Investigation reports for these incidents are being considered for adoption in 2026 due to the nature of the events and a review of the WMSC's process for collecting information related to these investigations.

Safety event summary:

On April 3, 2023, at 9:11 a.m., a Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) Officer aboard train 120 reported locating a person on the roadway showing no signs of life on track 1 approximately 1,000 feet from Judiciary Square platform.

Prior to locating the person on the roadway, the Station Manager at Judiciary Square contacted the MTPD at 8:10 a.m. and requested assistance for three people on the platform engaged in activities not allowed in the Metrorail system. Two of the customers then began to kick and roll around on the platform floor. Eight minutes later, person #1 walked beyond the end gate on track 2 in the direction of Union Station. At 8:22 a.m., Train 111 was traveling on track 2 from Union Station to Judiciary Square Station when the operator reported seeing person #1 cross through a gap in the tunnel wall from track 2 to track 1. The button rail Traffic controller notified the assistant operations manager. The operator of Train 120 was instructed to hold their location at Gallery Place, track 1. At 8:26 a.m., MTPD reported that the tracks were clear, and person #2, who had a similar clothing description, was being escorted out of the station. The radio rail traffic controller made an announcement that the roadway was clear for normal service.

At 8:30 a.m., after servicing Judiciary Square Station and departing the platform, the train operator of Train 120, now located between Judiciary Square Station and Union Station, on track 1, reported to the control center that they observed person #1 sitting on the third rail coverboard and the train passed them. There was confusion among control



center management because MTPD reported the person had already exited the station. The button rail traffic controller de-energized power at 8:35 a.m., despite the assistant operations manager in the control center instructing them to allow the train to continue. Metrorail procedure requires the de-energization of third rail power when there is a report of an unauthorized person on the roadway. The train operator of Train 120 performed an inspection, walking through the train, looking out of the bulkhead doors, but was unable to locate the person on the roadway. A clear track inspection was reported on track 2 between Union Station and Judiciary Square by the train operator of Train 113. Third rail power was re-energized on track 1 at 8:54 a.m., and Train 120 was instructed to reverse ends and return to Judiciary Square Station's platform.

Train 120 changed its identification number to non-revenue ID 720 and at 9:05 a.m., was instructed to perform a track inspection from Judiciary Square Station to Union Station, track 1, with personnel from MTPD, the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) and rail supervisors aboard the train. Five minutes later, the train operator of Train 720 reported locating the person at Chain Marker (CM) B1 047+00 with no signs of life. MTPD then instructed the Station Manager to close the station. Third rail power was de-energized again, and service was suspended between Gallery Place-Chinatown Station and NoMa-Gallaudet Station on tracks 1 and 2. District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services (DCFEMS) arrived and established Unified Command at 9:33 a.m.

By 12:28 p.m., the person was removed from the roadway, all personnel and equipment were clear and third rail power was energized. Normal service resumed minutes later. Train 720 was transported to Brentwood Rail Yard for inspection.

The train operator and Train 720 were removed from service in accordance with Metrorail policy. WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Program determined that the train operator complied with the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program Policy.

There was no damage to the railcar or the roadway as a result of this event.

The probable cause of this safety event was a person trespassing onto the roadway. Contributing factors included: the person crossing from track 2 to track 1 through a gap in the tunnel wall, confusion among control center management regarding the location of person #1, and MTPD reporting the roadway was clear.

Investigation W-0442 led to specific recommended corrective actions (RCA), including a review of SOP #47 to evaluate if changes are necessary to the procedures when responding to an incident when there's difficulty in determining the location of reported persons on the roadway and communications with all involved parties. No changes were recommended.



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety (SAFE)
Office of Safety Investigations (OSI)

FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E23222

Date of Event:	April 3, 2023
Type of Event:	Fatality
Incident Time:	08:30 Hours
Location:	Between Judiciary Square & Union Station, track 1 Chain Marker (CM) B1 047+00
Time and How received by SAFE:	08:31 Hours – SAFE/MAC
WMSC Notification Time:	10:32 Hours
Responding Safety Officers:	Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP)
Rail Vehicle:	Train ID 120 L7168-7169.7093-7092.7028-7029.7397-7396T
Injuries:	One (1) Fatal
Damage:	None
Emergency Responders:	Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) District of Columbia Fire Department (DCFEMS)
SMS I/A Number	20230403#107381

Between Judiciary Square & Union Station – Fatality

April 3, 2023

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIMS	Advanced Information Management System
ARS	Audio Recording System
CAP	Corrective Action Plan
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
CENV	Office of Car Engineering Vehicles
CM	Chain Marker
CMNT	Office of Car Maintenance
COMR	Office of Radio Communications
DVEU	Digital Video Evidence Unit
MAC	Mission Assurance Coordinator
MSRPH	Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook
MTPD	Metro Transit Police Department
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
RTC	Rail Traffic Controller
RTRA	Office of Rail Transportation
ROCC	Rail Operations Control Center
SAFE	Department of Safety
SMS	Safety Measurement System
SPOTS	System Performance On-Time Summary
VMDS	Vehicle Monitoring and Diagnostic System
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WMSC	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety – Office of Safety Investigations

Executive Summary

**Note that all times listed are approximate and may contain minor variations due to differences between systems of record. **

On Monday, April 3, 2023, at 08:10 hours the Station Manager located at Judiciary Square Station contacted the Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) and requested assistance for three people on the platform loitering and using drugs. The Station Manager described one White/Hispanic male wearing a black jacket and blue jeans with brown shoes laying on the platform.

At 08:22 hours the Train Operator of Train ID 111 (L7306-7307.7061-7060.7220-7221.7499-7498T), located between Union Station and Judiciary Square Station, track 2 reported to the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) that a person (Person #1) was observed on the roadway wearing a black shirt with blue jeans, and they crossed over to track 1. The Radio Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) inquired if the train could be moved safely. The Train Operator replied in the affirmative and then the Radio RTC instructed the Train Operator to continue to Judiciary Square Station at restricted speed. Then they instructed an Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Rail Supervisor to board Train ID 120 located at Gallery Place Station.

The Button RTC notified the Assistant Operations Manager (AOM) and the Rail Operations Information Center (ROIC) of the report from Train ID 111. An ROIC Controller contacted and instructed the Station Manager at Judiciary Square Station to check for a person on the roadway. The Station Manager reported the tracks were clear and MTPD was on scene. The MTPD unit located at Judiciary Square Station advised MTPD Dispatch that the tracks were clear, and a person (Person #2) was being escorted from the station. Normal service was then resumed, with Train ID 120 moving up to Judiciary Square Station on track 1, servicing the station, and continuing towards Union Station.

At 08:30 hours, the Train Operator of Train ID 120 (L7168-7169.7093-7092.7028-7029.7397-7396T) located between Judiciary Square Station and Union Station, track 1 reported to ROCC that the train “passed a person” (Person #1) on the roadway. The Radio RTC asked the Train Operator to confirm their report and the Train Operator repeated that they passed a person sitting on the third rail. The Button RTC de-energized third rail power. The Radio RTC instructed the Train Operator to perform a visual inspection by walking through the train. The Train Operator reported they did not see anything after performing the inspection and third rail power was energized again.

The Button RTC notified the AOM, ROIC and MTPD of the report from Train ID 120. ROIC requested a bus bridge. The Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) and Office of Safety Investigations (OSI) dispatched units to Judiciary Square Station.

MTPD Digital Video Evidence Unit (DVEU) advised that the person (Person #1) was observed walking beyond the end gate at Judiciary Square Station and was not observed exiting the tunnel. At 08:50 hours, the Radio RTC instructed Train ID 113, located at Union Station, track 2 to perform a track inspection to Judiciary Square Station. Train ID 113 reported a clear track inspection.

At 08:54 hours, the Radio RTC instructed Train ID 120 to reverse ends and perform a track inspection back to Judiciary Square Station at restricted speed. Train ID 120 reported a clear track inspection.

At 09:02 hours, MTPD established Incident Command at Judiciary Square Station platform. The Radio RTC instructed the Train Operator of Train ID 120 to change to Train ID 720. At 09:05 hours, Train ID 720 was instructed to perform a track inspection from Judiciary Square Station to Union Station, track 1 with personnel from MTPD, OEP and Rail Supervisors aboard the train.

At 09:10 hours, Train ID 720 reported locating the person (Person #1) at Chain Marker (CM) B1 047+00 with no signs of life. MTPD then instructed the Station Manager to close the station. Third rail power was de-energized. At 09:12 hours, the Mission Assurance Coordinator (MAC) notified the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC) of the event. At 09:14 hours, the AOM notified the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services (DCFEMS) Department of the event. At 09:33 hours, Unified Command was established at 4th Street and Indiana Avenue, NW. Service was suspended between Gallery Place Station and NoMa Station, tracks 1 and 2.

At 12:05 hours, Person #1's body was recovered, and emergency responders and equipment were cleared from the roadway. At 12:24 hours, MTPD reported all personnel clear from the roadway and turned the scene over to RTRA. At 12:28 hours, third rail power was energized. Train ID 720 continued to Brentwood Rail Yard. At 12:47 hours, normal train service resumed.


RTRA removed the Train Operator of Train ID 120/720 from service for post-incident testing. The train consist was removed from service for post-incident inspection. The post-incident inspection of the railcars found no damage to the car body or under-car equipment.

The probable cause of the Fatality event between Judiciary Square Station and Union Station on April 3, 2023, was a person trespassing onto the roadway and subsequently being struck by a train.

Incident Site

900 feet outside of Judiciary Square Station, track 1 at CM B1 047+00.

Field Sketch/Schematics



The above depiction is not to scale.

Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this incident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigation Methods

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Site assessment through video and document review.
- Formal Interviews – SAFE interviewed five individuals as part of this investigation to date. The interviews included persons present at, during, and after the incident, those directly involved in the response process, and representatives from the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC). SAFE interviewed the following individuals:
 - Train Operator (Train ID 111)
 - Train Operator (Train ID 120)
 - Radio Rail Traffic Controller
 - Button Rail Traffic Controller
 - Station Manager (Judiciary Square)
- Informal Interviews – Collected through conversations with individuals during the investigation to provide background and supporting information. Written statements were reviewed from personnel present during the event.
 - Assistant Operations Manager
 - Operations Manager
- Documentation Review – A collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in Metro systems of record. These records include:
 - Employee Training Records
 - Employee Certifications

- Employee 30-Day Work History
 - Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH)
 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
 - Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) Incident Report
 - Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) Hot Wash Summary
 - Maximo Data
- System Data Recording Review – A collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
 - Audio Recording System (ARS) Playback - Radio and Landline Communications
 - Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)
 - System Performance On-Time Summary (Spots)
 - The Office of Car Engineering Vehicles (CENV) Vehicle Monitoring and Diagnostic System (VMDS)
 - Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)

Investigation

On Monday, April 3, 2023, a person wearing a black jacket, blue jeans with brown shoes trespassed onto the roadway and was struck by Train ID 120 between Judiciary Square Station and Union Station, track 1.

Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) indicated that Person #1, wearing a black jacket and blue jeans with brown shoes, entered Judiciary Square Station at 08:01 hours and fare evaded before heading to the platform on track 2. The Station Managers followed Person #1 onto the platform and had a brief conversation with them. Person #1 walked to an area behind the escalator, positioned themselves beside a pylon, then sat down on the platform. Person #1 began to kick and roll around on the platform, then was lying still on the platform next to the pylon.

Person #2 arrived on the platform pushing a bicycle and was wearing a black jacket and gray pants. Person #2 reached down and took something from Person #1. Person #2 stood near the escalator control cabinet and appeared to inject something. Person #2 sat on the platform, the began to kick and roll around on the platform near Person #1.

Person #1 then returned to their feet and walked beyond the end gate onto the roadway on track 2. Person #2 returned to their feet and was met on the platform by an MTPD Officer with a bicycle.



Image 1 – CCTV images of Persons 1 and 2 on the platform at Judiciary Square Station, track 2.

The Audio Recording System (ARS) indicated that at 08:10 hours the Station Manager located at Judiciary Square Station contacted MTPD and requested assistance for three people on the platform loitering and using drugs. The Station Manager described one White/Hispanic Male wearing a black jacket and blue jeans with brown shoes laying on the platform. They also reported that two other males possibly boarded a train and departed the station. At 08:14 hours, MTPD Dispatch instructed Officers to respond to Judiciary Square Station and provided the description of one person provided by the Station Manager.

At 08:22 hours the Train Operator of Train ID 111 located between Union Station and Judiciary Square Station, track 2 reported to ROCC that a person was observed on the roadway wearing a black shirt with blue jeans, and they crossed over to track 1. The Radio RTC acknowledged the report from Train ID 111. The Button RTC notified the AOM and ROIC of the report.



Image 2 – CCTV from Train ID 111 lead car 7306 depicting Person #1 crossing from track 2 to 1 through a gap of the tunnel wall.

At 08:23 hours, the Radio RTC granted a permissive block to Train ID 120 and instructed the Train Operator to hold on the platform at Gallery Place Station. Train ID 120 acknowledged and repeated the instruction. Train ID 111 requested to continue to Judiciary Square Station. The Radio RTC inquired if it was safe for the train to move to the platform. Train ID 111 advised it was safe to move the train to the platform, the Radio RTC granted permission to continue at restricted speed.

ROIC advised the Judiciary Square Station Manager of the report of a person on the roadway and instructed the Station Manager to provide a radio check to Ops 5 and to give an update.

At 08:24 hours, the Radio RTC instructed the Rail Supervisor located at Gallery Place to board Train ID 120 located on track 1. Train ID 120 began to move from Gallery Place Station and was instructed to hold for the Rail Supervisor to board the train.

At 08:25 hours, the Station Manager reported to ROIC their location on the platform and advised that no one was on the tracks. MTPD was also on the scene. ROIC instructed the Station Manager to switch to Ops 1 and relay the report. The Station Manager reported to the Radio RTC that they were located at Judiciary Square on track 1 and repeated their report. The Radio RTC acknowledged the report.

The Radio RTC instructed Train ID 113 located at NoMa Station and Train ID 111 located at Judiciary Square Station, track 2 to hold.

At 08:26 hours, the MTPD ROCC Liaison reported to MTPD Dispatch that a person was reported on the roadway at Judiciary Square and requested that the MTPD Unit at Judiciary Square Station confirm that the tracks were clear. The MTPD Unit responded that the tracks were clear, and Person #2, who had a similar clothing description, was being escorted out of the station.

At 08:27 hours, the Radio RTC advised that the roadway was clear for normal service.

At 08:30 hours, after servicing Judiciary Square Station and departing the platform, the Train Operator of Train ID 120, now located between Judiciary Square Station and Union Station, on track 1, reported to ROCC that they observed Person #1 sitting on the third rail coverboard and the train "passed them." The Radio RTC confirmed with the Train Operator that the train passed Person #1.

At 08:31 hours, the Button RTC notified the AOM and requested to de-energize third rail power. The AOM inquired whether MTPD was on scene. The Button RTC requested to de-energize third rail power under the train. The AOM inquired about what Train ID 120 reported.

The Radio RTC instructed Train ID 101, located at Gallery Place, to hold. The Rail Supervisor reported that they exited Train ID 120 at Judiciary Square Station. The MTPD ROCC Liaison advised MTPD Dispatch of the report of a person on the roadway. The MTPD Unit located at Judiciary Square Station advised they would contact them via landline.

At 08:32 hours, the Button RTC notified ROIC of the report from Train ID 120. The Radio RTC instructed the Train Operator to perform an inspection to try and locate the person.

The Button RTC contacted the AOM and again requested to de-energize third rail power. The AOM advised to hold off on de-energizing third rail power due to MTPD reporting they had a person on the platform, and they were trying to determine why Train ID 120 reported someone on the roadway. The Button RTC advised that the Train Operator would perform an inspection to try and locate the person. The Button RTC requested to de-energized third rail power, there was no response from the AOM.

The MTPD Unit located at Judiciary Square Station reported to the MTPD ROCC Liaison that no one was on the roadway in the station and the Station Managers looked down the tunnel. The MTPD Unit reported that they were with a person on a rideshare bike (Person #2) and they may be the same person, then advised that trains were running in both directions.

At 08:33 hours, OEP dispatched Units to Judiciary Square Station. At 08:34 hours, the AOM advised the Button RTC that MTPD reported no one is on the roadway and instructed to have Train ID 120 to move at restricted speed to Union Station.

At 08:34 hours, the Radio RTC instructed the Train Operator to return to the lead car and move the train at restricted speed to Union Station. The Train Operator advised that they observed the person sitting on the third rail coverboard and inquired if it was safe to move the train. The Radio RTC instructed to Train Operator to continue with the inspection.

At 08:35 hours, the Button RTC de-energized third rail power between Judiciary Square Station and Union Station, track 1 based on the report of the person sitting on the third rail.

08:35:24.462D	04/03/23	Judiciary Sq	B02-41 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED Trip	BY [REDACTED]	AT ctwksr-wkstpp
08:35:24.462D	04/03/23	Union Station	B03-31 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED Trip	BY [REDACTED]	AT ctwksr-wkstpp
08:35:24.681D	04/03/23	Judiciary Sq	B02-B03 Third Rail Power - Deenergize COMPLETED BY [REDACTED]	AT ctwksr-wkstpp	
08:35:25.853D	04/03/23	Union Station	B03-31 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED CHANGE = Tripped		
08:35:25.853D	04/03/23	Union Station	B03-31 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED Prohibit Close BY SYSTEM	AT ctsc-hostapva	
08:35:26.790D	04/03/23	Judiciary Sq	B02-B03 Third Rail Power CURRENT STATE = Deenergize		
08:35:27.790D	04/03/23	Judiciary Sq	B02-41 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED CHANGE = Tripped		
08:35:27.790D	04/03/23	Judiciary Sq	B02-41 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED Prohibit Close BY SYSTEM	AT ctsc-hostapva	

Table 1 – AIMS Data detailing third rail de-energization between Judiciary Square and Union Stations, track 1.

At 08:38 hours, MTPD DVEU reported to the MTPD ROCC Liaison that they observed a person walking beyond the end gate at Judiciary Square, track 2 and not returning to the platform.

ROIC contacted BOCC and requested a bus bridge. The Radio RTC instructed Train ID 113 located at Union Station, track 2 to offload and prepare to perform a track inspection between Union Station and Judiciary Station.

At 08:39 hours, the Button RTC notified MTPD that the Train Operator reported a person sitting on the third rail coverboard. Train ID 120 reported they did not see anything after performing the inspection. At 08:44 hours, the Button RTC contacted the Power Desk and requested third rail to be energized.

At 08:46 hours, the Train Operator contacted the Button RTC via cellular phone, advised they were having radio communication issues and reported the person was sitting on the third rail coverboard and they immediately stopped the train. They did not exit the train for a ground walkaround but they looked through the bulkhead and number 9 doors and did not see the person. The Train Operator advised that they were unsure about moving the train. The Button RTC advised ROCC Management that the Train Operator called, then instructed the Train Operator to reverse ends to move the train to Judiciary Square Station.

At 08:47 hours, the Radio RTC instructed Train ID 113 to perform a track inspection between Union Station and Judiciary Station track 2. At 08:48 hours, Train ID 120 reported reversing ends. At 08:49 hours, the Radio RTC announced a power energization alert between Judiciary Square and Union Stations, track 1.

At 08:50 hours, the MTPD ROCC Liaison contacted MTPD DVEU and inquired if the person was observed exiting the tunnel. MTPD DVEU responded they had not observed the person exiting the roadway and were currently reviewing Union Station cameras.

Train ID 113 reported a clear track inspection between Union Station and Judiciary Station track 2.

At 08:51 hours, Train ID 120 reported that they reversed ends and were located in rail car 7396. At 08:52 hours, third rail power was energized between Judiciary Square Station and Union Station, track 1.

08:52:30.426D	04/03/23	Judiciary Sq	B02-41 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED Enable Close BY 046975 AT ctwkspower5pp
08:52:30.426D	04/03/23	Union Station	B03-31 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED Enable Close BY 046975 AT ctwkspower5pp
08:52:31.929D	04/03/23	Judiciary Sq	B02-8 Signal Request Route COMMANDED Cancel Route BY 862538 AT ctwkssr-wkstpp
08:52:35.772D	04/03/23	Ashburn	TRAIN 610 TWC DESTINATION CODE 51 ACCEPTED FROM FIELD
08:52:40.538D	04/03/23	Foggy Bottom	S1A-C04-2 Train Number Input RETURN TO NORMAL CURRENT VALUE = 0
08:52:41.244D	04/03/23	Ashburn	TRAIN 610 TURNBACK ON TRACK N12-N2-1660-63
08:52:43.435D	04/03/23	Foggy Bottom	TWC C04-----2 TRAIN 905 RECEIVED ID 205 DOES NOT MATCH CURRENT ID
08:52:53.281D	04/03/23	Cheverly	TRAIN 452 TWC DESTINATION CODE 21 COMMAND FAILED
08:52:53.281D	04/03/23	Cheverly	TRAIN 452 TWC ID COMMAND FAILED
08:52:58.625D	04/03/23	Dupont Circle	DESTINATION CODE OF TRAIN 103 ON TRACK A03-A2-65 CHANGED BY 862538 AT ctwkssr-wkstpp
08:52:58.625D	04/03/23	Dupont Circle	CONSIST OF TRAIN 103 ON TRACK A03-A2-65 CHANGED BY 862538 AT ctwkssr-wkstpp
08:53:07.063D	04/03/23	Loudoun Gateway	Signal N11-6 COMMANDED Enable Exit BY 047718 AT ctwkssr-wkstpp
08:53:07.625D	04/03/23	Foggy Bottom	S1A-C04-2 Train Number Input RETURN TO NORMAL CURRENT VALUE = 0
08:53:12.625D	04/03/23	Loudoun Gateway	Loudoun Gate ROUTE FROM N11-8 TO N11-6 REQUESTED BY 047718 AT ctwkssr-wkstpp
08:53:12.984D	04/03/23	Loudoun Gateway	N11-8 Signal Request Route COMMANDED Request Route BY SYSTEM AT ctsc-hostapva
08:53:12.984D	04/03/23	Loudoun Gateway	Loudoun Gateway ROUTE N11-8-6 IN PROGRESS
08:53:14.065D	04/03/23	Loudoun Gateway	N11-6 Signal Request Route COMMANDED Request Route BY SYSTEM AT ctsc-hostapva
08:53:16.260D	04/03/23	Loudoun Gateway	N11-8 Signal Request Route COMMANDED Request Route BY SYSTEM AT ctsc-hostapva
08:53:16.260D	04/03/23	Loudoun Gateway	N11-8 Signal Request Fleet COMMANDED Fleet BY SYSTEM AT ctsc-hostapva
08:53:16.885D	04/03/23	Loudoun Gateway	N11-8 Signal Fleeting COMMANDED CHANGE = Fleeted
08:53:17.231D	04/03/23	Union Station	B03-31 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED Close BY 015826 AT ctwkspower3pp
08:53:17.231D	04/03/23	Judiciary Sq	B02-41 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED Close BY 015826 AT ctwkspower3pp
08:53:17.371D	04/03/23	Gallery Pl Up	TRAIN 113 DESTINATION CODE 87 COMMANDED TWC UPDATE
08:53:18.043D	04/03/23	Georgia Av	FE7 Fan Exhaust COMMANDED Exhaust BY 015175 AT ctwkspower9pp
08:53:18.043D	04/03/23	Georgia Av	FE7 Fan On COMMANDED Automatic On BY 015175 AT ctwkspower9pp
08:53:18.871D	04/03/23	Georgia Av	FE7 Fan Status COMMANDED CHANGE = Automatic
08:53:23.856D	04/03/23	Judiciary Sq	B02-41 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED CHANGE = CLOSED
08:53:23.856D	04/03/23	Judiciary Sq	B02-B03 Third Rail Power CURRENT STATE = Energize

Table 2 - AIMS Data detailing third rail energization between Judiciary Square and Union Stations, track 1.

The Operations Manager (OM) instructed the AOM to send Train ID 120 back to offload, perform a track inspection on track 1, and ask Train ID 120 are there any openings where a person can cross from track 1 to 2. If Train ID 120 did not see anyone while traveling back to the platform, they would perform a track inspection from Judiciary Square to Union Station.

The Train Operator contacted the Button RTC via cellular phone, advised they were having radio communication issues, and requested an update. The Train Operator was advised that they were waiting for third rail power to be energized. The Train Operator inquired about moving the train if the person was stuck. The Button RTC asked if they saw anything when they performed their inspection. The Train Operator responded that they did not but there was no clearance on the third rail side, and they did not perform a full ground walkaround [due to the lack of clearance]. The Button RTC advised the Train Operator that there was a report that the person was off of the roadway, and they would have an absolute block to move back to Judiciary Square Station. The Train Operator acknowledged the instruction.

At 08:54 hours, the Radio RTC instructed Train ID 120 to move back to Judiciary Square Station with an absolute block and offload. Train ID 120 arrived at Judiciary Square Station at 08:57 hours.

ROCS SPOTS REPORT

based on up-to-the-second operational performance data from the Rail Operations Control System

Current date/time: Sun Apr 16 18:11:31 2023

Select Platform: and/or Select ID: Leave blank to remove criteria
 and/or Select 4-digit car number: Leave blank to remove criteria
 Select Date: Select Times (0-24HRS): From To

Generate Report

ID	Platform	length	dcode	Right door open	Right door close	dwell	Left door open	Left door close	dwell	Head Arrived	Tail cleared	cars	Travel Time door open to door open
720	B02-1	2	13							08:57:16	09:08:44	7396-7397.7029-7028.7092-7093.7169-7168	-

Table 3 – Spots Report detailing Train ID 120 located at Judiciary Square Station, track 1 at 08:57 hours.

At 09:00 hours, the Train Operator reported a good track inspection and that they were reversing ends again.

At 09:02 hours, MTPD reported establishing incident command on the platform. The Radio RTC instructed the Train Operator of Train ID 120 to change to Train ID 720. At 09:05 hours, Train ID 720 was instructed to perform a track Inspection from Judiciary Square Station to Union Station, track 1 with personnel from MTPD, OEP and Rail Supervisors aboard the train.

At 09:10 hours, Train ID 720 reported locating the person at Chain Marker (CM) B1 047+00 with no signs of life. MTPD then instructed the Station Manager to close the station. This location is approximately 1,000 feet from the end of the platform at Judiciary Square and not visible from the platform.

According to the Track Access Guide, the location of the event is within a Restricted View: Curve with a maximum authorized speed 45 miles per hour.

Union Station	B-03	B-03	072+00	066+00	40
Restricted View: Curve	B-03	B-02	066+00	055+00	40
Clear View	B-03	B-02	055+00	046+00	45
Restricted View: Curve	B-03	B-02	046+00	038+00	45
Clear View	B-03	B-02	038+00	031+00	45
Judiciary Square Station	B-02	B-02	037+00	031+00	45
Interlocking	B-02	B-01	031+00	029+00	45
Restricted View: Curve	B-02	B-01	029+00	018+00	45
Gallery Place Station	B-01	B-01	018+00	012+00	45

Table 4 – Snippet of the Track Access Guide detailing the area of the event located within a Restricted View: Curve.

At 09:12 hours. The Mission Assurance Coordinator (MAC) notified WMSC of the event and third rail power was de-energized.

09:12:50.018D 04/03/23	Union Station	B03-31 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED CHANGE = Tripped
09:12:50.018D 04/03/23	Union Station	B03-31 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED Prohibit Close BY SYSTEM AT ctsc-hostapva
09:12:51.065D 04/03/23	Judiciary Sq	B02-B03 Third Rail Power CURRENT STATE = Deenergize
09:22:37.087D 04/03/23	Judiciary Sq	B02-42 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED Trip BY [REDACTED] AT ctwksr-wkstpp
09:22:37.087D 04/03/23	Union Station	B03-32 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED Trip BY [REDACTED] AT ctwksr-wkstpp
09:22:37.306D 04/03/23	Judiciary Sq	B02-B04 Third Rail Power*- Deenergize COMPLETED BY [REDACTED] AT ctwksr-wkstpp
09:22:37.712D 04/03/23	Eisenhower Av	C14-12 Signal Request Route COMMANDED Request Route BY SYSTEM AT ctsc-hostapva
09:22:38.478D 04/03/23	Union Station	B03-32 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED CHANGE = Tripped
09:22:38.478D 04/03/23	Union Station	B03-32 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED Prohibit Close BY SYSTEM AT ctsc-hostapva
09:22:38.478D 04/03/23	Union Station	B03-36 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED Prohibit Close BY SYSTEM AT ctsc-hostapva
09:22:38.478D 04/03/23	Union Station	B03-B06A Third Rail Power CURRENT STATE = Deenergize
09:22:38.712D 04/03/23	Judiciary Sq	B02-42 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED CHANGE = Tripped
09:22:38.712D 04/03/23	Judiciary Sq	B02-42 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED Prohibit Close BY SYSTEM AT ctsc-hostapva
09:22:38.712D 04/03/23	Judiciary Sq	B02-46 DC Feeder Tie Breaker CURRENT STATE = Racked Out
09:22:38.712D 04/03/23	Judiciary Sq	B02-B04 Third Rail Power CURRENT STATE = Deenergize
09:22:38.712D 04/03/23	Judiciary Sq	B02-B04A Third Rail Power CURRENT STATE = Deenergize
09:22:39.712D 04/03/23	Judiciary Sq	B02-46 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED Prohibit Close BY SYSTEM AT ctsc-hostapva
09:23:01.268D 04/03/23	Union Station	Signal B03-14 COMMANDED Prohibit Exit BY [REDACTED] AT ctwksr-wkstpp

Table 5 - AIMS Data detailing third rail de-energization between Judiciary Square and Union Stations, tracks 1 and 2.

At 09:14 hours, the AOM notified DCFEMS of the event. At 09:33 hours, Unified Command was established at 4th Street and Indiana Avenue, NW. Service was suspended between Gallery Place Station and NoMa Station, tracks 1 and 2. Investigation and recovery activities continued.

At 12:05 hours, Person #1's body, emergency responders and equipment were cleared from the roadway. At 12:11 hours, the Radio RTC announced a power energization alert between Gallery Place and Noma Stations, tracks 1 and 2. At 12:24 hours, MTPD reported all personnel clear from roadway and turned the scene over to RTRA.

At 12:28 hours, third rail power was energized.

12:28:48.122D 04/03/23	Judiciary Sq	B02-41 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED CHANGE = CLOSED
12:28:48.122D 04/03/23	Judiciary Sq	B02-B03 Third Rail Power CURRENT STATE = Energize
12:28:48.169D 04/03/23	Union Station	B03-31 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED CHANGE = CLOSED
12:28:48.169D 04/03/23	Union Station	B03-32 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED CHANGE = CLOSED
12:28:48.169D 04/03/23	Judiciary Sq	B02-B04 Third Rail Power CURRENT STATE = Energize
12:28:48.544D 04/03/23	D & G Junction	D98-40 Signal Request Route COMMANDED Request Route BY SYSTEM AT ctsc-hostapva
12:28:50.126D 04/03/23	Judiciary Sq	B02-42 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED CHANGE = CLOSED
12:28:53.563D 04/03/23	Union Station	B03-33 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED CHANGE = CLOSED
12:28:53.563D 04/03/23	Union Station	B03-43 DC Feeder Tie Breaker COMMANDED CHANGE = CLOSED
12:28:53.563D 04/03/23	Union Station	B03-B05 Third Rail Power CURRENT STATE = Energize
12:28:57.753D 04/03/23	Judiciary Sq	B02-46 DC Feeder Tie Breaker UNCOMMANDED CHANGE = CLOSED
12:28:57.753D 04/03/23	Judiciary Sq	B02-B04A Third Rail Power CURRENT STATE = Energize
12:28:59.472D 04/03/23	Takoma	TRAIN 155 TURNBACK ON TRACK B07-1BTN
12:29:00.191D 04/03/23	Union Station	B03-36 DC Feeder Tie Breaker UNCOMMANDED CHANGE = CLOSED
12:29:00.191D 04/03/23	Union Station	B03-B06A Third Rail Power CURRENT STATE = Energize

Table 6 – AIMS Data detailing third rail energization between Judiciary Square and Union Stations, tracks 1 and 2

Train ID 720 continued to Brentwood Rail Yard. At 12:47 hours, normal train service resumed.




Figure 1 – AIMS Playback depicting Train IDs 155 and 115 servicing Judiciary Square Station after normal service resumes.

The Office of Car Engineering Vehicles/Vehicle Monitoring and Diagnostic System (CENV/VMDS) performed an inspection of the train consists involved and provided the following analysis:

“CENV completed reviewing the Event Recorder data from car 7306, lead car in Train ID 111, the train responded to the operator commands and operated as designed, no anomalies were found. CENV completed data analysis from car 7168 (Train ID 120), the train functioned as designed, no anomalies were found.”

During the formal interview, the Train Operator of Train ID 111 stated that the event occurred during their second round trip headed towards Shady Grove after they departed Union Station. When the train departed Union Station, there is a curve. The speed commands were between 30-35 miles an hour. The train was coming out of the curve, they turned the high beam lights on because they saw someone walking 300 feet ahead of the train. The Train Operator stated that the person was a white male with dark hair, had on a black sweatshirt, blue jeans and had a cell phone in their hand. The person crossed over to track one through an opening in the tunnel wall and went out of sight. The Train Operator stated that they contacted ROCC and reported an unauthorized individual on the railroad. ROCC instructed them to stop the train and asked whether it safe to move the train. They replied yes, it is safe to move the train because the person was on track 1 now. The Train Operator stated that ROCC instructed them to move to Judiciary Square at restricted speed.

During the formal interview, the Train Operator of Train ID 120 stated that they heard an operator report something on the roadway and heard them say that they saw somebody on the roadway. When the train departed Gallery Place Station, the train lost speed commands and they contacted ROCC. ROCC instructed a supervisor to board the train and pull it back to the platform, then

ROCC told them to disregard. ROCC instructed them to key up the train and continue in revenue service. After servicing Judiciary Square, they departed from the platform at normal speed. As the train turned the corner, they noticed someone on the roadway. They stated that they reported that the person was struck by the train; however, audio recordings of the radio transmissions found that they initially reported “the guy was sitting on the third rail...just passed him. He was walking down the tracks...he was standing by the third rail, sitting by the third rail.” Review of communications on the Ops 1 radio channel did not identify them explicitly reporting a person struck by train.

Post-incident inspection of the railcars found no damage to the car body or undercar equipment.

Chronological ARS Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, revealed the following timeline:

Time	Description
08:01:30 hours	Person #1 wearing a black jacket, blue jeans with brown shoes entered the station. [CCTV]
08:02:30 hours	Person #1 standing beside pylon on the platform. [CCTV]
08:06:13 hours	Person #1 sitting beside the pylon on the platform [CCTV]
08:07:46 hours	Person #1 kicking and rolling around on the platform. [CCTV]
08:10:34 hours	Person #2 with a bike wearing a black jacket and gray pants takes something from Person #1. [CCTV]
08:10:34 hours	<u>Station Manager</u> : Reported three people on the platform loitering and doing drugs. One White/Hispanic wearing a black jacket, blue jeans with brown shoes laying on the platform and 2 black males possibly boarded the train. <u>MTPD SOCC</u> : Acknowledged and advised Units would respond. [SOCC 5A Phone]
08:11:23 hours	Both Persons #1 and #2 kicking and rolling around on the platform. [CCTV]
08:14:01 hours	<u>MTPD Dispatch</u> : Instructed Units to respond to Judiciary Square for White/Hispanic wearing a black jacket, blue jeans with brown shoes laying on the platform. <u>MTPD Unit</u> : Responded, en route. [MTPD 1X]
08:18:08 hours	Person #1 walks beyond the end gate on track 2. [CCTV]
08:22:27 hours	<u>Train ID 111</u> : Reported someone on the roadway unauthorized. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged and inquired at Judiciary Square, track 2. <u>Train ID 111</u> : Reported the person switched to track 1. White male, black sweatshirt, and blue jeans. Heading towards Union Station. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. [Ops 1]
08:22:58 hours	<u>ROCC Button RTC</u> : Reported to AOM person on the roadway at Judiciary Square. [Redline 1 Phone]
08:23:10 hours	<u>ROCC Button RTC</u> : Reported to ROIC person on the roadway at Judiciary Square. [Redline 1 Phone]

Time	Description
08:23:13 hours	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Provided a permissive block Train ID 120 to Gallery Place, track 1 and hold. <u>Train ID 120</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Ops 1]
08:23:31 hours	<u>Train ID 111</u> : Requested to continue. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Inquired if it was safe to move the train to the platform. <u>Train ID 111</u> : Advised it was safe to move the train to the platform. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Granted permission to move the train to Judiciary Square, track 2 at restricted speed. <u>Train ID 111</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Ops 1]
08:23:35 hours	<u>ROIC Controller</u> : Contacted the Station Manager at Judiciary Square and advised someone on the roadway on track 1. <u>Station Manager</u> : Advised, they would check. <u>ROIC Controller</u> : Instructed to check and give a radio check to Ops 5. <u>Station Manager</u> : Reported, the area was clear. <u>ROIC Controller</u> : Acknowledged. [ROIC Lead Phone]
08:23:58 hours	MTPD Unit with bike made contact with Person #2 on the platform. [CCTV]
08:24:38 hours	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Requested the location of a Rail Supervisor. <u>Rail Supervisor</u> : Responded Gallery Place. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Instructed to board the train on track 1. <u>Rail Supervisor</u> : Reported the trailing end of the train was on the platform. Inquired if the train would hold. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Inquired why Train ID 120 did not hold. <u>Train ID 120</u> : Responded they were instructed to hold at Union Station. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Instructed the Rail Supervisor to board the train to move it back onto the platform. [Ops 1]
08:25:03 hours	<u>Station Manager</u> : Reported, located on the platform; no one on the track and MTPD was on the scene. <u>ROIC Controller</u> : Acknowledged. Instructed to switch to Ops 1 and relay the information. <u>Station Manager</u> : Acknowledged. [Ops 5]
08:25:42 hours	<u>Station Manager</u> : Reported located at Mezzanine 23, on track 1 no one on the track and MTPD was on scene. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Ops 1]
08:26:17 hours	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Instructed Train ID 113 to hold at NoMa Station and Train ID 111 to hold at Judiciary Square Station. <u>Train ID 111</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Ops 1]
08:26:46 hours	<u>MTPD ROCC</u> : Reported to Dispatch a person on the roadway at Judiciary Square. Inquired, MTPD Unit to confirm tracks were clear. <u>MTPD Unit</u> : Reported, tracks were clear and was escorting the person out of the station. <u>MTPD Dispatch</u> : Acknowledged. [MTPD 1X]
08:27:14 hours	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Instructed the Rail Supervisor to disregard the instructions and advised that the roadway was clear for normal service. <u>Rail Supervisor</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Ops 1]

Time	Description
08:28:04 hours	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Instructed Train ID 113 to hold 1 minute, then continue. <u>Train ID 113</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Ops 1]
08:30:30 hours	<u>Train ID 120</u> : Reported the guy was sitting on the third rail. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Requested, repeat. Inquired, you see someone on the roadway. <u>Train ID 120</u> : Advised, just passed him walking down the track. Reported, the train was stopped. He was standing by the third rail – sitting by the third rail. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Inquired, have you passed the person. <u>Train ID 120</u> : Reported, passed the person. The train is stopped <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Confirmed, you have passed the person. <u>Train ID 120</u> : Responded, affirmative. [Ops 1]
08:31:05 hours	<u>ROCC Button RTC</u> : Reported, person back on the roadway. <u>AOM</u> : Inquired, how MTPD is there. <u>ROCC Button RTC</u> : Responded, “If I drop power it’s going to be under the train.” <u>AOM</u> : Inquired, what are they reporting. [Ops 1 RD Phone]
08:31:09 hours	Station Manager looked beyond the end gate into the tunnel from the platform. [CCTV]
08:31:34 hours	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Instructed, Train ID 101 to hold at Gallery Place. <u>Train ID 101</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Ops 1]
08:31:45 hours	<u>Rail Supervisor</u> : Reported, exited the train at Judiciary Square Station. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. [Ops 1]
08:31:53 hours	<u>MTPD ROCC</u> : Reported, customer back on the roadway. <u>MTPD Unit</u> : Responded, they would give a landline phone call. [MTPD 1X]
08:31:57 hours	<u>ROCC Button RTC</u> : Reported, person on the roadway at Judiciary Square. <u>ROIC</u> : Acknowledged. [Ops 1 RD Phone]
08:32:00 hours	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Instructed, look out the cab window and see if you can see the customer. <u>Train ID 120</u> : Advised, it’s dark. Cannot see the person. Inquired, key down, walk back and look through the door to see if he’s there. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Confirmed, you have passed the person. <u>Train ID 120</u> : Responded, affirmative. [Ops 1]

Time	Description
08:32:45 hours	<u>ROCC Button RTC</u>: Advised, I'm about to drop power under the train. <u>AOM</u>: Inquired: "what are they reporting?" <u>ROCC Button RTC</u>: Responded, someone in the roadway, the train passed them, don't know where he is. <u>AOM</u>: Inquired: "who reported it; MTPD is on the platform." <u>ROCC Button RTC</u>: Responded, Train ID 120 track 1 approaching Union Station. Inquired: "Do you want power dropped?" <u>AOM</u>: Advised, hold tight MTPD had someone on the platform. Trying to figure out why Train ID 120 is reporting someone on the roadway. <u>ROCC Button RTC</u>: Reported, Train Operator was going back to investigate. <u>AOM</u>: Inquired: "Are cars on the platform?" <u>ROCC Button RTC</u>: Responded, no. The Train Operator is going to check. Inquired: "Do you want power dropped?" <u>AOM</u>: Inquired: "What is he doing? A ground walkaround?" <u>ROCC Button RTC</u>: Advised, the Train Operator was checking for a customer on the roadway. <u>AOM</u>: Inquired: "How is he checking? Sticking his head out the window?" <u>ROCC Button RTC</u>: Responded, walking through the train and looking between the bulkhead doors. <u>AOM</u>: Responded, ok. <u>ROCC Button RTC</u>: Inquired: "Do you want power dropped?" <u>AOM</u>: No response. [Ops 1 RD Phone]
08:32:52 hours	MTPD Unit located at Judiciary Square Station reported to MTPD ROCC no one in the station on the roadway, the Station Managers looked down the tunnel. They were with a person (Person #2) on a rideshare bike and it may be the same person. Trains were running in both directions. [MTPD-544 Phone]
08:32:59 hours	<u>Train ID 120</u>: Provided a radio check on the handset. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u>: Acknowledged and repeated. Advised, loud and clear. Inquired, if the Train Operator copied the transmission. <u>Train ID 120</u>: Responded, transmission not clear. [Ops 1]
08:33:22 hours	MAC dispatched OEP First Responder to Judiciary Square Station. [MAC SAFE Phone]
08:33:23 hours	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u>: Provided a radio check to the Train Operator. <u>Train ID 120</u>: Responded, loud and clear. Advised, going back to investigate. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u>: Acknowledged. [Ops 1]
08:34:09 hours	<u>AOM</u>: Advised, MTPD reported no one is on the roadway. <u>ROCC Button RTC</u>: Acknowledged and repeated. <u>AOM</u>: Instructed, have the train move at restricted speed to Union Station. <u>ROCC Button RTC</u>: Acknowledged. [Ops 1 RD Phone]
08:34:38 hours	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u>: Instructed, head back to the lead car. Restricted speed to Union Station. <u>Train ID 120</u>: Responded, the person was sitting on the third rail. Inquired, if it was safe to move the train. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u>: Instructed to continue with the inspection. <u>Train ID 120</u>: Acknowledged and repeated. [Ops 1]

Time	Description
08:35:24 hours	Button RTC de-energized power between Judiciary Square and Union Station, track 1. [AIMS]
08:38:03 hours	<u>MTPD DVEU</u> : Reported to MTPD ROCC observing a person walking beyond the end gate at Judiciary Square, track 2 and not returning to the platform. [MTPD-544 Phone]
08:38:29 hours	ROIC contacted BOCC and requested a bus bridge. [ROIC Lead Phone]
08:38:36 hours	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Instructed, Train ID 113 located at Union Station, track 2 to offload and prepare to perform a track inspection between Union Station and Judiciary Station. <u>Train ID 113</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Ops 1]
08:39:31 hours	<u>ROCC Button RTC</u> : Advised, Train Operator reported a person sitting on the third rail. <u>MTPD SOCC</u> : Acknowledged. [Ops 1 RD Phone]
08:39:58 hours	<u>Train ID 120</u> : Reported, did not see anything after performing the inspection. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Ops 1]
08:44:13 hours	<u>ROCC Button RTC</u> : Requested, third rail power energized. <u>Power Personnel</u> : Advised, working on the switch order. [Ops 1 RD Phone]
08:46:08 hours	<u>Train ID 120</u> : Reported, using cell phone due to radio communication issues. The person was sitting on the third rail, immediately stopped the train, did not exit the train for a ground walkaround but looked through the bulkhead doors and was unsure whether to move the train. <u>ROCC Button RTC</u> : Instructed to reverse ends to move the train to Judiciary Square Station. Advised, MTPD reported no one was there. Advised, ROCC management of the phone call. <u>Train ID 120</u> : Advised, the person was sitting on the third rail and the train passed them. Acknowledged the instruction to reverse ends. [Ops 1 RD Phone]
08:47:17 hours	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Instructed Train Operator to perform a track inspection between Union Station and Judiciary Station track 2. <u>Train ID 113</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Ops 1]
08:48:05 hours	<u>Train ID 120</u> : Reported, reversing ends. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : No response. [Ops 1]
08:49:52 hours	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Announced, power energization alert between Judiciary Square and Union Stations, track 1. [Ops 1]
08:50:11 hours	<u>MTPD ROCC</u> : Inquired if the person was observed exiting the tunnel. <u>MTPD DVEU</u> : Responded, no. Currently checking Union Station. Will provide an update. <u>MTPD ROCC</u> : Acknowledged. [MTPD 544 Phone]
08:50:21 hours	<u>Train ID 113</u> : Reported, clear track inspection at Judiciary Square Station. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. Instructed continue the track inspection to Gallery Place. <u>Train ID 113</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Ops 1]

Time	Description
08:51:12 hours	<u>Train ID 120</u> : Reported, reversed ends in car 7396. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. Instructed, standby for power energization. <u>Train ID 120</u> : Acknowledged. [Ops 1]
08:51:35 hours	<u>MTPD Unit</u> : Advised, would board the train for a track inspection. <u>MTPD ROCC</u> : Acknowledged. [MTPD 544 Phone]
08:52:30 hours	Power Desk restored power between Judiciary Square and Union Station, track 1. [AIMS]
08:52:45 hours	<u>AOM</u> : Reported, clear on track 2. Inquired, to single track. <u>OM</u> : Instructed, send Train ID 120 back to offload, perform a track inspection on track 1, ask Train ID 120 are there any openings where a person can cross from track 1 to 2. <u>AOM</u> : Inquired, what if it's clear. <u>OM</u> : Responded, if it's clear, go normal. <u>AOM</u> : Inquired if Train ID 120 does not see anyone going back to the platform. <u>OM</u> : Responded, yes. Go back to Judiciary Square offload, track inspection from Judiciary Square to Union Station. If they do not see anyone, go normal. <u>AOM</u> : Acknowledged. [ROCC IT]
08:52:54 hours	<u>Train ID 120</u> : Reported, radio communication issues. Requested an update. <u>ROCC Button RTC</u> : Advised, waiting for power to energize to take the train to the platform. <u>Train ID 120</u> : Inquired, what about if the person was struck? <u>ROCC Button RTC</u> : Inquired, did you see anything? <u>Train ID 120</u> : Advised, no clearance on the third rail side. Did not perform a ground walkaround <u>ROCC Button RTC</u> : Advised, there is a report that the person is off the roadway. <u>Train ID 120</u> : Responded, thank God. <u>ROCC Button RTC</u> : Advised, you have an absolute block to Judiciary Square, track 1 eight car mark. Perform a visual inspection. <u>Train ID 120</u> : Responded, waiting for the train to load and will give a radio check. <u>ROCC Button RTC</u> : Acknowledged. [Ops 1 RD Phone]
08:53:05 hours	<u>Train ID 113</u> : Reported, clear track inspection at Gallery Place Station. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. Instructed go in service at Gallery Place. <u>Train ID 113</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Ops 1]
08:54:49 hours	<u>Train ID 120</u> : Reported, waiting for the train to inaugurate. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. Instructed, absolute block to Judiciary Square and offload. <u>Train ID 120</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Ops 1]
09:00:19 hours	<u>Train ID 120</u> : Reported, good track inspection back to Judiciary Square. Reversing ends for track inspection to Union Station. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. [Ops 1]
09:02:20 hours	MTPD established Incident Command at Judiciary Square Station, track 2 platform. [MTPD 1X]

Time	Description
09:02:54 hours	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Instructed to change Train ID to 720 and perform a track inspection from Judiciary Square to Union Station. <u>Train ID 120</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Ops 1]
09:04:47 hours	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Announced, train service suspended between Judiciary Square and Union Station. [Ops 1]
09:05:46 hours	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Instructed, absolute block to Union Station to perform a track inspection. <u>Train ID 720</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Ops 1]
09:10:26 hours	<u>Train ID 720</u> : Reported locating the person on the roadway. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. <u>Train ID 720</u> : Reported, train keyed down. MTPD on the roadway. <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. [Ops 1]
09:14:00 hours	<u>Incident Command</u> : Instructed the Station Manager to close the station. [MTPD Report]
09:11:03 hours	<u>MTPD Unit</u> : Reported, locating a person showing no signs of life between the third rail and running rail at B1 047+00. <u>MTPD Dispatch</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [MTPD 1X]
09:11:27 hours	<u>OEP Unit</u> : Reported, person located at CM B1 047+00. <u>MAC</u> : Acknowledged. [MAC Safe Phone]
09:12:44 hours	<u>MAC</u> : Reported event to the WMSC [MAC Safe Phone]
09:12:51 hours	Power de-energized between Judiciary Square and Union Station, track 1. [AIMS]
09:14:58 hours	AOM contacted DCFEMS to respond to Judiciary Square Station. [Rail 2 Phone]
09:23:54 hours	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Instructed, Rail Supervisor to hot stick tracks 1 and 2. <u>Rail Supervisor</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Ops 1]
09:22:37 hours	Power de-energized between Judiciary Square and Union Station, track 2. [AIMS]
09:25:13 hours	MTPD advised DCFEMS on scene. [MTPD 1X]
09:33:00 hours	Unified Command was established at 4 th and Indiana Avenue.
09:35:23 hours	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Granted foul time to Rail Supervisor to hot stick tracks 1 and 2. <u>Rail Supervisor</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Ops 1]
09:37:12 hours	<u>Rail Supervisor</u> : Reported, third rail power de-energized on track 1 CM B1 040+00 <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Ops 1]
09:38:22 hours	<u>Rail Supervisor</u> : Reported, third rail power de-energized on track 2 CM B2 040+00 <u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged and repeated [Ops 1]
09:53:35 hours	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Announced, service suspended between Gallery Place and Noma Stations. [Ops 1]
12:11:32 hours	<u>ROCC Radio RTC</u> : Announced, power energization alert between Gallery Place and Noma Stations, tracks 1 and 2. [Ops 1]
12:05:00 hours	All personnel and equipment were cleared from the roadway. [MTPD Report]

Time	Description
12:24:53 hours	MTPD reported all personnel cleared from the roadway and the scene was turned over to RTRA. [MTPD1X]
12:28:48 hours	Power restored between Judiciary Square and Union Station, tracks 1 and 2. [AIMS]
12:42:19 hours	ROCC Radio RTC: Instructed, Train ID 720 to continue with permissive block to Brentwood Yard. [Ops 1]
12:46:03 hours	Train ID 155 serviced Judiciary Square Station, Track 2. [Spots]
12:47:38 hours	Train ID 115 serviced Judiciary Square Station, Track 1. [Spots]

****Note:** Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings and reporting sources.

Interview Findings

As part of the investigation launched into the event, SAFE interviewed five people. The interviews identified the following key findings associated with this event. Findings detailed below include reported information from involved personnel and may conflict with other data sources contained in the report.

RTRA

Train Operator (Train ID 111)

- The Train Operator stated that the event occurred during their second round trip headed towards Shady Grove after they departed Union Station.
- The Train Operator stated that when the train left Union Station there is a curve, the speed commands were between 30-35 miles an hour.
- The Train Operator stated that as the train was coming out of the curve, they turned the high beam lights on because they saw someone walking 300 feet ahead of the train.
- The Train Operator stated that the person was a white male with dark hair, had on a black sweatshirt, blue jeans, and had a cell phone in their hand.
- The Train Operator stated that the person crossed over to track one through an opening in the tunnel wall, the person was no longer in their sight.
- The Train Operator stated that they contacted ROCC and an unauthorized individual on the railroad.
- The Train Operator stated that ROCC instructed them to stop the train and asked if it was safe to move the train. They replied yes, it is safe to move the train. The person was on track 1.
- The Train Operator stated that ROCC instructed them to move to Judiciary Square at restricted speed.

Train Operator (Train ID 120)

- The Train Operator stated that they had picked up the train on the platform at Shady Grove Station; they were not having any issues with the train.
- They heard an operator report something on the roadway and heard them say that they saw somebody on the roadway.
- The Train Operator stated that when the train departed Gallery Place Station, the train lost speed commands and they contacted ROCC.

- The Train Operator stated that ROCC instructed a supervisor to board the train and pull it back to the platform, then ROCC told them to disregard.
- The Train Operator stated that ROCC told them to key up the train and continue in revenue service.
- The Train Operator stated that after servicing Judiciary Square, they departed from the platform at normal speed, as they turned the corner, they noticed someone on the roadway.
- They reported to ROCC that the person was struck by the train¹.

Station Manager

- The Station Manager stated that on the day of the event they spoke with the person when they entered the station since they had been there before.
- The Station Manager stated that the person was irritated and said ok, then went to the platform.
- The Station Manager stated that they thought the person got on the train.
- The Station Manager stated that they went to the platform and looked past the end gate and reported they did not see anyone on the tracks.
- The Station Manager stated that they were confused and had no idea that the person went past the end gate until MTPD told them someone was on the third rail.

ROCC

Radio Rail Traffic Controller (RTC)

- The Radio RTC stated that a train on track 2 [Train ID 111] reported that a person was on the roadway, and they had to stop the train.
- The Radio RTC stated that they asked if the Train Operator could see the person and they responded that the person crossed over to track 1.
- The Radio RTC stated that Rail 3 informed them that the person was off the roadway and on the platform with MTPD and everything was clear.
- The Radio RTC stated that Train ID 120 was leaving Judiciary Square on track 1, then reported that they passed someone on the roadway; not that they hit someone.
- The Radio RTC stated that Rail 3 informed them that the person was clear from the roadway and MTPD had the person on the platform and to let the train continue.
- The Radio RTC stated that the Train Operator continued to check, and power was de-energized by the Button RTC. Power was later energized to move the train back to Judiciary Square.
- The Radio RTC stated that the train offloaded and the Rail Supervisor and MTPD boarded the train for a track inspection. Next, they reported that they found a person with no signs of life.

¹ This statement was not confirmed by a review of radio and phone recordings. No finding of a declarative statement of a person struck by train was identified.

Button Rail Traffic Controller (RTC)

- The Button RTC stated that before the event there was a little confusion because a train on track 2 had called in an unauthorized person on track 2.
- The Button RTC stated that the Train Operator of Train ID 111 called in and said the person went to track one.
- There was confusion because moments later the train on track one called in the unauthorized person.
- The Button RTC stated that they received verbal information from the AOM that there were no persons on roadway, that [MTPD] had apprehended the person, and they were on the platform.
- The Button RTC stated that they were instructed not to drop power because there was no confirmation on whether the person was on the roadway.
- The Button RTC stated that the operator called on the phone and said there's a person on the third rail and they passed them.
- The Button RTC stated that even though they were told not to drop power, they dropped power based on how adamant the operator was about passing the person.
- The Button RTC stated that once the train was back on the platform, the operator came over the air and reported they did not see anything.
- The Button RTC stated that the operator performed a track inspection on track 1 from Judiciary Square to Union Station.
- As the train was performing the inspection, the operator reported that there was a body on the roadway.

Weather

On April 3, 2023, at the time of the incident, NOAA recorded the temperature as 58° F, with some cloud cover. The event occurred within a tunneled section of the rail system. Weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: NOAA – Location: Washington, DC).

Human Factors

Evidence of Fatigue

RTRA

Train Operator (Train ID 111)

We evaluated signs and symptoms of fatigue that may have been present at the time of the incident. No signs or symptoms of fatigue were detected from the available data. Video of the incident was reviewed for signs of the Train Operator's fatigue. No signs or symptoms of fatigue were evident from the video. Train Operator reported feeling fully alert at the time of the incident. Train Operator reported experiencing no symptoms of fatigue in the time leading up to the incident.

Train Operator (Train ID 120)

We evaluated signs and symptoms of fatigue that may have been present at the time of the incident. No signs or symptoms of fatigue were detected from the available data. Video of the incident was reviewed for signs of the Train Operator's fatigue. No signs or symptoms of fatigue were evident from the video. Train Operator reported feeling fully alert at the time of the incident. Train Operator reported experiencing no symptoms of fatigue in the time leading up to the incident.

Station Manager

We evaluated signs and symptoms of fatigue that may have been present at the time of the incident. No signs or symptoms of fatigue were detected from the available data. Video of the incident was reviewed for signs of the Station Manager's fatigue. No signs or symptoms of fatigue were evident from the video. Station Manager reported feeling fully alert at the time of the incident. Station Manager reported experiencing no symptoms of fatigue in the time leading up to the incident.

ROCC

Radio RTC

We evaluated signs and symptoms of fatigue that may have been present at the time of the incident. No signs or symptoms of fatigue were detected from the available data. No signs or symptoms of fatigue were evident from the video. The Radio RTC reported feeling fully alert at the time of the incident. The Radio RTC reported experiencing no symptoms of fatigue in the time leading up to the incident.

Button RTC

We evaluated signs and symptoms of fatigue that may have been present at the time of the incident. No signs or symptoms of fatigue were detected from the available data. No signs or symptoms of fatigue were evident from the video. The Button RTC reported feeling fully alert at the time of the incident. The Button RTC reported experiencing no symptoms of fatigue in the time leading up to the incident.

Fatigue Risk

RTRA

Train Operator (Train ID 111)

We evaluated incident data for fatigue risk factors. No significant risk was identified. The incident time of day did not suggest an increased risk of fatigue-related impairment. The Train Operator reported keeping a regular sleep schedule in the days leading up to the incident. The Train Operator worked one shift in the days leading up to the incident. The Train Operator was awake for 6 hours at the time of the incident. The Train Operator reported 7 hours of sleep in the 24 hours preceding the incident. The off-duty period was 11.58333333 hours which provides an

opportunity for 7-9 hours of sleep. This was more than the Train Operator's usual workday sleep durations. The Train Operator reported no issues with sleep.

Train Operator (Train ID 120)

We evaluated incident data for fatigue risk factors. No significant risk was identified. The incident time of day did not suggest an increased risk of fatigue-related impairment. The Train Operator reported keeping a regular sleep schedule in the days leading up to the incident. The Train Operator worked 0 shifts (Assigned Days Off) in the days leading up to the incident. The Train Operator was awake for 2.5 hours at the time of the incident. The Train Operator reported 9 hours of sleep in the 24 hours preceding the incident. The off-duty period was 58.32 hours which provides an opportunity for 7-9 hours of sleep. This was more than the Train Operator's usual workday sleep durations. The Train Operator reported no issues with sleep.

Station Manager

We evaluated incident data for fatigue risk factors. No significant risk was identified. The incident time of day did not suggest an increased risk of fatigue-related impairment. The Station Manager reported keeping a regular sleep schedule in the days leading up to the incident. The Station Manager worked one shift in the days leading up to the incident. The Station Manager was awake for 5.25 hours at the time of the incident. The Station Manager reported 6 hours of sleep in the 24 hours preceding the incident. The off-duty period was 13.35 hours which provides an opportunity for 7-9 hours of sleep. This was more than the Station Manager's usual workday sleep durations. The Station Manager reported no issues with sleep.

ROCC

Radio RTC

We evaluated incident data for fatigue risk factors. No significant risk was identified. The incident time of day did not suggest an increased risk of fatigue-related impairment. The Radio RTC reported keeping a regular sleep schedule in the days leading up to the incident. The Radio RTC worked 0 shifts (Assigned Days Off) in the days leading up to the incident. The Radio RTC was awake for 5.5 hours at the time of the incident. The Radio RTC reported 6 hours of sleep in the 24 hours preceding the incident. The off-duty period was 63.75 hours which provides an opportunity for 7-9 hours of sleep. This was more than the Radio RTC's usual workday sleep durations. The Radio RTC reported no issues with sleep.

Button RTC

We evaluated incident data for fatigue risk factors. No significant risk was identified. The incident time of day did not suggest an increased risk of fatigue-related impairment. The Button RTC reported keeping a regular sleep schedule in the days leading up to the incident. The Button RTC worked one shift in the days leading up to the incident. The Button RTC was awake for 4.5 hours at the time of the incident. The Button RTC reported 7 hours of sleep in the 24 hours preceding the incident. The off-duty period was 15.75 hours which provides an opportunity for 7-9 hours of sleep. This was more than the Button RTC's usual workday sleep durations. The Button RTC reported no issues with sleep.

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Program determined that the Train Operator of Train ID 120 complied with and was not in violation of the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program 7.7.3/6.

Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)




Figure 2 – Train ID 120 located between B02 and B03, at the site of the incident at 08:30 hours.




Figure 3 – Third rail power de-energized between B02 and B03, track 1 at 08:35 hours.




Figure 4 - Third rail power energized between B02 and B03, track 1 at 08:53 hours




Figure 5 – Train ID 120 located at Judiciary Square Station, track 1 at 08:57 hours.




Figure 6 - Train ID 120 located between B02 and B03, at the site of the incident at 09:09 hours.




Figure 7 - Third rail power de-energized, blue block and human form between B02 and B03, track 1 at 09:11 hours.




Figure 8 - Third rail power de-energized between B02 and B03 on tracks 1 and 2 at 09:23 hours.



Figure 9 – Third rail power energized, and normal service resumed at 12:46:30 hours.

Office of Systems Maintenance, Office of Radio Communications (COMR)

On April 18, 2023, COMR completed communication testing and determined that radio checks performed throughout Judiciary Square Station (Station, Mezzanine and Tracks 1 and 2) were loud and clear.

The Office of Car Engineering Vehicles (CENV) Incident Investigation Team (IIT)

CENV completed reviewing the Event Recorder data from car 7306, lead car in Train ID 111, the train responded to the operator commands and operated as designed, no anomalies were found, attached is the spreadsheet with events before, during and after the incident.

7306 Time of Events				
Time	Event	Location	Speed	MC Position
8:20:44	Train ID 111 Stopped in B03 Track 2 (Inbound) Car 7306 Leading	B03 TRK2 (Union Station)	0	B4 (deadmen "0" released)
8:20:49	Doors Open Left	B03 TRK2 (Union Station)	0	B4 (deadmen "0" released)
8:21:22	Door Close Left	B03 TRK2 (Union Station)	0	B4 (deadmen "0" released)
8:21:33	Train start moving (inbound)	Between B03 and B02 TRK2	2.5mph	P5
8:21:48	Train Moving Inbound	Between B03 and B02 TRK2 (F1/F10)	33.7mph	Coast
8:22:16	Train Moving Inbound	Between B03 and B02 TRK2 (F2/F8)	28.1mph	B5,EM,A/S
8:22:48	Train Stopped	Between B03 and B02 TRK2 (passed F2/F8)	0	B5,EM,A/S Deadman Released)
8:23:20	Train Stopped	Between B03 and B02 TRK2 (passed F2/F8)	0	B5,EM,A/S Deadman "1" Active)
8:24:01	Train Stopped	Between B03 and B02 TRK2 (passed F2/F8)	0	B5,EM,A/S Deadman Released)
8:24:28	Train Stopped (ready to Move)	Between B03 and B02 TRK2 (passed F2/F8)	0	P1-P4
8:25:39	Train Moved inbound with Max speed 15mph to B02	Train Moved to B02	Max 15mph	P1-P4_Cost
8:26:02	Train Stopped (serving the Station)	B02 TRK2 (Judiciary Square)	0	B4 (deadmen "0" released)

Table 7 – Timeline of Events for Train ID 111 (L7306-7307.7061-7060.7220-7221.7499-7498T).

CENV completed data analysis from car 7168 (Train ID 120), the train functioned as designed, no anomalies were found. Based on the Event Recorder data downloaded from the car, attached is the spreadsheet with events before, during and after the incident.

7168 Time of Events					
Time	Event	Location	Limit Speed mph	Actual Speed mph	MC Position
8:23:02	Train approaching B01 (Gallery Place), Car 7168 leading	Approaching B01 (F3/F8)TRK1	45	28	B1-B3
8:23:16	Train entering B01 platform	At First (F4) -B01 TRK1	28	21.6	B1-B3
8:23:30	Train moving into B01 platform	At Second (F4) -B01 TRK1	28	10.6	B1-B3
8:23:38	Train Stopped in B01 BCar marker rain Berthed pushbutton activated (hold for 5-6 sec)	B01 BCar marker	0	0	B1-B3
8:23:43	Train Stopped in B01 BCar marker Train Berthed pushbutton Door Back End Code: High	B01 BCar marker	0	0	B5, EM, A/S Deadman handle released
8:23:45	Train Stopped in B01 BCar marker Door Open Right T/L -1	B01 BCar marker	0	0	B5, EM, A/S Deadman handle released
8:24:04	Train Stopped in B01 BCar marker Door Close Right T/L -1	B01 BCar marker	0	0	B5, EM, A/S Deadman handle released
8:24:14	Train Started moving Direction to B02 TRK1	Just out from B01 TRK1	28	2.5	P1-P4, P5
8:24:24	Train moving Direction to B02 TRK1 (overspeed alarm ON)	Between B01 and B02 TRK1	28	30.1	B1-B3
8:24:26	Train moving Direction to B02 TRK1 (overspeed alarm OFF)	Between B01 and B02 TRK1	28	28.1	Coast, P1-P4
8:24:27	Train moving Direction to B02 TRK1 Speed Limit changed for 28 to 0 (overspeed alarm ON)	Between B01 and B02 TRK1	0	24.681	B4
8:24:40	Train Stopped	Between B01 and B02 TRK1	0	0	B5, EM, A/S Deadman handle released
8:26:23	Train Keyed down from 7168 During the key down Yard Horn/Buzzer was activated 2 times	Between B01 and B02 TRK1	N/A	0	B5, EM, A/S Deadman handle released
8:27:33	Train Keyed up from 7168	Between B01 and B02 TRK1	45	0	B5, EM, A/S Deadman handle released
8:27:54	Train Started moving Direction to B02 TRK1	Between B01 and B02 TRK1	45	3	P1-P4
8:28:28	Train moving Direction to B02 TRK1	First F4 (B02 TRK1)	40	23.5	B1-B3
8:28:40	Train moving Direction to B02 TRK1	Second F4 (B02 TRK1)	40	12.1	B1-B3
8:28:53	Train Stopped at B02 TRK1	B02 BCar marker	0	0	B5, EM, A/S Deadman handle released
Time	Event	Location	Speed	MC Position	
8:28:53 AM	Train fully Stopped, serving the station (7168 Leading -Outbound) Train ID 120	B02 (Judiciary Square) TRK1	0	B5,EM,AUTO	
8:28:56 AM	Door Open Right	B02 (Judiciary Square) TRK1	0	B5,EM,AUTO	
8:29:15 AM	Door Close Right	B02 (Judiciary Square) TRK1	0	B5,EM,AUTO	
8:29:27 AM	Deadman Handle (1), MC moved	B02 (Judiciary Square) TRK1	0	B4	
8:29:31 AM	MC moved (train start moving direction to B03)	B02 (Judiciary Square) TRK1	2mph	P1-P4	
8:29:42 AM	MC moved (train moving direction to B03)	Between B02-B03 TRK1	28.6mph	Coast	
8:29:49 AM	MC moved (train moving direction to B03)	Between B02-B03 TRK1(F1/F10)	29.3mph	B1-B3	
8:29:01 AM	MC moved (train moving direction to B03)	Between B02-B03 TRK1(Passed F1/F10)	28.1mph	Coast	
8:29:52 AM	MC moved (train moving direction to B03)	Between B02-B03 TRK1	28.3mph	P1-P4	
8:29:53 AM	MC moved (train moving direction to B03)	Between B02-B03 TRK1	29.2mph	Coast	
8:29:54 AM	MC moved (train moving direction to B03)	Between B02-B03 TRK1	30.6mph	B1-B3	
8:29:55 AM	MC moved (train moving direction to B03)	Between B02-B03 TRK1	30.9mph	B5,EM,AUTO	
8:30:08 AM	MC B5 position - Deadman Released	Between B02-B03 TRK1	0	B5,EM,AUTO	
8:55:46 AM	Train start moving different direction (Inbound- 7168 Trailing)	Between B02-B03 TRK1	Max speed 6.1mph	N/A	
9:00:23 AM	Train Arrived in B02 (Trk1)	B02 (Judiciary Square) TRK1	0	N/A	
9:05:21 AM	Train keyed up from 7168 (Train ID 120)	B02 (Judiciary Square) TRK1	0	B5,EM,AUTO	
9:06:50 AM	Train started moving outbound	Between B02-B03 TRK1	Max speed 5.3mph	P1-P4	

Table 8 – Timeline of Events for Train ID 120 (L7168-7169.7093-7092.7028-7029.7397-7396T).

Office of Car Maintenance (CMNT)

Both consist under car inspection completed and no damage to car body and under floor equipment. All cars successfully passed Daily Inspection and released for service.

Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA)

RTRA performed an administrative investigation of the event and provided to following:

Based on the information provided the patron intentionally placed himself in the path of the Train ID 120. The operator was told by ROCC to reverse ends and take the train back to the platform at Judiciary Square even after the operator could not find the patron. The operator is now out on Worker's Compensation for the trauma caused by this incident. There were no corrective actions.

Office of Operating Practices (OOP)

OOP has reviewed SOP #47 and is currently modifying the SOP for inclusion into the Metrorail Operating Rulebook.

Related Rules and Procedures

MSRPH SOP 1A – Command, Control and Coordination of Emergencies on the Rail System

MSRPH SOP 2 – Emergency Removal and Restoration of Third Rail Power

MSRPH SOP 26 – Person Hit By A Train

MSRPH SOP 47 – Unauthorized Personnel On The Roadway In Between Stations

Findings

- Persons #1 and #2 entered the station through fare evasion. The Station Manager requested an MTPD response to address concerns of loitering and drug use.
- Person #1 walked past the end gate, which was marked with a universal “No Trespassing” sign at Judiciary Square Station on track 2.
- The Train Operator of ID 111 made the initial report of a person on the roadway on track 2, who then crossed over to track 1. They then advised that they could safely move their train because they no longer saw the person. Train ID 111 arrived on the platform at Judiciary Square without incident.
- MTPD Unit and the Station Manager reported no one on the roadway after encountering Person #2 on the platform.
- Person #1 encountered Train ID 120 approximately 1,000 feet from the platform on the opposite track of where they were first observed.
- Person #1 was located at the end of a curve, sitting on the third rail cover board as Train ID 120 exited the curve at normal track speed for the area.
- Train Operator (Train ID 120) reported passing a person on the roadway after normal service was resumed.
- Button RTC de-energized third rail power as a precaution following the report of a person sitting on the third rail received from Train ID 120.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- Third rail power was de-energized.
- Train Operator performed a visual inspection in an attempt to locate the person.
- MTPD checked local vent shafts.
- Train service was suspended.

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause of the Fatality event between Judiciary Square Station and Union Station on April 3, 2023, was a person trespassing onto the roadway and subsequently being struck by a train.

Recommended Corrective Actions

Corrective Action Code	Description	Responsible Party	Estimated Completion Date
107381_SAFE CAPS_SAFE_ 001	Review of SOP #47 to evaluate if changes are necessary to the procedures when responding to an incident when there's difficulty in determining the location of reported persons on the roadway and communications with all involved parties.	SAFE/OOP	Ongoing

Appendices

Appendix A – Interview Summaries

The below narratives summarize the incident and represent the statements made by the involved individual. As such, times and details may present a conflict with the data contained in systems of record.

RTRA

Train Operator (Train ID 111)

The Train Operator is a WMATA employee with 10 years of service and three months of experience as a Train Operator. The Train Operator holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 2 certification that expires in November 2023.

During the formal interview, the Train Operator stated that they reported on duty at 4:11 am and they take a train out of the yard, the first revenue train at 5:00 am heading towards downtown. The Train Operator stated that they were having a normal day, with no issues and everything was running according to schedule.

The Train Operator stated that the event occurred during their second round trip headed towards Shady Grove after they departed Union Station. The Train Operator stated that when the train left Union Station there is a curve, the speed commands were between 30-35 miles an hour. The Train Operator stated that as the train was coming out of the curve, they turned the high beam lights on because they saw someone walking 300 feet ahead of the train.

The Train Operator stated that they were able to stop the train and the person continued to walk towards the train. The Train Operator stated that the person was a white male with dark hair, had on a black sweatshirt, blue jeans, and had a cell phone in their hand. The Train Operator stated that the person crossed over to track one through an opening in the tunnel wall, and the person was no longer in their sight.

The Train Operator stated that they contacted ROCC and an unauthorized individual on the railroad. The Train Operator stated that ROCC instructed them to stop the train and asked if it was safe to move my train. They replied yes, it is safe to move the train. The person was on track 1. The Train Operator stated that ROCC instructed them to move to Judiciary Square at restricted speed.

Train Operator (Train ID 120)

The Train Operator is a WMATA employee with 19 years of service and eleven years of experience as a Train Operator. The Train Operator holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 2 certification that expires in October 2023.

During the formal interview, the Train Operator stated that they work at the Shady Grove Division and that they are on their second stint of working as a Train Operator for the past 3 years.

The Train Operator stated that their day was going great, and they had just picked up the train on the platform at Shady Grove Station; they were not having any issues with the train.

The Train Operator stated that when they arrived at Gallery Place Station, ROCC told them to hold the train at Union Station and they repeated back the transmission, then departed Gallery Place Station. They heard an operator report something on the roadway and heard them say that they saw somebody on the roadway. The Train Operator stated that when the train left Gallery Place Station, the train lost speed commands and they contacted ROCC. The Train Operator stated that they heard ROCC respond, we told you to hold.

The Train Operator stated that ROCC instructed a supervisor to board the train and pull it back to the platform. The Supervisor never pulled the train back to the platform, ROCC told them to disregard. The Train Operator stated that ROCC told them to key up the train and continue in revenue service.

The Train Operator stated that after servicing Judiciary Square, they departed from the platform at normal speed and as the train turned the corner, they noticed someone on the roadway. They stated that they reported to ROCC that the person was struck by the train. The Train Operator stated that when they encountered the person, they were on the left side as the train turned the corner and the person was right there. The Train Operator stated that it appeared that the person was sitting on the third rail coverboard.

The Train Operator stated that radio communication issues began after the incident.

Station Manager

The Station Manager stated that nothing was out of order during the rush hour time the day was normal. The Station Manager stated that they saw the person enter the station and it was the same person that was in the station the week prior, sitting on a bench, and doing drugs on the platform. On that day they called MTPD, and Medics arrived, the person declined medical attention and MTPD walked them out of the station.

The Station Manager stated that on the day of the event they spoke with the person when they entered the station and told them that they did not want any trouble in the station since they were there before. The Station Manager stated that the person was irritated and said ok, then went to the platform.

The Station Manager stated that they continued to help other customers and the person apparently went past the end gate and was struck by the train. The Station Manager stated that they thought the person got on the train. The Station Manager stated that they were confused and had no idea that the person went past the end gate until MTPD told them someone was on the third rail.

The Station Manager stated that ROCC called and told them to check to see if anyone was on the tracks. The Station Manager stated that they went to the platform with another Station Manager and looked past the end gate and reported they did not see anyone on the tracks. After that, MTPD arrived, and the station was closed.

ROCC

Radio Rail Traffic Controller (RTC)

The Radio RTC is a WMATA employee with 24 years of service and 1.5 years of experience as a Rail Traffic Controller. The Radio RTC holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 4 certification that expires in January 2024.

The Radio RTC stated that they clocked in at 05:45 hours on the day of the event. They were assigned as the Radio Controller.

The Radio RTC stated that a train on track 2 reported that a person was on the roadway, and they had to stop the train. The Radio RTC stated that they asked if the Train Operator could see the person and they responded that the person crossed over to track 1. They told the train located at Gallery Place to hold.

The Radio RTC stated that Rail 3 informed them that the person was off the roadway and on the platform with MTPD and everything was clear.

The Radio RTC stated that Train ID 120 was leaving Judiciary Square, then reported that they passed someone on the roadway, not that they hit someone. The Radio RTC stated that they requested the Train Operator to check to see if the person was on the roadway. At first, the Train Operator said it was too dark, then they checked by looking out of the #9 doors.

The Radio RTC stated that Rail 3 informed them that the person was clear from the roadway and MTPD had the person on the platform and to let the train continue. The Train Operator continued to check, and power was de-energized. Afterwards power was energized to move the train back to Judiciary Square.

The Radio RTC stated that the train offloaded and the Rail Supervisor and MTPD boarded the train for a track inspection. Then they reported that they found a person with no signs of life.

The Radio RTC stated that they felt nervous during the event because it was the first time that something like this event had occurred. The Radio RTC stated that there was a lot of confusion because the Train Operator reported that they passed the person and not that they came in contact with the person. They reported that they were receiving information from supervision that MTPD had the person and that it was clear.

The Radio RTC stated that during the event the Button RTC brought down third rail power. The Button RTC was trying to get approval to bring power down and never got it. The Button RTC decided to just bring the power down. The Radio RTC stated that they thought it was the correct decision because of the confusion and no one would tell the Button RTC whether to bring the power down.

The Radio RTC stated that the event could have gone different and better than it did. When the Train Operator reported they passed someone, the train would usually continue but this one stopped. The Radio RTC believed that there should be more caution taken because it would prevent this from happening. There is too much verification going on before any action is taken.

Button Rail Traffic Controller (RTC)

The Button RTC is a WMATA employee with 27 years of service and 8 years of experience as a Rail Traffic Controller. The Button RTC holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 4 certification that expires in August 2023.

The Button RTC stated that they were working as the Button Controller and was to notify all concerned personnel of the events that were occurring. For example, where to stop trains, red signals and to drop power. The Button RTC stated that they attended a safety briefing that day before taking over the position.

The Button RTC stated that prior to the event, everything was fine until moments before the event. There was a little confusion because a train had called in an unauthorized person on track 2. The Button RTC stated that the Train Operator called in and said the person was then on (moved over to) track one. There was confusion about where the person was and moments later the train on track one called in the unauthorized person.

The Button RTC stated that they received verbal confirmation from the AOM that there were no persons on roadway and MTPD had apprehended the people and they were on the platform. The Button RTC stated that after verifying the person was on the platform with transit, train ID 120 could close and continue after servicing Judiciary Square Station. The Button RTC stated then Train 120 called in an unauthorized person on the roadway, and it all started all over again.

The Button RTC stated that they stopped the oncoming trains, then tried to get confirmation that the person was still on the roadway. The Train Operator reported that they passed them and that they didn't see them anymore. The Button RTC stated that they pulled up power on their screen. They were instructed not to drop power because there was no confirmation on whether the person is on the roadway. Then, they received another report that MTPD had the person back on the platform on track number one. Everyone was trying to figure out what else to do. The Radio RTC was telling the other trains what to do and they were making notifications. The AOM was directly behind them.

The Button RTC stated that the operator called on the phone and said there's a person on the third rail and they passed them. The Train Operator asked, "why are you telling me to reverse?" The Button RTC stated that they received verbal confirmation again from the AOM that the person had been apprehended and was on the platform. The Button RTC stated that they confirmed that transit had the person and they're on the platform. They told the operator, that the person had been apprehended and that they were on the platform.

The Button RTC stated that the operator said the person was on the third rail, he was sitting on the third rail, when the train passed him, and they couldn't see him. The operator was adamant about someone being on the third rail so even though they were told not to drop the power, they did so. After dropping power, the Button RTC was instructed to go to the back of the room and talk to management. They were asked what their thought process was regarding dropping third rail power. The Button RTC stated that they responded that they made the decision to drop power based on how adamant the operator was about passing the person. He clearly saw something.

The Button RTC stated that they were not sure if the operator could get in a transmission, or maybe they didn't hear the transmissions, so they took it upon themselves to call because they couldn't get through.

The Button RTC stated that once the train got back to the platform, the operator came over the air and told us that they did not see anything. There was nothing found, and they were instructed to offload the train. Shuttle bus service had been requested, the operator verified that the train was clear of customers, then they reversed ends. The Button RTC stated that they performed a track inspection on track 1 from Judiciary Square to Union Station. As the train was performing the inspection, the operator reported that there was a body on the roadway. Then they dropped power again.

Assistant Operations Manager (AOM) – Written Statement

“At approximately 08:20 am, prior to train 120 servicing Judiciary Square track one, there was a report of an unauthorized person on the roadway, track one at Judiciary Square. Shortly after, MTPD reported that they had that individual on the platform, and it was safe for train movement at which point train 120, which was holding at B02-02 signal red, was routed into the platform. At approximately 08:30am, OPS 1 Rail Traffic Controllers, notified me that Train 120 Operator reported an unauthorized person on the roadway, track one departing Judiciary Square and that they instructed the Operator to key down and perform a visual inspection while walking through the consist.

I walked to the back of the room and spoke with the ROCC MTPD Liaison and asked him to confirm that MTPD Officers at Judiciary Square still had that customer who was on the roadway prior to train 120 entering the station, on the platform. As I walked back towards OPS 1, the Button RTC notified me that the Operator of train 120 reported he could not see anyone roadway and that the customer was sitting on the third rail coverboard when he passed them, at which point the Button RTC de-energized third rail power on track one.

The Radio RTC instructed the Operator to key down again to perform another visual inspection. Train 113 was instructed to offload at Union Station track two and performed a good track inspection at restricted speed from Union Station to Judiciary Square reporting nothing unusual. MTPD Liaison confirmed that the Officers still had that customer in custody on the platform and that there were no unauthorized persons roadway tracks one and two at Judiciary Square. Train 120 Operator reported no visual of an unauthorized person roadway.

Third rail power was re-energized, the train was moved back to the platform at Judiciary Square while performing a track inspection under an absolute block and offloaded. MTPD and an RTRA Supervisor verified the train clear of customers, boarded the train to perform a track inspection from Judiciary Square to Union Station on track one. During the inspection, a body was located on track one and pronounced DOA. Third rail power was de-energized on both tracks, train service was suspended, and the incident was under investigation.”

Operations Manager (OM) – Written Statement

“I was notified of an unauthorized person roadway at 08:40 hours on April 3, 2023. I was informed that the customer was walking track #1 between Judiciary Sq and Union Station, walking in the

direction of Union Station. It was reported the operator could no longer see the unauthorized person roadway. Power was de-energized only under the train.

I confirmed officers were standing by at Union Station. I confirmed it was safe to restore third rail power and power restoration procedures started. Once power was restored the train moved back to Judiciary Sq to allow the customers access to the platform. Once the train was offloaded, a supervisor and MTPD boarded the train to conduct inspections. The train operator later reported making contacting with the unauthorized customer roadway.”

Appendix B – MTPD Hot Wash Summary

Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

ADMINISTRATION HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

This report will be completed after a debriefing or "hot wash" in accordance with applicable department policies/directives and procedures; at the request of the Chief of Police or designee or following any incident or event requiring the activation of the Incident Command System (ICS). The purpose of the report is to provide information, assess response, identify training, equipment needs, and to identify areas that may require improvement. After completion of this report, it should be forwarded to the Deputy Chief through the chain of command for review.

This report and any attachments are classified as For Official Use Only. This report may be used for emergency incidents, special events, and exercises. Items marked with an asterisk (*) will be completed by the last official designated as the Incident Commander (IC) as there may be more than one IC during the incident.

INCIDENT SUMMARY			
Incident Requiring ICS Activation:	9929 - INJURED/SICK PERSON TO THE HOSPITAL		
*Incident Commander (IC):	[REDACTED]		
MTPD CCN:	2023-02741	Local CCN:	
*Date ICS Initiated:	4/3/2023	*Time ICS Initiated:	8:51:00 AM
*Date ICS Terminated:	4/3/2023	*Time ICS Terminated:	12:25:00 PM
*Duration of Incident:	3.5hr	*Service Disrupted Disrupted Type: Disrupted Time:	Y - Yes 4/3/2023 8:47:00 AM
Incident Location:	435 4th St. NW,	Command Post Location:	Top Side 435 4th St. NW DC
MTPD On-Scene Commander (OSC):	[REDACTED]	Command Aid for OSC:	[REDACTED]
Forward Liaison:	[REDACTED]	Unified Command:	[REDACTED]
OCC Liaison:	[REDACTED]	Alternate Channel:	N - No
Single Tracking Track No.: Time Started: Time End:	N - No	Bus Bridge Established From: To:	Y - Yes GALP UNST

Document 1 – MTPD Hot Wash Summary, Page 1 of 6

Incident Date: 04/03/2023 Time: 08:30 hours
Final Report – Fatality
E23222

Drafted By: SAFE 707 – 06/08/2023
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 06/09/2023
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 06/09/2023

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Inner and/or Outer Perimeter:	Track 1 platform	Power De-energized: De-energized Time:	Y - Yes 4/3/2023 8:47:00 AM
OSC Relinquished Scene Command to Name	Y - Yes [REDACTED]	Medical Attention Required/Requested:	Y - Yes Subject showing no signs of life
Dept:		CID Response: Y - Yes	[REDACTED]

For Official Use Only

The information in this document marked FOUO is the property of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority's Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) to law enforcement, public safety and protection, intelligence officials and individuals with a need to know. Distribution to other entities without prior MTPD authorization is prohibited. Precautions shall be taken to ensure this information is stored and destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. Information bearing the FOUO marking may not be used in legal proceedings without prior authorization from the originator. Recipients are prohibited from posting information marked FOUO on a website or unclassified network.

Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

WMATA and EXTERNAL ON-SCENE PERSONNEL		
Name	Department/Office	Title/Role
[REDACTED]		Patrol
[REDACTED]	DC EMS	EMS
[REDACTED]	DC EMS	EMS
[REDACTED]		Entry/Exit
[REDACTED]	DCFD	Battalion Chief
[REDACTED]		CSS
[REDACTED]		CSS

Document 2 - MTPD Hot Wash Summary, Page 2 of 6

Incident Date: 04/03/2023 Time: 08:30 hours
Final Report – Fatality
E23222

Drafted By: SAFE 707 – 06/08/2023
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 06/09/2023
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 06/09/2023

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██████████		
██████████	Rail	Station Mgr
	DCFD	Engine 4
	DCFD	Engine 2
██████████	Rail	Brentwood Superintendent
██████████	Rail	Rail Supervisor
██████████	ERT	ERT ██████████
██████████	SAFE	Safe
██████████	OEP	OEP ██████████
██████████		On scene
██████████		On Scene

Use separate sheet if additional space is required.

MTPD-OSP-TMPL-009-00

Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

REQUESTS	
*Radio Run Requested (Yes/No):	
If "Yes," location where tape is stored:	

Document 3 - MTPD Hot Wash Summary, Page 3 of 6

Incident Date: 04/03/2023 Time: 08:30 hours
Final Report – Fatality
E23222

Drafted By: SAFE 707 – 06/08/2023 Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 06/09/2023 Approved By: SAFE 71 – 06/09/2023

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*Digital Video Evidence Unit (DVEU) Video Requested (Yes/No):	Y - Yes
If "Yes," location where video is stored:	

OBSERVATIONS

-0827hr ROCC 1 reports a subject on the roadway
-0827hr [REDACTED] on scene
-0834hr DVEU live feed no one observed on tracks
-0842hr Train inspection requested
-0844hr Rail Spvr [REDACTED] witness subject standing on third rail
-0847hr Rail took down power-attempt to bring back up on track 1
-0903hr Request to check vent shafts
-0909hr [REDACTED] to conduct track inspection towards UNST
-0911hr [REDACTED] observed subject w/ no signs of life at B1+047+00
-0914hr Request to close station
-0917hr [REDACTED] took over command from [REDACTED]
-0922hr MAC advised power down on both tracks 1 & 2
-0923hr Request to est. bus bridge between GALP-UNST
-0925hr DCFD Truck 4 on scene
-0934hr DCFD Battalion Chief on scene
-1028hr OCME escorted onto track bed
-1205hr All WMATA personnel & equipment off of tracks
-1206hr Request for MAC to bring power back up
-1225hr Station turned over to rail

Monday, April 3, 2023 at approximately 0827 hours MTPD officers responded to the Judiciary Square Metro Station located at 435 4th St NW Washington, DC, for the report of an individual on the Roadway as provided by the Metro Transit Police Rail Operations Communications Center (MTPD ROCC 1) via MTPD Communications (Channel MTPD 1X).

Document 4 - MTPD Hot Wash Summary, Page 4 of 6

Officer [REDACTED] who was clearing an unrelated call canvassed the station and cleared the train on the Shady Grove platform of the station at approximately 0830 hours.

At approximately 0832 hours, ROCC 1 reported the individual returned to the roadway. The Digital Video Evidence Unit (DVEU) reviewed the live feed with negative results for an individual on the roadway. Further investigation by DVEU revealed a Hispanic Male wearing a black jacket and blue jeans went beyond the end gate on the Track #2 Shady Grove side of the Platform at approximately 0817 hours. DVEU Information Bulletin #23-2281 was disseminated to MTPD [REDACTED] members with an image of the individual matching the description provided.

MTPD & MPD Officers responded to Union Station to canvass the station and await the exit of the individual from the tunnel. Additional MTPD Officers were dispatched to vent shafts between Judiciary Square and Union Station to canvass. Sgt [REDACTED] initially established incident command at Judiciary Square and relinquished command duties to Lieutenant [REDACTED] upon arrival. Sgt [REDACTED] assumed the role of forward liaison.

Sgt [REDACTED] prior to becoming the Forward Liaison requested a train inspection on track 1 from Union Station to Judiciary Square from Officer [REDACTED] and Rail Supervisor [REDACTED] at approximately 0844 hours. Rail Supervisor [REDACTED] advised an individual was witnessed standing on the third rail.

At approximately 0911 hours, Officer [REDACTED] located one individual with no signs of life between the running rails and the third rail approximately 30 feet from marker B1+047+00 while conducting a train inspection between Judiciary Square and Union Station.

A request to establish a bus bridge between Gallery Place and Union Station was set in motion. All patrons were cleared from the Judiciary Square metro station and the incoming patrons were redirected to the bus bridge. Officer [REDACTED] documented all ingoing and outgoing personnel on the entry/exit log

The MTPD Mission Assurance Coordinator (MAC) coordinated the taking down of power on tracks 1 and 2.

Document 5 - MTPD Hot Wash Summary, Page 5 of 6

DC Fire Truck 4 and Engine 2 responded to the scene. Fire Department units set up the ERT cart and entered the roadway. Fire Department WSADs were placed and the Fire Department units responded to the scene of the located individual. Per Procedural announcement, EMS [REDACTED] contacted Dr. [REDACTED] and the individual was pronounced deceased at approximately 0954 hours.

Detectives [REDACTED] responded and conducted CID preliminary investigations.

MTPD Crime Scene Officers [REDACTED] and Officer [REDACTED] responded to the scene, photographed, and conducted on scene investigations. Officer [REDACTED] responded to the Rail Yard at the conclusion of the event for further crime scene investigations.

Units from the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME) responded to the scene, documented, and retrieved the decedent's body.

Once all personnel and equipment were cleared from the roadway and power was requested to be re-energized, the station was turned back over to Superintendent [REDACTED] at 1225 hours.

TSOC NOTIFICATION (TSA 04-10397-23) was made by [REDACTED]

Additional MTPD WSAD's were needed to replace the FD WSAD's

MTPD WSAD's should've already been on scene and ready to replace the FD's after removal

Rail personnel response to the command post was delayed

All responding members performed duties professionally

On Scene Commander's Title, Printed Name, and Signature/Date
[REDACTED]

Document 6 - MTPD Hot Wash Summary, Page 6 of 6

Appendix C – Maximo Work Orders



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Maintenance and Material Management System Work Order Details

Page 1 of 1
MX76PROD

Work Order #: 17782148
Type: CM



Status: CLOSE
04/04/2023 10:37

Work Description: Person struck by a train, 66/246, B02, PUB, JUMP, 120
Job Plan Description:

Work Information									
Asset: R7306	7306, RAIL CAR, KAWASAKI, 7000 AC, A CAR	Owning Office: CMNT-CMNT-CMNT	Parent:						
Asset Tag: R7306		Maintenance Office: CMNT-SDYG-INSP	Create Date: 04/03/2023 16:12						
Asset S/N: 7306		Labor Group: CMNT	Actual Start: 04/03/2023 16:16						
Location: 1136	A99, SHADY GROVE YARD	Crew:	Actual Comp: 04/04/2023 08:37						
Work Location: 1136	A99, SHADY GROVE YARD	Lead:	Item: K18050001						
Failure Class: CMNT001	RAIL CAR	GL Account: WMATA-02-33320-50499160-041-*****-OPR**							
Problem Code: 2649	PASSENGER RELATED PROBLEM	Supervisor:	Target Start:						
Requested By:		Requestor Phone:	Target Comp:						
Chain Mark Start:		Chain Mark End:	Scheduled Start:						
Create-Mileage: 442665.0		Complete-Mileage: 442857.0							
Task IDs									
Task ID									
10	Inspected undercar for damage								
No body fluids, flats, or undercar damage was found.									
Component: 000-300 RAIL CAR; 2K/3K/6K/7K	Work Accompl: INSPECTED	Reason: INCIDENT//ACCIDENT	Status: CLOSE	Position:	Warranty?: N				
Actual Labor									
Task ID	Labor	Start Date	End Date	Start Time	End Time	Approved?	Regular Hours	Premium Hours	Line Cost
10		04/04/2023	04/04/2023	00:30	00:45	Y	00:15	00:00	\$11.99
Total Actual Hour/Labor:							00:15	00:00	\$11.99
Related Incidents									
Ticket	Description	Class	Status	Relationship					
8662333	Person struck by a train, 66/246, B02, PUB, JUMP, 120	SR	INPROG	ORIGINATOR					
Failure Reporting									
Cause	Remedy	Supervisor	Remark Date						
2752	PUBLIC RELATED INCIDENT	3192 TESTED / INSPECTED	04/04/2023						
Remarks: NTF: UNDER CAR INSPECTION COMPLETE, DI PASSED .GOOD FOR SERVICE									

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04/16/2023 09:31

Document 7 – Maximo Work Order 17782148 in relation to Train ID 111 (L7306-7307.7061-7060.7220-7221.7499-7498T), Page 1 of 1

Incident Date: 04/03/2023 Time: 08:30 hours
Final Report – Fatality
E23222

Drafted By: SAFE 707 – 06/08/2023
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 06/09/2023
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 06/09/2023

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Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Maintenance and Material Management System
Work Order Details

Page 1 of 2
MX76PROD

Work Order #: 17782140
Type: CM



Status: CLOSE
04/04/2023 07:19

Work Description: Person struck by a train, 66/246, B02, PUB, JUMP, 120
Job Plan Description:

Work Information									
Asset: R7168	7168, RAIL CAR, KAWASAKI, 7000 AC, A CAR	Owning Office: CMNT-CMNT-CMNT	Parent:						
Asset Tag: R7168		Maintenance Office: CMNT-SDYG-INSP	Create Date: 04/03/2023 16:11						
Asset S/N: 7168		Labor Group: CMNT	Actual Start: 04/03/2023 16:16						
Location:		Crew:	Actual Comp: 04/04/2023 07:14						
Work Location: 1136	A99, SHADY GROVE YARD	Lead:	Item: K18050001						
Failure Class: CMNT001	RAIL CAR	GL Account: WMATA-02-33320-50499160-041.*****.OPR**	Target Start:						
Problem Code: 2649	PASSENGER RELATED PROBLEM	Supervisor:	Target Comp:						
Requested By:		Requestor Phone:	Scheduled Start:						
Chain Mark Start:		Chain Mark End:							
Create-Mileage: 451416.0		Complete-Mileage: 451607.0							
Task IDs									
Task ID									
10	SEE DETAILS								
IN SHOP, PERFORMED SAFETY WALKAROUND AND INSPECTED UNDERCAR FOR DAMAGE, NO DAMAGE FOUND.									
Component: 000-300-B00 SUBSYSTEM; CAR BODY; 2K/3K/6K/7K	Work Accom: INSPECTED	Reason: INCIDENT//ACCIDENT	Status: CLOSE	Position:	Warranty?: Y				
20	Inspected undercar for damage								
No body fluids, flats, or undercar damage was found.									
Component: 000-300 RAIL CAR; 2K/3K/6K/7K	Work Accom: INSPECTED	Reason: INCIDENT//ACCIDENT	Status: CLOSE	Position:	Warranty?: N				
Actual Labor									
Task ID	Labor	Start Date	End Date	Start Time	End Time	Approved?	Regular Hours	Premium Hours	Line Cost
10		04/03/2023	04/03/2023	14:30	15:30	Y	01:00	00:00	\$40.27
20		04/04/2023	04/04/2023	01:00	01:15	Y	00:15	00:00	\$11.99
Total Actual Hour/Labor:							01:15	00:00	\$52.27
Related Incidents									
Ticket	Description	Class	Status	Relationship					
8662333	Person struck by a train, 66/246, B02, PUB, JUMP, 120	SR	INPROG	ORIGINATOR					
Failure Reporting									
Cause	Remedy	Supervisor	Remark	Date					
2752	PUBLIC RELATED INCIDENT	3192 TESTED / INSPECTED		04/04/2023					
WT_plust_woprnt.rptdesign				04/16/2023 09:27					

Document 8 - Maximo Work Order 17782140 in relation to Train ID 120 (L7168-7169.7093-7092.7028-7029.7397-7396T), Page 1 of 2

Incident Date: 04/03/2023 Time: 08:30 hours
Final Report – Fatality
E23222

Drafted By: SAFE 707 – 06/08/2023
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 06/09/2023
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 06/09/2023

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Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Maintenance and Material Management System
Work Order Details

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MX76PROD

Work Order #: 17782140
Type: CM



Status: CLOSE
04/04/2023 07:19

Work Description: Person struck by a train, 66/246, B02, PUB, JUMP, 120

Job Plan Description:

Failure Reporting			
Cause	Remedy	Supervisor	Remark Date
Remarks: NTF UNDER CAR INSPECTED & DI PERFORMED PASSED. GOOD FOR SERVICE			

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04/16/2023 09:27

Document 9 - Maximo Work Order 17782140 in relation to Train ID 120 (L7168-7169.7093-7092.7028-7029.7397-7396T), Page 2 of 2

Incident Date: 04/03/2023 Time: 08:30 hours
Final Report – Fatality
E23222

Drafted By: SAFE 707 – 06/08/2023
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 06/09/2023
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 06/09/2023

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Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Maintenance and Material Management System
Work Order Details

Page 1 of 1
MX76PROD

Work Order #: 17812747
Type: CM



Status: CLOSE
04/19/2023 23:14

Work Description: B02 Safety request Radio Operational test in Station limit and Mezz area, tracks 1&2
Job Plan Description:

Work Information									
Asset: COMMB02 COMM, COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM, B02				Owning Office: COMM-TSSM			Parent:		
Asset Tag:				Maintenance Office: COMM-TSSM-AFLD			Create Date: 04/17/2023 16:10		
Asset S/N: COMM B02				Labor Group: COMMR3RADO			Actual Start: 04/18/2023 07:35		
Location: 6341 B02, JUDICIARY SQUARE, STATION, PLATFORM #2, ROOM W115, COMMUNICATIONS ROOM				Crew:			Actual Comp: 04/18/2023 07:35		
Work Location:				Lead: [REDACTED]			Item: R60000001		
Failure Class: SAMS004 HANDHELD RADIO EQUIPMENT				GL Account: WMATA-02-33540-50499280-042-*****_OPR**					
Problem Code: 2500 NO PROBLEM FOUND				Supervisor: [REDACTED]			Target Start:		
Requested By: 55385				Requestor Phone: [REDACTED]			Target Comp:		
Chain Mark Start:				Chain Mark End:			Scheduled Start:		
Create-Mileage: 0.0				Complete-Mileage: 0.0					
Task IDs									
Task ID									
10 performed radio checks throughout station and all checks were L/C									
Component: Work Accompl: Reason: Status: CLOSE Position: Warranty?: N									
Actual Labor									
Task ID	Labor	Start Date	End Date	Start Time	End Time	Approved?	Regular Hours	Premium Hours	Line Cost
10	[REDACTED]	04/17/2023	04/17/2023	08:00	09:00	Y	01:00	00:00	\$46.60
Total Actual Hour/Labor:							01:00	00:00	\$46.60
Failure Reporting									
Cause	Remedy	Supervisor	Remark Date						
2450 NO DEFECT	3190 TESTED	[REDACTED]	04/18/2023						
Remarks: performed radio checks throughout station and all checks were L/C									

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04/23/2023 10:54

Document 10 - Maximo Work Order 17812747 in relation to COMR radio testing at Judiciary Square Station.

Incident Date: 04/03/2023 Time: 08:30 hours
Final Report – Fatality
E23222

Drafted By: SAFE 707 – 06/08/2023
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 06/09/2023
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 06/09/2023

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Appendix D – Root Cause Analysis

