



W-0443 – Collision at Pentagon City Station – April 15, 2023

Document Purpose

This WMSC written report on WMATA Metrorail's safety event investigation and review of Metrorail's findings in accordance with the WMSC Program Standard, in conjunction with the attached Metrorail investigation report that has undergone WMSC staff review, feedback, and Metrorail revision, describes the investigation activities, identifies factors causing or contributing to the accident, and sets forth ongoing, additional, or upcoming corrective actions and further oversight work (such as inspections and audits) as necessary or appropriate. The WMSC's ongoing oversight during the investigative process, including safety event reporting and verification, participation in investigative interviews, data review, consistent communication with the Metrorail investigations team, and feedback on Metrorail's reports leads to further improvements prior to consideration of the reports by WMSC Commissioners for adoption. The WMSC's safety event investigation oversight assures the sufficiency and thoroughness of Metrorail's investigations. The WMSC Commissioners are considering these documents (the WMSC review and Metrorail's investigation report) as a unified item for adoption at the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on September 15, 2026.

WMSC staff recommend adoption of this investigation.

When a fatality occurs within the Metrorail system, the WMSC, in collaboration with WMATA, conducts an investigation to determine causes and contributing factors so that, where possible, mitigations can be implemented to help prevent future occurrences. Between 2023 and 2024, there were 14 such fatalities on the Metrorail system. Of these fatalities, 13 investigations are being presented on September 15, 2026. The investigations into 9 of these 13 fatalities presented no safety protocol deviations that contributed to the causation of the event. Therefore, there are no corrective measures or mitigations that were identified to prevent recurrence. Investigation reports for these incidents are being considered for adoption in 2026 due to the nature of the events and a review of the WMSC's process for collecting information related to these investigations. The WMSC staff will not present any further details for these reports prior to Commissioner review for adoption due to the sensitive nature of these events. As with all adopted WMSC investigation reports, each of these will also be available for review on our website at wmsc.gov. The WMSC extends its condolences to each family impacted by these events.

Safety event summary:

On April 15, 2023, at 10:28 a.m., the train operator of Train 458 reported to the radio rail traffic controller that their train struck a person on the roadway at Pentagon City Station, track 1. Train 458 was entering the Pentagon City Station platform after servicing Crystal City Station at 34 miles per hour when the train operator saw something on the roadway and depressed the emergency stop button on the train console. The train came to a complete stop with three out of six cars on the platform. Third rail power was de-energized, and the control center immediately contacted emergency services.

An investigative review of closed-circuit television footage determined that prior to the collision, the person entered the roadway at Pentagon City Station, track 1, at 10:24 a.m., and walked into the tunnel in the direction of Crystal City Station.



750 First St. NE • Ste. 900 • Washington, D.C. 20002

Office: 202-384-1520 • Website: www.wmsc.gov

A rail transportation supervisor, who was already at the station, assisted with offloading customers from Train 458 and conducted a ground walkaround but was unable to locate the person on the roadway. Metro Transit Police Department officers arrived at 10:34 a.m., and Arlington County Fire Department (ACFD) personnel arrived at 10:38 a.m. Trains on track 2 bypassed the station.

At 10:54 a.m., ACFD personnel reported that the person was located on track 1, approximately 250 feet outside the platform limits, with no signs of life.

Third rail power was restored on track 1 at 2:05 p.m. to move Train 458 and to conduct further investigation and clean up. Normal service resumed at 4:15 p.m.

The train operator and Train 458 were removed from service in accordance with Metrorail policy. WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Program determined that the train operator complied with the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program Policy.

The probable cause of this safety event was a customer intentionally entering the roadway.

There were no corrective actions as a result of this event.



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety (SAFE)
Office of Safety Investigations (OSI)

FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E23253

Date of Event:	April 15, 2023
Type of Event:	Collision
Incident Time:	10:28 hours
Location:	Pentagon City Station, track 1, Chain Markers (CM) C1 288+42 – C1 316+00
Time and How received by SAFE:	10:30 Hours – SAFE/MAC
WMSC Notification Time:	11:02 Hours
Responding Safety Officers:	WMATA: Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) WMSC: None Other: None
Rail Vehicle:	Train ID 458 L3053-3052.3019-3018.-3082-3083T
Injuries:	One (1) Fatal Injury
Damage:	None
Emergency Responders:	Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD), Arlington County Fire Department (ACFD)
SMS I/A Incident Number:	20230415#107735MX

Pentagon City - Collision

April 15, 2023 Table of Contents

Abbreviations and Acronyms-----	3
Executive Summary -----	4
Incident Site -----	5
Field Sketch/Schematics -----	5
Purpose and Scope -----	5
Investigation Methods-----	5
Investigation -----	6
Chronological ARS Timeline -----	9
Interview Findings-----	14
Written Statement Findings-----	14
Office of System Maintenance, Office of Radio Communications (COMR) -----	14
Office of Car Maintenance (CMNT) -----	14
The Office of Car Engineering Vehicle (CENV) Vehicle Monitoring and Diagnostic Systems (VMDS) -----	15
System Performance On-Time Summary (SPOTS)-----	16
Advanced Information Management System (AIMS) -----	16
Weather -----	17
Human Factors -----	17
Evidence of Fatigue -----	17
Fatigue Risk -----	17
Post-Incident Toxicology Testing -----	17
Work History-----	17
Related Rules and Procedures -----	18
Findings -----	18
Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence -----	18
Probable Cause Statement-----	19
Recommended Corrective Actions -----	19
Appendices -----	20
Appendix A – Interview Summary -----	20
Appendix B – MTPD Hot Wash-----	21
Appendix C – OEP Incident Report -----	25
Appendix D – RTRA Supervisors Incident Report-----	27
Appendix E – RTRA Managerial Incident Investigative Report -----	31
Appendix F – Incident Train Operator’s Written Statement -----	35
Appendix G – Post–Accident/Post-Incident Determination Referral Form -----	38
Appendix H – Maximo Work Orders-----	40
Appendix I – After Action Review -----	43
Appendix J – Why-Tree Analysis -----	46

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACFD	Arlington County Fire Department
AAR	After Action Review
ARS	Audio Recording System
AIMS	Advanced Information Management System
CAP	Corrective Action Plan
CENV	The Office of Vehicle Program Services
CID	Criminal Investigation Unit
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
DVEU	Digital Video Evidence Unit
ICS	Incident Command System
MAC	Mission Assurance Coordinator
MOC	Maintenance Operations Center
MSRPH	Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
RTRA	Office of Rail Transportation
ROCC	Rail Operations Control Center
SAFE	Department of Safety
SPOTS	System Performance On-Time Summary
SMS	Safety Measurement System
VMDS	Vehicle Monitoring and Diagnostic Systems
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WMSC	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety – Office of Safety Investigations

Executive Summary

**Note that all times listed are approximate and may contain minor variations due to differences between systems of record. **

On Saturday, April 15, 2023, at 10:28 hours, a Blue Line Train ID 458 (L3053-3052.3019-3018.-3082-3083T) traveling on track one in the direction of Pentagon City Station; transmitted an emergency broadcast to the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) Radio Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) stating that they “just ran over someone on the roadway.” The RTC asked for Train ID 458’s location and instructed the Operator to key down and offload all customers at Pentagon City Station. The Train Operator advised they had three cars on the platform.

At 10:29 hours, the RTC instructed an Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Rail Supervisor to respond to Pentagon City Station for a report of a person struck by a train.

At 10:30 hours, the Mission Assurance Coordinator (MAC) notified the Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) via radio of a person struck by Train ID 458 on track one, Pentagon City, and power was down on tracks one and two. At 10:32 hours, the MTPD dispatcher notified the Arlington County Fire Department (ACFD) of the incident.

At 10:34 hours, the RTRA Rail Supervisor and an MTPD Officer arrived at the incident scene and were granted foul time to enter the roadway on track one to check for signs of life. At 10:36 hours, the MTPD officer advised that a person was struck on track one and is partially located within the tunnel. At 10:38 hours, the MTPD officer assumed command and removed all personnel from the track bed to preserve the incident scene upon the arrival of the MTPD Criminal Investigation Unit (CID) arrived. A temporary command post was designated on the platform of Pentagon City Station until the recovery process was complete.

At 10:39 hours, the ACFD arrived at Pentagon City Station and established a command post on the street level of Pentagon City Station on 12 Street and Hayes Street. At 10:40 hours, the Digital Video Evidence Unit (DVEU) advised that at 10:23 hours, a male with a red shirt entered the roadway at the platform portal entrance and walked into the tunnel at 10:24 hours.

At 10:41 hours, third rail power was confirmed de-energized on tracks 1 and 2; ACFD initiated recovery efforts and reported that the customer was located on track 1 in a track section approximately 250 feet outside the platform heading towards Washington D.C.

At 10:54 hours, ACFD confirmed an unidentified male showing no signs of life and further reported that EMS unit 111 would manage any further recovery efforts. At 11:02 hours, the MAC notified the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC) of the event.

Recovery efforts continued through the Medical Examiner’s Office and, ultimately, a local funeral home. At 15:33 hours, the customer’s body was recovered, and all emergency personnel and equipment were cleared from the roadway. The Maintenance Operations Center (MOC) coordinated clean-up efforts, and the scene was turned over to RTRA. At 16:15 hours, normal service resumed.

The probable cause of the Collision event at Pentagon City Station on April 15, 2023, was a customer intentionally entering and trespassing on the roadway and subsequently being struck by a train as it approached the station in a tunneled section of the rail system.

250 feet outside of Pentagon City Station platform, track#1.

The diagram illustrates the intersection of the Silver Line and the Orange Line at the Pentagon City C08 station. The Silver Line runs horizontally, with stations Crystal City C09, Pentagon City C08, and Crystal City C09. The Orange Line runs vertically, with stations Crystal City C09, Pentagon City C08, and Crystal City C09. A blue star marks the intersection at Pentagon City C08. The diagram includes track numbers (e.g., 3, 4, 2, 2, 8, 6, 1, 6, 14, 06, 08, 24, 1B, 1A, 02, 04, 20, 1B), track names (Track C2, Track C1), and a note '(14'-00" TC) (DIRECT FIXATION)'.

Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this incident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Upon receiving notification of the Collision event at the Pentagon City Station on April 15, 2023, SAFE dispatched a cross-functional team to assess the scene and conduct the subsequent investigation. SAFE team members worked with relevant WMATA subject matter experts to review the incident's facts and data.

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Field Response and site assessment through video and document review.

- Informal Interviews – Collected through conversations with individuals during the investigation to provide background and supporting information. Written statements were reviewed by personnel present during the event.
 - RTRA Supervisor
 - RTRA Supervisor (Forward Liaison)

Formal Interviews – SAFE was unable to interview the Train Operator involved in this event as they remain out of work related to the event. Written statements were reviewed in lieu of a formal interview.

- Documentation Review – A collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in Metro record systems. These records include the following:
 - Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook (MSRPH)
 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
 - Employee Training Records
 - Employee Certifications
 - Employee 30 Day Work History
 - Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) Incident Report
 - Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) Hot Wash Summary
 - Maximo Data
- System Data Recording Review – A collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
 - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback, including OPS 3 Radio and Landline Communications.
 - Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)
 - System Performance On-Time Summary (SPOTS)
 - The Office of Car Engineering Vehicles (CENV) Vehicle Monitoring and Diagnostic Systems (VMDS)
 - Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)

Investigation

On Saturday, April 15, 2023, at 10:28 hours, a Blue Line Train ID 458 (L3053-3052.3019-3018.-3082-3083T) traveling on track one in the direction of Pentagon City Station; transmitted an emergency broadcast to the ROCC Radio RTC that they “just ran over someone on the roadway.” The RTC asked for Train ID 458’s location and instructed the Operator to key down and offload all customers at Pentagon City Station. The Train Operator advised they had three cars on the platform.

At 10:29 hours, the RTC instructed an RTRA Rail Supervisor to respond to Pentagon City Station for a report of a person struck by a train.

At 10:30 hours, the MAC broadcast over radio channel MTPD 1x that a person was struck by Train ID 458 on track one, Pentagon City, and power was down on tracks one and two. Also at this time, Train ID 458 reported that all the passengers have been evacuated from the doors on the platform. At 10:32 hours, the MTPD dispatcher notified the ACFD of the incident.

At 10:36 hours, the RTRA Rail Supervisor and an MTPD Officer arrived at the incident scene. The RTRA Supervisor was granted foul time to enter the roadway on track one to check for signs of life. Also at, 10:36 hours, the MTPD officer advised that a person was struck on track one and was partially located within the tunnel. At 10:38 hours, the MTPD officer assumed command and removed all personnel from the track bed to preserve the incident scene until the arrival of the MTPD CID Unit. A temporary command post was designated on the platform of Pentagon City Station until the recovery process was complete.

At 10:39 hours, ACFD arrived at Pentagon City Station and established a command post on the street level of Pentagon City Station on 12 Street and Hayes Street.

At 10:40 hours, DVEU advised that at 10:23 hours, on camera P046, a male with a red shirt entered the roadway at the portal entrance and walked into the tunnel at 10:24 hours. At 10:41 hours, third rail power was confirmed de-energized on tracks 1 and 2. ACFD initiated recovery efforts and reported that the customer was located on track 1 in a track section approximately 250 feet outside the platform heading towards Washington, D.C.



Figure 1 Unidentified Person#1 on Pentagon City Station Platform at 10:23 hours

At 10:43 hours, the MAC confirmed power was de-energized on track 1 platform level plus two hundred feet past the end gate, with a Warning Strobe and Alarm Device (WSAD) in place.

At 10:54 hours, ACFD confirmed an unidentified male showing no signs of life and further reported that EMS unit 111 would manage any further recovery efforts. The RTRA Rail Supervisor requested the status of the Train to be deemed in recovery. At 10:57 hours, ACFD requested that the incident train be moved to assist with the recovery for the MTPD Investigations Unit.

At 11:02 hours, the MAC notified the WMSC of the event. At 11:03 hours, the MAC reported that a Bus Bridge had been established from Pentagon Station to National Airport. At 11:04 hours, MTPD conducted an investigative interview with the incident Train Operator.

At 11:14 hours, the RTC announced to all Ops 3 Train Operators that Pentagon City Station was closed. They further instructed all operators to reverse ends at Pentagon Station. The RTC announced that trains from Huntington and Franconia would be turning at National Airport Station. At 11:16 hours, the ACFD Battalion Chief reported that all ACFD personnel were in a place of safety, concluded all Fire Department operations, and turned the scene over to the MTPD and RTRA.

At 11:35 hours, a re-energization alert for track 2 was announced by the Radio RTC for Pentagon City Station. At 11:44 hours, the Radio RTC announced to go back into service, but all operators would bypass Pentagon City. At 11:45 hours, Pentagon City Station, track 2, was put back in service for single tracking. At 11:48 hours, the Radio RTC updated Train Operators on Ops3 to bypass Pentagon City on track two.

At 12:26 hours, MTPD requested the MAC to activate the tunnel fans to exhaust to alleviate the odor from the deceased.

At 13:00 hours, the Arlington County Medical examiner arrived and determined that a funeral home would have to remove the deceased from the roadway due to the condition and damage of the body. At 13:04 hours, MTPD requested that the Station be closed to all pedestrian traffic. The RTRA Forward Liaison communicated information outside of the Incident Command, resulting in some delays and confusion.

At 13:33 hours, CMNT personnel were granted foul time to inspect the incident train on track 1. At 13:39 hours, CMNT personnel transmitted the all-clear and stated that the train was safe for movement.

At 13:53 hours, MTPD requested to the MAC that power be restored to track 1 for train movement. At 13:57 hours, MTPD made a secondary request for power restoration to the MAC. At 13:59 hours, the Radio RTC transmitted a power energization alert for track 1, Pentagon City. At 14:05 hours, third rail power was restored to Pentagon City, track one.

At 14:17 hours, CMNT personnel requested foul time to recharge Train ID 458 (now ID 725) and to trip circuit breakers. At 14:27 hours, CMNT personnel relinquished their foul time and gave an all-clear.

At 14:28 hours, ERT inspected tracks 1 and 2 and reported no damage. At 14:29 hours, MTPD stated that the incident train was clear for movement to Alexandria Rail Yard. At 14:42 hours, Train ID 725 exited Pentagon City Station without issue.

At 14:47 hours, MTPD requested power de-energization for Pentagon City for crime scene recovery efforts. MTPD requested that the station be closed to recover the remaining body parts discovered throughout the area after Train ID 725 departed.

At 15:17 hours, Train ID 725 arrived at Alexandria Rail Yard and was stored on track 21.

At 15:33 hours, the customer's body was recovered, and all emergency personnel and equipment were cleared from the roadway. The MOC conducted all clean-up efforts, and the scene was turned over to RTRA. At 16:15 hours, regular service resumed.

RTRA removed the Train Operator of ID 458/725 from service for post-incident testing. The train consist was removed from service for post-incident inspection. The post-incident inspection of the railcars found no damage to the car bodies.

On May 5, 2023, the Office of Emergency Preparedness: Prevention and Mitigation sponsored an After Action Review(AAR) with all the stakeholders from this event. The consensus was that an overall Unified Command Structure was established utilizing the Incident Command System (ICS). The meeting concluded in agreeance that the collective response from WMATA personnel and the ACFD was deemed effective in achieving the intended outcome, maintaining compliance with established safety protocols, and promoting interagency coordination.

The only recommendation from the AAR was to improve interoperability and connectivity in field response operations. It was recommended to implement a talk-around feature on WMATA's current radio communication system with the function to record all transmissions. The stakeholders agreed that this single channel could be utilized in emergency response situations for better communication for the different jurisdictions.

Chronological ARS Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, revealed the following timeline.

Time	Description
10:28:10 hours	<u>Train ID 458</u> : Transmits emergency- "I just ran over someone on the roadway." <u>Radio RTC</u> : What is your location? <u>Train ID 458</u> : Pentagon City. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Pentagon City tracks 1 or 2 <u>Train ID 458</u> : Get somebody to me. [inaudible] <u>Radio RTC</u> : Good copy; how many doors do you have on the platform? Hold on the platform at Pentagon City. [Radio communication clarity was poor during this transmission] [Radio Ops3]
10:29:54 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Communicated to an RTRA Supervisor to respond to Pentagon City Station for a reported person struck and designated them as the Incident Commander. [Radio communication clarity was poor during this transmission] <u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Acknowledged and Repeated [Radio Ops3]
10:30:41 hours	MAC notified the MTPD dispatcher of a person struck on track one at Pentagon City. [MTPD1x]
10:30:24 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Requested an update on the status of the consist. <u>Train ID 458</u> : Stated they have three cars on the platform. Train ID 458 further stated they felt uncomfortable entering the roadway to check on the customer. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed 458 to key down, secure their cab and give a radio check on your handheld and offload your customers from the doors on the platform. <u>Train ID 458</u> : Customers have been offloaded from the doors on the platform. [Radio Ops3]
10:30:45 hours	RTRA Supervisor on the scene; conducted a wellness check on the operator and obtained brief synopsis of what transpired.
10:31:33 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : requested the RTRA Supervisor to enter the roadway and check for signs of life from the customer. <u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : The customer may have been hit by another train; he was lying in the roadway.
10:32:38 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Advised the RTRA Supervisor that he is granted foul time to enter the roadway, track one, to check for signs of life- hot stick and confirm. [Radio Ops3]
10:32:41 hours	<u>ACFD Dispatcher</u> : 911 call for a person struck at Pentagon City. [Open Mhz]
10:33:30 hours	<u>MAC</u> : Updated ACFD dispatcher of a possible jumper. [Open Mhz]
10:34:41 hours	<u>MAC</u> : advised the MTPD dispatcher that Train ID 458 has three door on the platform, and power is down on tracks one and two. MTPD Unit on scene. [MTPD1x]
10:36:24 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : third rail power is de-energized, track one – Pentagon City. The customers are offloaded and clear of the platform. I entered the roadway to check for signs of life. [Radio Ops3]

Time	Description
10:36:44 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : on scene-advised, the person struck is in the tunnel-Power down in track one side. [MTPD1x]
10:36:54 hours	<u>MAC</u> : Confirmed on person struck on track one side. MTPD is on the scene, and the power on tracks one and two are down. [Open Mhz]
10:38:24 hours	<u>MTPD Supervisor</u> : transmitted – no personnel on the roadway until confirmed power is down. [MTPD1x]
10:38:35 hours	ACFD arrived at the scene. I was entering the platform with MTPD. Request a radio relay. [Open Mhz]
10:39:34 hours	<u>ACFD</u> : established command at the corner of Hayes Street and 12 Street on the top side of Pentagon City. [Open Mhz]
10:39:57 hours	MTPD- no personnel is on the roadway- unable to locate the train operator, the subject has not been located, and there is a possibility that they may be in the tunnel. [MTPD1x]
10:40:12 hours	<u>DVEU</u> : At 10:23, on camera P046, a male with a red shirt enters the roadway at the portal entrance and walks into the tunnel at 10:24 hours. [MTPD1x]
10:40:49 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : Train Operator secured on the platform. They will be taken to the Kiosk. [MTPD1x]
10:41:31 hours	MTPD designated the Command Post on the Platform and track one side until verification of recovery. [MTPD1x]
10:41:53 hours	<u>ACFD</u> : Injured customer is on track one in a section preceding (approximately 250 ft) past the platform heading towards DC. [Open Mhz]
10:42:16 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : Set up a WSAD track one side. [MTPD1x]
10:42:23 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : “Transit on the scene; Transit assumed command; I relinquished foul time on the platform.” [Radio Ops3]
10:43:09 hours	<u>MAC</u> : “Power is down, including two hundred feet past the end gate. The Power Department is hot sticking to confirm.” [Open Mhz]
10:43:16 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : requested a secondary channel, switched to MTPD2x, and the MAC will monitor. [MTPD1x]
10:46:39 hours	<u>ACFD</u> : Designated a Rescue Group to enter the track bed for a recovery effort. [Open Mhz]
10:43:43 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : stated they did not locate the customer, no visual. Redesignated as the RTRA Forward Liaison. [Radio Ops3]
10:47:47 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : WSAD in place- CM C1 316+00- C1 288+43. (Radio transmission distorted) [MTPD2x]
10:46:15 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : Advised that the decedent was located beyond the end gate on track one. [MTPD2x]
10:46:33 hours	RTRA QA instructor on scene. [Radio Ops3]
10:48:34 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : Command designated a unit as Forward Liaison to perform communication relays. [MTPD1x]
10:49:23	<u>MAC</u> : Confirmed power is down—chain markers C1-288+42-C1316+00. [MTPD2x]
10:49:32 hours	RTRA Supervisor#2 arrived at the incident scene. [Radio Ops3]
10:51:20 hours	Pentagon City Station Manager present at Incident Command Post. RTC advised Incident Commander was guiding them. [Radio Ops3]
10:51:41 hours	<u>MAC</u> : Noted to the field units that permission was granted to enter the Roadway to hot stick and confirm. [Open Mhz]
10:53:12 hours	ACFD Battalion Chief present at Incident Command. [MTPD2x]
10:53:52 hours	RTRA Supervisors#3 and 4 reported to Incident Command. [Radio Ops3]
10:54:19 hours	<u>ACFD</u> : Confirmed DOA- EMS unit 111 will handle. [Open Mhz]

Time	Description
10:54:31 hours	RTRA Line Director reported to the Incident Command. [Radio Ops3]
10:54:48 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Requested that the incident train be moved—train Status deemed in recovery. RTRA Supervisor reported the customer deceased, with no signs of life. [Radio Ops3]
10:57:18 hours	<u>ACFD</u> : requested that the incident train be moved to assist with recovery for CID. [MTPD2x]
11:03:17 hours	MAC reported that a Bus Bridge formed- Pentagon to National Airport, [MTPD2x]
11:03:46 hours	<u>ACFD</u> : All ACFD personnel are out of the roadway [Open Mhz]
11:04:00 hours	MTPD conducted an investigative interview with the incident Train Operator. [MTPD2x]
11:10:53 hours	The Assistant Superintendent of PLNT reported to the Incident Command Post. [MTPD2x]
11:14:00 hours	Radio RTC announced track and station status to all Ops3 Train Operators. [Radio RTC] (Radio transmission distorted)
11:15:45 hours	<u>ACFD</u> : "All ACFD personnel are off the roadway and in a place of safety. The Command has been turned over to the MTPD and WMATA personnel." [Open Mhz]
11:16:08 hours	<u>ACFD</u> : All Fire operations have been concluded. The command has been terminated. [Open Mhz]
11:21:38 hours	MTPD transmitted for verification that all personnel had left the roadway. [MTPD2x]
11:22:50 hours	MTPD confirmed all personnel is off the roadway on track two [MTPD2x]
11:25:24 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : Medical examiner requested [MTPD2x]
11:26:36 hours	ERT reported to the Incident Command. [MTPD2x]
11:31:08 hours	MTPD, ERT, and Power personnel entered the roadway to confirm if power was down- (Hot stick) [MTPD2x]
11:33:25 hours	MTPD Forward Liaison confirmed that power is down, and all personnel is off the roadway. [MTPD2x]
11:34:00 hours	ERT reported to the Incident Command. [Radio Ops3]
11:35:13 hours	Radio RTC re-energized alert for Track 2 Pentagon City. [Radio Ops3]
11:40:55 hours	MTPD transmitted that track two power is hot and energized. [MTPD2x]
11:44:00 hours	Incident Command requested to service the station. Verification is needed from CID and Crime scene. [MTPD2x]
11:44:22 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Made an announcement to go back in service-bypassing Pentagon City on Track Two. [Radio Ops3]
11:45:17 hours	Radio RTC: Advised RTRA Supervisor that the station was back in service - track 2- instructed to open station doors. [Radio Ops3]
11:48:46 hours	Radio RTC updated Train Operators on Ops3 to bypass Pentagon City on track two. [Radio Ops3]
11:54:00 hours	Incident Command is relocating to the mezzanine level. Medical Examiner confirmed that station service is permitted. [MTPD2x]
12:00:12 hours	ERT on track one established a work zone. [MTPD2x]
12:01:38 hours	CMNT reported to the Incident Command. [Radio Ops3]
12:11:38 hours	All clear given to service Pentagon City Station-track two. [MTPD2x]
12:19:52 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Announced a power energization alert for Pentagon City track two. [Radio Ops3]

Time	Description
12:26:01 hours	MTPD Forward Liaison requested directly to the MAC for tunnel fan activation to alleviate odor. [MTPD2x]
12:37:35 hours	RTRA supervisor gave an update on the status of the removal of the decedent. - "awaiting the medical examiner." [Radio Ops3]
12:39:21 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : made service announcement for Pentagon City, Pentagon City will be closed due to an emergency incident. [Radio Ops3]
13:00:00 hours	Medical Examiner reported to the command post. [Radio Ops3]
13:03:30 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Per Transit, the station will be shut down, evacuated, and then can move the train on track one. [OPS3]
13:04:06 hours	<u>MTPD Forward Liaison</u> : requested the station to close to all pedestrian traffic per CID and Crime Scene. [MTPD2x]
13:13:05 hours	Incident Command confirmed from the ROCC confirming the bypassing of Pentagon City. **** ROCC stated numerous times that they have two trains left to service Pentagon City***** [MTPD2x]
13:22:08 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Announced to all Ops3 Train Operators that single tracking will occur from National Airport to Pentagon City. [Radio Ops3]
13:29:47 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : notified the ROCC that CMNT will require a five-minute foul time window to inspect the incident train. [MTPD2x]
13:33:07 hours	<u>MAC</u> : Instructed CMNT to utilize Ops3 for foul time. [MTPD2x]
13:33:17 hours	<u>CMNT</u> : Requested foul time to inspect the incident train, track two. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Granted CMNT foul time for train inspection on the platform limits. Advised CMNT when foul time is relinquished. <u>CMNT</u> : Acknowledged and repeated. [Radio Ops3]
13:34:18 hours	<u>CMNT</u> granted foul time to inspect the incident train. [MTPD2x]
13:39:55 hours	<u>CMNT</u> : In a place of safety-relinquished foul time. [Radio Ops3]
13:39:56 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : "CMNT completed inspection. The train is safe for movement to continue crime scene and recovery. All personnel is clear of tracks one-two and request power to be energized for the train to be moved." [MTPD2x]
13:43:23 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Requested power restoration on track one. CMNT completed their inspection. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Confirmed request.
13:53:35 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : Requested to the MAC that power be restored to Track One for train movement. <u>MAC</u> : Direct
13:57:01 hours	<u>Command</u> : A second request was made to the MAC to restore power on track one. [MTPD2x]
13:59:37 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Power Energization alert for Pentagon City Track One, Track One is hot and energized. [Radio Ops3]
14:00:30 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Announced an established bus bridge. [Radio Ops3]
14:05:18 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Confirmed no personnel is in the roadway. [Radio Ops3]
14:05:40 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Third rail power is restored Pentagon City, track one. [Radio RTC]
14:15:56 hours	<u>CMNT</u> : Requested foul time on track two to reset Trip Circuit Breakers. [Radio Ops3]
14:16:44 hours:	<u>CMNT</u> : Requested foul time on Track Two to finish the inspection. [MTPD2x]
14:17:57 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Granted CMNT foul time on track two to recharge circuit breakers. [Radio RTC]

Time	Description
14:27:14 hours	<u>CMNT</u> : Reported that they are in place of safety and relinquished foul time. [Radio Ops3]
14:28:36 hours	ERT completed an inspection and moved off the roadway to a place of safety. Trains can bypass Pentagon City using Track Two. [MTPD2x]
14:29:56 hours	<u>Command</u> : The Incident train is ready for movement to Alexandria Rail Yard utilizing track two and stored on track twenty-one.
14:33:59 hours	<u>CMNT</u> : Reported all hand brakes are fully released. The train is ready for movement. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged and repeated-CMNT personnel will remain on the train for the trip. [Radio Ops3]
14:34:22 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : The train will move slowly to lessen the damage to the deceased during recovery. [MTPD2x]
14:35:40 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : Requested to stop the train at the eight-car marker to ensure no damage to the deceased or the crime scene. [MTPD2x]
14:42:50 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : Train ID 458 has exited Pentagon City Station with no issues (Damage to the deceased). [MTPD2x]
14:45:50 hours	<u>MAC</u> : Reported that Train ID 458 is having mechanical issues. [MTPD2x]
14:44:58 hours	<u>Train ID 725 (formerly 458)</u> : The operator reports train is pulling. <u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Reports train is experiencing rollback. (No loss of control of the train) <u>Radio RTC</u> : Request CMNT to investigate to ascertain if the train can move towards Crystal City. Instructs the operator to conduct a rolling-rolling brake test. [Radio Ops3]
14:47:37 hours	<u>Train ID 725</u> : Reported all clear of the deceased and in approach to Crystal City. [Radio Ops3]
14:47:38 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : Train has cleared the victim. Advised that they are awaiting measurements. Request power de-energization on track one [MTPD2x]
14:52:21 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : Communicated that body parts of the deceased are on the platform. [MTPD2x]
14:53:17 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : Power is down; track #1-WSAD is in place. [MTPD2x]
14:54:04 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : Requested station closed (no service) for crime scene purposes to lessen public exposure. When the incident train was moved, evidence was recovered. <u>MAC</u> : Request made to ROCC to have trains reverse ends and not service Pentagon City. [MTPD2x]
14:55:48 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Informed RTRA Supervisor that power was de-energized on track one. [Radio Ops3]
14:57:00	Train ID 725 received an absolute block to Alexandria Rail Yard. [Radio Ops3]
14:58:00 hours	<u>MTPD</u> : Requested to close the Station. A recovery process is needed to recover the remaining body parts. Roadway protection will be established. [MTPD2x]
15:00:20 hours	<u>MAC</u> : Confirmed request. No other trains will enter Pentagon City Station. Power is down on track one, and WASD is in place. [MTPD2x]
15:05:40 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Granted the RTRA Supervisor foul time to hot stick and confirm if power is down in Pentagon City. Blue Block protection is in place. [Radio Ops3]
15:08:05 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : ERT confirmed power de-energized- WSAD in place. [Radio RTC]

Time	Description
15:17:12 hours	Train ID 725: Arrived at Alexandria Rail Yard, stored on track twenty-one. [Radio Ops3]
15:33:11 hours	<u>Command</u> : The crime scene has been concluded. The funeral home has recovered the body. MOC is on the scene to conduct clean-up efforts. Roadway protection remains in place. The incident scene is released to RTRA. [MTPD2x]
15:34:05 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Advised that MTPD has released the scene over to RTRA. MOC is on the roadway conducting clean-up work. [Radio Ops3]
16:04:23 hours	<u>RTC</u> : Informs RTRA Supervisor that a test train is optional. [Radio Ops3]
16:09:27 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : reported that WSAD has been removed and all personnel is in a place of safety. Ready for third rail power. [Radio Ops3]
16:12:56 hours	<u>RTC Radio</u> : Power Energizing alert for Pentagon City-third rail power is hot and energized. [Radio Ops3]
16:15:52 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Announced regular service at Pentagon City Station. [Radio Ops3]

****Note:** Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings and reporting sources.

Interview Findings

As part of the investigation launched into the event, SAFE reviewed written statements from involved personnel. The Train Operator was unavailable for interview as they were in a non-work status as a result of this event.

Written Statement Findings

Adopted from Written Report with minor formatting and grammatical edits

Train Operator

- “As I approached Pentagon City, I noticed something on the roadway. As I got closer, it was a person. I tried to stop the train. It was too late; I had run over the person. I stopped and notified ROCC.”

RTRA Rail Supervisor (Forward Liaison)

- “At approximately 10:29 am, Operator [redacted] reported to ROCC that someone had been struck by his train at Pentagon City Track 1. The train was offloaded and removed from service. Personnel was dispatched to the scene to help with recovery efforts. Mr. [redacted] was from service, transported for post-incident-tested and returned to the division to complete all related paperwork.”

Office of System Maintenance, Office of Radio Communications (COMR)

On April 24, 2023, COMR completed communication testing and determined that the radio checks performed at Pentagon City Station (Station, tracks 1 and 2) were loud and clear.

Office of Car Maintenance (CMNT)

CMNT personnel performed under-car inspections of all the consists and no structural or car body damage was found. All train cars successfully passed the Daily Inspection and were released for service.

The Office of Car Engineering Vehicle (CENV) Vehicle Monitoring and Diagnostic Systems (VMDS)

Adopted from CENV Report with minor formatting and grammatical edits:

"CENV completed reviewing the Event Recorder data from car 3053, the lead vehicle in train ID 458; the train responded to the operator's commands and operated as designed. No anomalies were found; the spreadsheet with events before, during, and after the incident is attached."

Time	MC Position	Event	Limit Speed	Actual Speed
10:26:40 to 10:26:41	B5	Road Horn Activated 3x approaching C08	40 MPH	36 to 34MPH
10:28:44	B4	TL 82 goes from high to low (Brakes in Emergency)	45 MPH	26 MPH
10:28:55	B4	After traveling 136 feet from when train went into Emergency, train comes to a complete stop	40 MPH	0 MPH
10:29:52	B4	TL 82 goes high	45 MPH	0 MPH
10:35:37	B4	EM Stop 1 (console side) is depressed; TL 82 goes low again (CabOccu B is still high)	0 MPH	0 MPH
10:38:08	B4	CabOccu B is low, and TL 82 goes from low to high	0 MPH	0 MPH

Figure 2 Timeline of events for Train ID 458 Pg-1




Figure 3 Timeline of events for Train ID 458 Pg-2

Incident Date: 4/15/2023 Time: 10:28 hours
Final Report – Collision Rev. 1
E23253

Drafted By: SAFE 706 – 06/02/2023
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 06/14/2023
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 06/14/2023

System Performance On-Time Summary (SPOTS)

ROCS SPOTS REPORT

based on up-to-the-second operational performance data from the Rail Operations Control System

Current date/time: Wed Apr 26 15:05:41 2023

Select Platform: C08-1 and/or Select ID: Leave blank to remove criteria

and/or Select 4-digit car number: Leave blank to remove criteria

Select Date: Apr 15 2023 Select Times (0-24HRS): From 10:00 To 11:00

Generate Report

ID	Platform	length	dcode	Right door open	Right door close	dwelt	Left door open	Left door close	dwelt	Head Arrived	Tail cleared	cars	Headway door open to door open
401	C08-1	8	72	10:06:13	10:06:31	18				10:05:45	10:06:49	7176-7177 7655-7654 7744-7745 7711-7710	-
457	C08-1	6	21							10:13:14	10:14:15	3203-3202 3287-3286 3280-3281	-
402	C08-1	6	72	10:21:45	10:22:07	22				10:21:14	10:22:27	3148-3149 3254-3255 3211-3210	15:32
25	C08-1	6	99	10:28:56	10:28:59	3				10:28:03	14:46:44	3082-3083 3018-3019 3052-3053	7:11

Figure 4 SPOTS -Train ID 458 entering Pentagon City Station

Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)




Figure 5 - Train ID 458, located on track 1, entering the Pentagon City Station site of the incident at 10:28 hours




Figure 6 Third rail power de-energized at Pentagon City Station track 1 at 10:29 hours

Weather

On April 15, 2023, at 10:28, NOAA recorded the temperature as 63°F, with sunny skies. This event occurred within a tunneled section of the rail system. The weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: NOAA – Location: Arlington, VA)

Human Factors

Evidence of Fatigue

Due to the unavailability of the Train Operator under the Employee Assistance Program, we were unable to carry out an analysis. As of June 13, 2023, the operator has not returned to work, and consequently, an interview could not be conducted by SAFE to gather essential information regarding fatigue factors. This lack of data hinders our ability to perform a comprehensive analysis at this time.

Fatigue Risk

Due to the unavailability of the Train Operator under the Employee Assistance Program, we were unable to carry out an analysis. As of June 13, 2023, the operator has not returned to work, and consequently, an interview could not be conducted by SAFE to gather essential information regarding fatigue factors. This lack of data hinders our ability to perform a comprehensive analysis currently.

Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Program determined that the Train Operator complied with and was not in violation of the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program 7.7.3/6.

Work History

- Train Operator certified at a Quality-Level 1 (QL-1) on 12/27/22 and is not due for recertification until 12/24/2024. QL-1 is the highest rating achievable.
- Train Operator was involved in a Station Overrun event in September 2022, but had no other Safety-related violations within the past two years.

Related Rules and Procedures

MSRPH SOP 1A - Command, Control, and Coordination of Emergencies on the Rail System
MSRPH SOP 2A - Emergency Removal and Restoration of Third Rail Power
MSRPH SOP 26 - Person Hit by a Train
MSRPH SOP 47 – Unauthorized Personnel on The Roadway In Between Stations

Findings

- The customer intentionally entered the roadway from the station platform and walked into the tunnel outside the station platform, where they were ultimately struck.
- No vehicle deficiencies were identified that may have contributed to the event.
- Multiple radio transmissions were inaudible and distorted. Cell phones were utilized to communicate throughout the incident. The communication issues caused delays throughout the incident.
- The incident train sat stationary for an extended period, causing the need to charge the circuit breaker batteries.
- The RTRA Forward Liaison communicated information outside of the Incident Command, which resulted in some delays and confusion.
- The Medical Examiner responded but did not remove the deceased. (condition of the deceased). The responding funeral home was delayed due to a pending call.

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- ROCC de-energized Third Rail intentionally as part of the mitigation measures.
- A thorough visual inspection of the affected area was conducted by a qualified Rail Supervisor to assess any visible issues or hazards.
- ACFD inspected Track 1 with MTPD to ensure safety and identify any potential risks.
- In the interest of passenger safety, ROCC suspended train service temporarily until the situation could be fully assessed and necessary actions were taken.

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause of the Collision event at Pentagon City Station on April 15, 2023, was a customer intentionally entering and trespassing on the roadway and subsequently being struck by a train as it approached the station in a tunneled section of the rail system.

Recommended Corrective Actions

There were no Recommended Corrective Actions identified from this investigation. The one recommendation made during the AAR session pertained to developing a talk-around system/emergency channel under WMATA's current communication system.

Appendices

Appendix A – Interview Summary

The below narratives summarize the incident and represent the statements made by the involved individual. As such, times and details may present a conflict with the data contained in systems of record.

Train Operator – Written Statement (Pending return)

“As I approached Pentagon City, I noticed something on the roadway. As I got closer, it was a person. I tried to stop the train. It was too late, I had run over the person. I stopped and notified ROCC.”

RTRA Train Supervisor (Forward Liaison)

“At approximately 10:29 am, Operator [redacted] reported to ROCC that someone had been struck by his train at Pentagon City Track 1. The train was offloaded and removed from service. Personnel was dispatched to the scene to help with recovery efforts. Mr. [redacted] was from service, transported for post-incident-tested and returned to the division to complete all related paperwork.”



Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary



ADMINISTRATION HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

This report will be completed after a debriefing or "hot wash" in accordance with applicable department policies/directives and procedures; at the request of the Chief of Police or designee or following any incident or event requiring the activation of the Incident Command System (ICS). The purpose of the report is to provide information, assess response, identify training, equipment needs, and to identify areas that may require improvement. After completion of this report, it should be forwarded to the Deputy Chief through the chain of command for review.

This report and any attachments are classified as For Official Use Only. This report may be used for emergency incidents, special events, and exercises. Items marked with an asterisk (*) will be completed by the last official designated as the Incident Commander (IC) as there may be more than one IC during the incident.

INCIDENT SUMMARY			
Incident Requiring ICS Activation:		Person Struck by Train	
*Incident Commander (IC):		[REDACTED]	
MTPD CCN:	2023-03281	Local CCN:	
*Date ICS Initiated:	4-15-23	*Time ICS Initiated:	10:42 AM
*Date ICS Terminated:	4-15-23	*Time ICS Terminated:	3:42 PM
*Duration of Incident:	5 hrs and 13 mins	*Service Disrupted (Type and Time):	Rail Service 10:32 AM
Incident Location:	1201 S. Hayes St Arlington, VA 22202 (PNTC)	Command Post Location:	Platform
MTPD On-Scene Commander (OSC):	[REDACTED]	Command Aid for OSC:	[REDACTED]
Forward Liaison:	[REDACTED]	Unified Command:	ACFD, MTPD, RAIL, BOCC
OCC Liaison:	[REDACTED]	Alternate Channel:	MTPD-X2
Single Tracking (Time & Track No.):	11:40 Am. Track. 2	Bus Bridge Established (From /To):	PNTC-NAPT
Inner and/or Outer Perimeter:	[REDACTED]	Power De-energized:	Yes on Track 1 and Track 2
OSC Relinquished Scene Command to Name:	[REDACTED]	Medical Attention Required/Requested:	
Dept: RAIL			
Entry/Exit Log:	[REDACTED]	CID Response:	D-951

For Official Use Only

The information in this document marked FOUO is the property of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority's Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) to law enforcement, public safety and protection, intelligence officials and individuals with a need to know. Distribution to other entities without prior MTPD authorization is prohibited. Precautions shall be taken to ensure this information is stored and destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. Information bearing the FOUO marking may not be used in legal proceedings without prior authorization from the originator. Recipients are prohibited from posting information marked FOUO on a website or unclassified network.

Figure 7 MTPD Hot Wash Pg-1

Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

WMATA ON-SCENE PERSONNEL		
Name	Department/Office	Title/Role
	MTPD	On Scene Commander
	MTPD	On Scene Supervisor
	MTPD	Watch Commander
	RAIL	Rail Supervisor
	MTPD	OCS Liaison
	MTPD	Patrol Sgt
	MTPD	CID
	RAIL	Rail Supervisor
	RAIL	Rail Supervisor
	RAIL	Superintendent
	RAIL	ERT
	RAIL	ERT
	RAIL	ERT

EXTERNAL ON-SCENE PERSONNEL		
Name	Agency/Department	Title/Role
Engine 209	ACFD	Rescue
Truck 105	ACFD	FIRE
Truck 104	ACFD	FIRE
Medic 301	ACFD	Rescue
Rescue 109	ACFD	FIRE
Tower 104	ACFD	Rescue
Buggy 111	ACFD	Rescue

Use separate sheet if additional space is required.

For Official Use Only

MTPD-OSP-TMPL-009-00

Page 2 of 4

Effective: 12/30/20

Figure 8 MTPD Hot Wash Pg-2

Incident Date: 4/15/2023 Time: 10:28 hours
Final Report – Collision Rev. 1
E23253

Drafted By: SAFE 706 – 06/02/2023
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 06/14/2023
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 06/14/2023

Page 22

Metro Transit Police Department

Hot Wash Summary

REQUESTS	
*Radio Run Requested (Yes/No):	NO
If "Yes," location where tape is stored:	
*Digital Video Evidence Unit (DVEU)	YES
Video Requested (Yes/No):	
If "Yes," location where video is stored:	DVEU Unit

OBSERVATIONS
ERT and PWR are conducting a final walkthrough to ensure tracks are clear to resume Track#2 service. Radio transmissions have resulted in facilitating combination radio and phone communications. Operator [REDACTED] on scene and will be moving train on track 2 to start single tracking once the power is up. All personnel clear track 2. CSS is back on track 1 for processing. Command post moving [REDACTED] mezzanine along with the staging area. ME Investigator [REDACTED] advised they are not responding to the scene due to the victims described condition. Permission granted to cover the victim. Power requested to be brought back down on track 2 for visual inspections and CSS evidence collection. Archer Supervisor on scene will conduct hot stick and WSAD placement on track 2. ATC headed down to track one to do a visual inspection and units are currently standing by for the power to be confirmed down by rail. ERT and [REDACTED] on standby for hot sticks and WSAD. Power is now live on track 2 and single tracking can commence and to service track 2 platform. Barriers are being set in place to restrict movement for the customers. Trains will start to bypass on track 2. Car maintenance is on standby to conducted track inspection and etec cart is getting set in place if needed. Car maintenance requesting foul time of 5 mins to conduct train inspection after the next inbound train. Request will be made on OPS 3. Car maintenance cleared the train to move on track 1. Car maintenance is off track 2. Request to bring power on track 1 to move the train to Alexandria Railyard. Foul time requested on track 2 to for a secondary inspection by car maintenance. Additionally, power is still down on track 1. Car maintenance need to reset the battery breakers once power is up on track 1 and should not interfere with track 2. Car maintenance has cleared the roadway and reset the battery breakers for the train at chain marker C1-298+00. Trains can continue to bypass on track 2. Power is confirmed up on track 1 currently. Train has cleared the platform as well as the victim and will resume to Alexandria Railyard to track 21 where it will remain out of service. Power has been requested to be taken down on track 1. Power has been advised down on track 1. Roadway protection is being set in place. Trains are being requested to turn around at crystal city and pentagon stations Power is confirmed down via hot stick and WSAD in place. CSS processing the scene and funeral service in place to recover the victim. CSS has concluding processing and funeral services have recovered the victim. The scene has been turned over to Archer Supervisor [REDACTED] at the time. Hot wash underway TSOC notification was made by Serge [REDACTED] nt. Awaiting return call from representative for incident number. MTPD CSS WSADS retrieved and in possession of Sergeant [REDACTED] All MTPD assets have cleared PNTC.

Figure 9 MTPD Hot Wash Pg-3

Metro Transit Police Department Hot Wash Summary

NOTES

RAIL - MTPD - Continuous communication issues from platform to mezzanine and topside.
MTPD - Train sitting for significant amount of time, the breaker battery needed to be reset - lesson learned.
RAIL - Bypassing trains are good, however, when we know it will be a recovery, it may be best to close station, ensure all power is taken down and remains down.
RAIL - Radios were biggest issue.
OEP relayed incident went well in spite of radios and time frame issues with funeral home.
RAIL - [REDACTED] relayed information and communication outside of Incident Command which caused delays and confusion -- an area we need to continually work.
OEP - We know more persons need to go through IMF -- more training and work will be done overall.
RTTRA - concerning radio issues in station.
MTPD - radio system caused significant communication issues and delays.
RAIL line director - spent more time attempting bypassing efforts which resulted in (2) foul time needs - recommend leaving station shut down for registry scene until everything is completed.
CID - couldn't hear radio that person had been pronounced - there was a lot of confusion concerning transmissions - leg time for funeral home as another body in LaPlata needed to be picked up. The need to utilize phone and radio to communicate created significant lag time.
RTTRA - Always try to check in with station manager for helpful resources.
MTPD - try to ensure communication is established early on and BRING station command board or paper to keep up with personnel

Use separate sheet if additional space is required.

On Scene Commander's Title, Printed Name, and Signature/Date

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Watch Commander's Title, Printed Name and Signature/Date

[REDACTED]

10/11/2023

Patrol Operations Bureau Commander's, Printed Name and Signature/Date

10/11/2023

Office of Emergency Management Director's, Printed Name and Signature/Date

10/11/2023

For Official Use Only

MTPD-OSP-TMPL-009-00

Page 4 of 4

Effective: 12/30/20

Figure 10 MTPD Hot Wash Pg-4

Incident Date: 4/15/2023 Time: 10:28 hours
Final Report – Collision Rev. 1
E23253

Drafted By: SAFE 706 – 06/02/2023
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 06/14/2023
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 06/14/2023

Page 24

Appendix C – OEP Incident Report

Submitted by: Nathan Kempfer		
		
SAFE OEP Incident Response Report		
Overview		
Incident Date/Time:	Responder 1:	Additional Responders:
2023-04-15		
1033	MAC 1:	Incident Type:
Incident Location:	MAC 2:	Person Struck by Train
Pentagon City		
Incident Metrics		
OPS Channel: OPS 3	On Scene Time: 1057	
MTPD Channels:	Disregard Time: NA	
["MTPD 2x", "MTPD 1x"]	Time of Recovery: 1130	
Bus/Rail Yard Channel: Bus Ops 2	In-Service Time: 1548	
Initial Incident Time: 1033	Command Est. Time: 1040	
Dispatch Time: 1034	Transfer of Command Time: 1045	
Response Time: 1035		
Incident Personnel		
Metro IC:	Maintenance Lead (ERT):	
Jurisdictional IC: Arlington	Investigations Lead (MTPD):	
Fire Liaison ROCC:	Investigations Lead (Safety):	
	SAFE	
Forward Liaison (RTRA Supervisor):	Transportation Lead (Bus TFS):	

Figure 11 - OEP Incident Response Sheet Pg-1

Submitted by: [REDACTED]

Incident Overview

Was Power removed: Yes - Supervisory

Red Tag (if applicable): NA

Incident Narrative:

Called for a report of a person struck on Track 1 CM C1 216+00 approximately 1000' outside of Pentagon City. The incident called in by the operator at approximately 1033 hours. Local FD/EMS, MTPD, RTRA, BOCC, ERT, ATC, PWR, OEP started per SOP by the ROCC. Power dropped on both tracks immediately after the incident by the RTC Ops 3. Upon arrival Adam 216 initiated Pentagon City Command. Command transferred to [REDACTED] Arlington FD on Scene with UC established topside with Arlington BC [REDACTED] on. Bus Bridge established and all notifications for service disruption made. ACFD recon crews hot stuck and set WSADs and verified that the person was deceased. ACFD personnel returned to the platform, removed their equipment and UC was dissolved. At this point the incident moved to a Recovery mode and actions were established to single track and remove the body. Contact was made with the VA M.E. who stated that they did not have to see the body and that the funeral home could come and remove it. Officer [REDACTED] was in contact with the funeral home personnel who stated that they would have an hour response. Attempts were made multiple times to have CMNT and ERT clear the tracks, but were denied by CSS due to the body being underneath the front of the train. Single tracking was initiated servicing the station, but stopped due to the fact that the body could be seen by the passengers on the operating revenue trains. Single tracking was changed to bypassing the station to reduce time that the body may be glimpsed. Upon arrival of the funeral home personnel, power was brought up on track 1 to move the train off of the body. Once the train was removed, the body was removed, the tracks cleaned and service returned to normal.

Incident Successes:

1. Operations and communications with the Jurisdictional Commanders. 2. UC worked textbook with discussions and priorities established by both jurisdictions. 3. Verbal IAPs established and plans disseminated to crews. 4. Staging area worked to control freelancing. 5. Rail personnel reported to the ICP and reported in.

Opportunities for Improvement:

1. Communications. a) radio comms were spotty and at times non-functional. b) Rail RTC still bypassing command and speaking to the Fwd. Liaison RTRA supervisor. This caused several problems. 2. Need a single radio channel for incident operations.

Figure 12 OEP Incident Response Report Pg-2

Appendix D – RTRA Supervisors Incident Report

RTRA Alexandria Division Supervisor's Report				
Date: 15 April 2023	Incident Time 1030am	Incident Location (Station) Pentagon City	Track/Mezzanine # Track one (1)	
Equipment Number (Train ID & Car number: Escalator/ Elevator #: Room) 3083 3019 3083				
Incident Description Person Struck by train				
WMATA Personnel Involved	Employee #	Rule Violation/ List Rule	Home Division	Post Incident?
				Yes
Customer Information (detailed information must be recorded on Station Manager Incident Report)				
Name:	Address:		Injury? N/A	
Name:	Address:		Injury?	
Name:	Address:		Injury?	
Fire Department/EMS/other External Agency Responding (Use supplemental sheet if necessary)				
Arrival Time	Unit Number	Person in charge	Remarks:	
1030am	50		SEE BELOW	
Chronological Account of Incident				
(Note time of each entry: include statement of Employee or Witness at conclusion)				
1028am [REDACTED] reported his train coming in contact with a person on the roadway in approach to the platform at Pentagon City Station, on track one (1).				
1030am [REDACTED] arrived on the scene and spoke with the operator, he stated the person was just lying on the roadway. [REDACTED] was not sure if his train was the first to contact the person. Medical assistance was offered to the operator, but declined.				
1036am ROCC de-energized third rail power. Unit 50 was given foul time to hotstick and confirm				
1039am Transit Police Officer: [REDACTED]				
1045am Fire Department and EMS 111; Captain [REDACTED]				
1051am Supervisors [REDACTED]				
1055am Death confirm, recovery remains under car #3083, second from the last car.				
1113am Fire Department and EMS Departed				
1134am ERT				
Supervisor Submitting Report (include payroll #) [REDACTED] 15 April 2023			Report Review By: [REDACTED] Date 4/17/2023	
Report must be faxed to ROCC 202_962_2809 at end of tour				

Figure 13 RTRA Supervisor Incident Report Pg-1

RTRA Alexandria Division Supervisor's Report

1150am Track two (2) power de-energized.
1155am Train on track two (2) departed.
1210pm CMNT [REDACTED]
1226pm Started single tracking, on track two (2); train ID 451.
1259pm A request for MOC to activate clean-up personnel.
1300pm Metropolitan Funeral Home.
1344pm A request for third rail power energized track One (1). Instructed to call 21651.
1405pm Third rail re-energized.
1446pm Train ID 725 [REDACTED] moved the incident train from Pentagon City towards Crystal City, destination Alexandria Yard.
1456pm Third rail power de-energized.
1509pm ERT, call ID 656 hot stick, and confirmed power was de-energized. The WSAD was placed on third rail.
1510pm Police investigation and removal of body.
1514pm Power call ID [REDACTED] completed the investigation and standing by for power to be de-energized.
1528pm Body removed from roadway.
1534pm Scene released to RTRA.
1535pm MOC clean up underway. MOC did not feel comfortable with trains moving on track two (2).
1609 WSAD removed and all personnel on platform power re-energized.

Supervisor Submitting Report (include payroll #)	Report Review By: [REDACTED]	Date 4/17/2023
Report must be faxed to ROCC 202 962 2809 at end of tour		

Figure 14 RTRA Supervisor Incident Report Pg-2



RTRA Supervisor's Report

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY

Office of Rail Transportation

Date: 04/15/2023	Incident Time 10:31am	Incident Location (Station) Pentagon City	Track/Mezzanine# Track 1
------------------	--------------------------	--	-----------------------------

Equipment Number (Train ID & Car Numbers; Escalator/Elevator #, Room #)

ID 458 3082-3018-3052

Incident Description

Person Struck by Train

WMATA Personnel Involved	Employee #	Rule Violation?	Home Division	Post Incident
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		Alexandria	Yes
Name	Address			Injury?
Name	Address			Injury?

Operator [REDACTED] arrived a little after 7am to Huntington Terminal waiting for his train ID 458 to arrive for his departure. Train ID 458 arrived @10:04am at

Huntington terminal track # 1 @ 10:14am operator [REDACTED] departed on train ID 458 to start his first trip for the day. While operator [REDACTED] was waiting

For His train he was in here having a normal conversation with me he was very happy and excited there was no signs of the operator being in distress.

Supervisor Submitting Shaka Ruffin 007360	Date 04/19/2023	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] 4/19/23
--	--------------------	------------	--------------------

[REDACTED] Report.

Page 2 of 2

Figure 15 RTRA Supervisor Incident Statement Pg-1

Details(continued from front)

Key Findings (Detail below)


 
 Submitting Report (Initials) Report Reviewed By (Initials)

Figure 16 RTRA Supervisor Incident Report Pg-2

Appendix E – RTRA Managerial Incident Investigative Report

	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority	
Office of Rail Transportation: Managerial Incident Investigation Report		
		Incident Status: PRELIMINARY
GENERAL INCIDENT INFORMATION		
Incident Type:	Person Struck by a Train	Delay (Minutes): N/A
Incident Date:	Saturday, April 15, 2023	Vehicles Involved: ID#458
Incident Time:	10:29AM	First Reported By: [REDACTED]
Location:	Pentagon City Track 1	
BRIEF DESCRIPTION:		
At approximately 10:29 am Operator [REDACTED] reported to ROCC that someone had been struck by his train at Pentagon City track 1. The train was offloaded and removed from service. Personnel was dispatched to the scene to help with recovery efforts. [REDACTED] was removed from service, transported for post incident tested and returned to the division to complete all related paperwork.		
Office of Rail Transportation: Managerial Incident Investigation Report		Page 1 of 4

Figure 17 RTRA Managerial Incident Investigative Report Pg-1



**Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority**
Office of Rail Transportation: Managerial Incident Investigation Report



Key Employees Involved & Employee Statements:

1. [REDACTED]
 - 1028am operator [REDACTED] reported his train coming in contact with a person on the roadway and approach to the platform at Pentagon city station on track 1.
 - 10:30 AM supervisor [REDACTED] arrived on scene and spoke with operator he stated the person was just lying on the roadway. [REDACTED] was not sure if his train was the first to contact the person. Medical assistance was offered to the operator but declined.
 - 10:36 AM ROCC de-energized third rail power. [REDACTED] was given five time to hot stick and confirm
 - 10:39 AM transit [REDACTED]
 - 10:45 AM fire department and [REDACTED]
 - 10:51 AM supervisors [REDACTED]
 - 10:55 AM death confirmed recovery remains under car 3083 second from the last car
 - 11:13 AM fire department and EMS departed
 - 11:34 AM ERT
 - 11:50 AM track two power de energized
 - 11:55 AM train on track 2 departed
 - 12:10 PM CMNT [REDACTED]
 - 12:26 PM started single tracking on track two train ID 451
 - 12:59 PM a request for MOC to activate cleanup personnel
 - 1300 PM Metropolitan Funeral Home
 - 1344 PM a request for third rail power energized track one instructed to call 21651
 - 1405 pm third rail re energized
 - 1446 PM train ID 725 [REDACTED] move the incident train from Pentagon City towards Crystal City destination Alexandria Yard
 - 1456 PM third rail power de energized
 - 1509 PM ERT call ID 656 hot stick and confirmed power was de energized the WSAD was placed on 3rd rail
 - 1510 PM police investigation and removal of body
 - 1514 PM power call ID 121 [REDACTED] completed the investigation and standing by for power to be de energized
 - 1528 PM body removed from roadway
 - 1534 PM scene released to RTRA
 - 1535 PM MOC clean up underway MOOC did not feel comfortable with trains moving on track 2
 - 1609 WSAD removed and all personnel on platform power reenergized
2. Operator [REDACTED] incident report stated "As approached Pentagon city I noticed something on the roadway. As I got closer it was a person, I tried to stop train it was too late I had ran over the person I stopped and notified ROCC."

Figure 18 RTRA Managerial Incident Investigative Report Pg-2



**Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority**
Office of Rail Transportation: Managerial Incident Investigation Report



Post Incident Testing & Employee History:

██████████ was removed from service at 12:45pm for Post Incident Testing

██████████ has been a WMATA employee since September 19, 2016

██████████ has been at train operator since May 15, 2022

██████████ 0 operational violations in the past 2 years. However, he had a station overrun on September 16, 2022

SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT TIMELINE:

10:29am – ROCC is notified of a person struck at Pentagon City track 1
10:30am – Supervisor ██████████ arrives on scene.
10:39am – MTPD arrives on scene.
10:45am – EMS arrives on scene.
10:55am – Body Located with no signs of life under 3rd car.
12:15pm – Operator transported for post incident testing
12:56pm – Single tracking initiated
2:46pm – Incident train moved to Alexandria Yard.
3:34pm – Scene released to RTRA

SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS & PENDING ISSUES:

1. Awaiting VMS results from the lead car.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Investigation On-going/Pending

Figure 19 Managerial Incident Report Pg-3



**Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority**
Office of Rail Transportation: Managerial Incident Investigation Report



INCIDENT PHOTOS: ATTACH ANY SIGNIFICANT PHOTOS BASED ON THE INITIAL INCIDENT INVESTIGATION.

Report Prepared
by: [REDACTED]

4/17/2023

Report Reviewed
by:

Office of Rail Transportation: Managerial Incident Investigation Report

Page 4 of 4

Figure 20 RTRA Managerial Incident Investigative Report Pg-4

Incident Date: 4/15/2023 Time: 10:28 hours
Final Report – Collision Rev. 1
E23253

Drafted By: SAFE 706 – 06/02/2023
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 06/14/2023
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 06/14/2023

Page 34

Appendix F – Incident Train Operator's Written Statement

☐ Property Damage	☐ Smoke	☐ Fire	☐ Customer Complaint
☒ Customer Injury	☐ Customer Illness	☐ Employee Injury	☐ Employee Illness
☐ Criminal Activity	☐ Elevator Entrapment	☐ Rail Vehicle Incident	☐ Other (Explain in description of incident)

WEATHER	LIGHT CONDITIONS (natural lighting)	LIGHTING (artificial lighting)
Clear ☒ Rain ☐	Dawn/Dusk ☐ Daylight ☒	Lights On ☒ Lights Off ☐
Snow ☐ Sleet/Ice ☐	Dark ☐ Tunnel/Underground ☐	Lights Not Working ☐

STATION INCIDENTS: Always include equipment number you use for MOC/AFC/EOC

Elevator/Escalator#: _____ AFC #: _____ Room Number/Location: _____

Failure Number(s): _____

Parking Lot ☐ Paid Area ☐ Free Area ☐ Garage ☐ Station Entrance ☐ Stairway # _____ Platform ☐ Ancillary Room ☐

Injury/Illness reported aboard Train ☐ Other ☐ _____

Name of Responding Supervisor: _____ Name/Department of PLNT/AFC or other WMATA responder: _____

TRAIN INCIDENTS

Train ID 458	Destination New Carrollton	Car Numbers(list all cars in consist): _____	Lead Car: _____
------------------------	--------------------------------------	--	-----------------

Name of Responding Supervisor: _____ Name/Department of CMNT/TRST or other WMATA responder: _____

DESCRIBE THE INCIDENT: Include what you did to correct the problem and who you notified and when.

Describe any property damage and the extent of any injuries.

As approached Pentagon City I noticed something on the roadway. As I got closer it was a person I tried to stop train. It was to late I had ran over the person. I stopped and notified ROCC.

Employee Completing Report

Employee Name (print) [Redacted]	Employee Signature (print) [Redacted]	Date: 4-15-23
Division: Alex	Run # 30	Assigned Days: Wed - Thurs

To Be Completed By Reviewing Manager

Supervisor Name (print) [Redacted]	Date: 4/15/23
---------------------------------------	-------------------------

Action taken needed
Entered into SHS

SMS Number:
20230415#107135 MX

50.753A 04/12 White Copy: Division or Supervisor Yellow Copy: For any incident involving escalators or elevators; remains in kiosk for use of elevator/escalator inspectors

Figure 21 Incident Train Operator Statement Pg-1

**Witness or Employee Statement Form**


TO BE COMPLETED AND

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

DISTRIBUTED WITHIN 24 HOURS

Involved Person or Witness (Use this Block for Non-WMATA Involved Person or Witness)			
Name		Phone Number	E-Mail
Address			
Incident Information			
Date	Incident Time	Date/Time Reported	Location
04/15/2023	10:29am	04/15/2023 10:30am	Pentagon City Station
Incident ID# (from OCC) - Completed by Supervisor		SMS Incidents/Accidents Report# 20230415A 1077358X Completed by Supervisor Gregory Raspberry	
What happened prior to the incident/accident?			
Left Huntington Station at 1015am operating towards New Carrollton			
Describe the incident/accident			
As I approached pentagon City I noticed something on the roadway. As I got closer it was a person. I tried to stop train. It was too late I had ran over the person			
What happened after the incident/accident?			
I stopped and notified ROCC			

Please indicate the area of the injury by placing an X on the corresponding body parts below. To specify which side of the body is involved, please use "L" for left and "R" for right.



Turn Over to Complete Employee and Injury Information



Figure 22 Incident Train Operators Witness Statement Pg-2

**Witness or Employee Statement Form**

TO BE COMPLETED AND

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

DISTRIBUTED WITHIN 24 HOURS

Complete all Fields (Write N/A if field does not apply)

Involved Personnel (Use this Block for WMATA Employees and Contractors)

Name of Involved Person		Witness?	D.O.B.	Employee ID
[Redacted]		☐ Yes ☒ No	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
Phone Number	Job Title	Department/Division (Company)		Union
[Redacted]	Train Operator	RTRA/ Alexandria		L-689
Last Day Worked (Prior to)	Hours Worked (in last 24 hours)	Date/Time Shift Began		
04/14/2023	10	04/15/2023 6:05am		
On Overtime?	Personal Protective Equipment used (list)			
☐ Yes ☒ No	N/A			

Secondary Employment (Write None if employee does not have secondary employment)

Name of Secondary Employer	☐ Full Time ☐ Part Time	Work Hours
Secondary Employer Full Address		
Date of Hire	Supervisor	Phone Number

Injury Information (Complete for all involved People, if there is no injury, write None in Date of Injury)

Date of Injury	Time of Injury	Date/Time Injury Reported	Body Part(s) Injured:
04/15/2023	10:29am	04/15/2023 10:30am	STRESS
Location (Address) where injury occurred (check one: MD ☐ VA ☒ DC)			
Pentagon City Station			
Witness Information (Name, Phone Number, Email, address)			
Did Another Person Cause this Injury?		Name of Responsible Party	
☒ Yes ☐ No		Unknown Person	
Responsible Party Insurance Carrier/Agent		Phone Number	
Are you able to Continue Work?		Name/Address of facility where you will seek treatment	
NO		WMATA EAP	
Doctor's Phone Number		Date you will see your doctor	

Employee, please read before signing:

- (1) This form is only to be used for Employees who are injured on the job.
- (2) All persons having a workers' compensation claim that was caused by the act of another is required to have the written approval of the Authority before agreeing to or signing any settlement for the injuries or lost wages that were paid as part of the whole by the Authority or its insurer to the employee as workers' compensation benefits.
- (3) Any Employee who willfully makes any materially false or misleading statements or representations for the purpose of obtaining any benefits under workers' compensation or leave provisions of the Authority may be subject to prosecution, disciplinary action up to and including dismissal and may adversely affect the employee's rights to workers' compensation benefits.

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT I HAVE READ THE ABOVE GUIDELINES AND UNDERSTAND THEM FULLY AND THE INFORMATION I HAVE PROVIDED IS TRUE

Employee Signature

Original: RISK

Copy: (1) SMS Incidents/Accidents (SAFE)

(2) Employee File

(3) Employee

Figure 23 Incident Train Operator Witness Statement Pg-3

Appendix G – Post–Accident/Post-Incident Determination Referral Form

OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND WELLNESS' DRUG AND ALCOHOL COMPLIANCE PROGRAM POST-ACCIDENT/POST-INCIDENT DETERMINATION REFERRAL FORM			
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) regulations and WMATA's drug and alcohol policy require employees involved in an accident/incident to submit to testing for prohibited drugs and alcohol as soon as possible following the occurrence. FTA regulations and WMATA's policy also require the testing of any other individual whose performance may have contributed to the accident/incident.			
EMPLOYEES MUST BE ESCORTED <i>(Testing will not commence without supervisory escort.)</i>			
GENERAL INFORMATION (Please Print)			
Employee Name		Employee ID Number	Job Title
[Redacted]		[Redacted]	Train Operator
Superintendent	Supervisor	Phone #	Dept./Location
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	RTA/Alexandria
ACCIDENT / INCIDENT INFORMATION			
Accident / Incident Date		Accident / Incident Time	
4/15/2023		10:29 AM	
Reported to Supervisor Date		Reported to Supervisor Time	
4/15/2023		12:15pm	
Please provide a brief description of what happened:			
Person struck by Train			
DECISION MAKER QUESTIONNAIRE			
Select One:	DOT Safety Sensitive	Non-Safety Sensitive (Non-DOT test ONLY)	
1. Did the occurrence involve the <u>operation of a revenue service vehicle</u> ?	YES ☒	NO ☐	
2. Was there a fatality?	YES ☒	NO ☐	
3. Has any individual suffered bodily injury and immediately received medical treatment away from the scene of the accident/incident?	YES ☐	NO ☒	
4. If the vehicle involved was a bus, van, or automobile was there disabling damage as a result of the occurrence and any vehicle removed from the scene by a tow truck or other vehicle?	YES ☐	NO ☒	
5. If the vehicle was a railcar, was the vehicle removed from revenue service as a result of the occurrence?	YES ☒	NO ☐	
If you responded "NO" to question number one, please proceed with <u>Non-DOT</u> testing as appropriate.			
Escorting Supervisor (Print Clearly)		ID Number	Phone Number
[Redacted]		[Redacted]	[Redacted]
Please Continue to Next Page			

Figure 24 Post Accident/Post Incident Determination Referral Form Pg-1

Incident Date: 4/15/2023 Time: 10:28 hours
Final Report – Collision Rev. 1
E23253

Drafted By: SAFE 706 – 06/02/2023
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 06/14/2023
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 06/14/2023

Appendix H – Maximo Work Orders



Work Order #: 17809108
Type: CM

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Maintenance and Material Management System
Work Order Details



Page 1 of 3
MX76PROD

Status: CLOSE
04/17/2023 12:00

Work Description: Person Struck By A Train, 0/0, C08, PUB, JUMP, 458
Job Plan Description:

Asset:		Work Information	
Asset Tag: R3052	3052, RAIL CAR, BRED A, 3000 AC, A CAR	Owning Office: CMNT-CMNT-CMNT	Parent:
Asset S/N: 3052		Maintenance Office: CMNT-GRBT-INSP	Create Date: 04/15/2023 15:21
Location: 1437	E99, GREENBELT YARD	Labor Group: CMNT	Actual Start: 04/15/2023 15:23
Work Location: 1213	C99, ALEXANDRIA YARD	Crew:	Actual Comp: 04/16/2023 13:25
Failure Class: CMNT003	CAR BODY	Lead:	Item: L19050002
Problem Code: 2423	N/A CODE (BODY SYSTEM)	GL Account: WMATA-02-33392-50499160-041-*****~OPR**	Target Start:
Requested By:		Supervisor: E002287	Target Comp:
Chain Mark Start:		Requestor Phone: 7036672858	Scheduled Start:
Create-Mileage: 2670216.0		Chain Mark End:	
		Complete-Mileage: 2670373.0	

Task ID	Task Description	Work Accomplishment	Reason	Status	Position	Warranty?
10	UNDERCAR NEEDS CLEANING UNDERCAR AND COMPONENTS NEED CLEANING C/W NO PLATS FOUND. GROUND CABLE ABOVE AXLE #4 BROKEN. GROUND CABLE FOR AXLE #3 UPPER AND LOWER GROUND BRUSH BOX BROKEN.	INSPECTED	INCIDENT//ACCIDENT	CLOSE	232	N
20	ESTABLISHED COMMUNICATIONS WITH VMS AND ALL SUBSYSTEMS.	RESET	INCIDENT//ACCIDENT	CLOSE		N

WT_plust_woprint.rptdesign 04/25/2023 12:02

Figure 26 Maximo Work order Pg-1



Work Order #: 17809109
Type: CM

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Maintenance and Material Management System
Work Order Details



Page 1 of 3
MX76PROD

Status: CLOSE
04/17/2023 11:59

Work Description: Person Struck By A Train, 0/0, C08, PUB, JUMP, 458
Job Plan Description:

Asset:		Work Information	
Asset Tag: R3018	3018, RAIL CAR, BRED A, 3000 AC, A CAR	Owning Office: CMNT-CMNT-CMNT	Parent:
Asset S/N: 3018		Maintenance Office: CMNT-GRBT-INSP	Create Date: 04/15/2023 15:21
Location: 1437	E99, GREENBELT YARD	Labor Group: CMNT	Actual Start: 04/15/2023 15:23
Work Location: 1213	C99, ALEXANDRIA YARD	Crew:	Actual Comp: 04/16/2023 13:21
Failure Class: CMNT003	CAR BODY	Lead:	Item: L19050002
Problem Code: 2423	N/A CODE (BODY SYSTEM)	GL Account: WMATA-02-33392-50499160-041-*****~OPR**	Target Start:
Requested By:		Supervisor: E002287	Target Comp:
Chain Mark Start:		Requestor Phone: 7036672858	Scheduled Start:
Create-Mileage: 2490954.0		Chain Mark End:	
		Complete-Mileage: 2491111.0	

Task ID	Task Description	Work Accomplishment	Reason	Status	Position	Warranty?
10	UNDERCAR NEEDS CLEANING UNDERCAR AND COMPONENTS NEED CLEANING C/W NO PLATS FOUND. NO DAMAGE FOUND.	INSPECTED	INCIDENT//ACCIDENT	CLOSE	232	N
20	ESTABLISHED COMMUNICATIONS WITH VMS AND ALL SUBSYSTEMS.	RESET	INCIDENT//ACCIDENT	CLOSE		N

WT_plust_woprint.rptdesign 04/25/2023 12:11

Figure 27 Maximo Work Orders Pg-2

Incident Date: 4/15/2023 Time: 10:28 hours
Final Report – Collision Rev. 1
E23253

Drafted By: SAFE 706 – 06/02/2023
Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 06/14/2023
Approved By: SAFE 71 – 06/14/2023



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Maintenance and Material Management System

Work Order Details

Page 1 of 3

MX76PROD

Work Order #: 17809110

Type: CM



Status: CLOSE

04/17/2023 11:58

Work Description: Person Struck By A Train, 0/0, C08, PUB, JUMP, 458

Job Plan Description:

Asset Information		Work Information		Parent	
Asset: R3019	3019, RAIL CAR, BRED A, 3000 AC, B CAR	Owning Office: CMNT-CMNT-CMNT		Create Date: 04/15/2023 15:21	
Asset Tag: R3019		Maintenance Office: CMNT-GRBT-INSP		Actual Start: 04/15/2023 15:23	
Asset S/N: 3019		Labor Group: CMNT		Actual Comp: 04/16/2023 13:21	
Location: 1437	E99, GREENBELT YARD	Crew:		Item: L18060002	
Work Location: 1213	C99, ALEXANDRIA YARD	Lead:			
Failure Class: CMNT003	CAR BODY	GL Account: WMATA-02-33392-50499160-041-*****-OPR**			
Problem Code: 2423	N/A CODE (BODY SYSTEM)	Supervisor: E002287		Target Start:	
Requested By:		Requestor Phone: 7036672858		Target Comp:	
Chain Mark Start:		Chain Mark End:		Scheduled Start:	
Create-Mileage: 2490954.0		Complete-Mileage: 2491111.0			

Task ID	Task Description	Component	Work Accomplishment	Reason	Status	Position	Warranty?
10	UNDERCAR NEEDS CLEANING						
	UNDERCAR AND COMPONENTS NEED CLEANING C/W NO FLATS FOUND. NO DAMAGE FOUND.						
	000-300-B01 CAR BODY: UNDER CAR STRUCTURE	Component: GROUP: 2K/3K/6K/7K	Work Accomplishment: INSPECTED	Reason: INCIDENT//ACCIDENT	Status: CLOSE	Position: 232	Warranty?: N

WT_plust_woprint.rptdesign

04/25/2023 12:17

Figure 28 Maximo Work Order Pg-3



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Maintenance and Material Management System

Work Order Details

Page 1 of 2

MX76PROD

Work Order #: 17809111

Type: CM



Status: CLOSE

04/17/2023 11:59

Work Description: Person Struck By A Train, 0/0, C08, PUB, JUMP, 458

Job Plan Description:

Asset Information		Work Information		Parent	
Asset: R3082	3082, RAIL CAR, BRED A, 3000 AC, A CAR	Owning Office: CMNT-CMNT-CMNT		Create Date: 04/15/2023 15:21	
Asset Tag: R3082		Maintenance Office: CMNT-GRBT-INSP		Actual Start: 04/15/2023 15:23	
Asset S/N: 3082		Labor Group: CMNT		Actual Comp: 04/16/2023 13:24	
Location: 1437	E99, GREENBELT YARD	Crew:		Item: L18050002	
Work Location: 1213	C99, ALEXANDRIA YARD	Lead:			
Failure Class: CMNT003	CAR BODY	GL Account: WMATA-02-33392-50499160-041-*****-OPR**			
Problem Code: 2423	N/A CODE (BODY SYSTEM)	Supervisor: E002287		Target Start:	
Requested By:		Requestor Phone: 7036672858		Target Comp:	
Chain Mark Start:		Chain Mark End:		Scheduled Start:	
Create-Mileage: 2693879.0		Complete-Mileage: 2694036.0			

Task ID	Task Description	Component	Work Accomplishment	Reason	Status	Position	Warranty?
10	UNDERCAR INSPECTION PERFORMED, DO DAMAGE FOUNDE.						
	000-300-B01 CAR BODY: UNDER CAR STRUCTURE	Component: GROUP: 2K/3K/6K/7K	Work Accomplishment: INSPECTED	Reason: NO TROUBLE FOUND	Status: CLOSE	Position: 232	Warranty?: N
20	ESTABLISHED COMMUNICATIONS WITH VMS AND ALL SUBSYSTEMS.						
	000-300-V02 VEHICLE MONITORING SYSTEM; VMS;	Component: 2K/3K/6K	Work Accomplishment: RESET	Reason: INCIDENT//ACCIDENT	Status: CLOSE	Position:	Warranty?: N

WT_plust_woprint.rptdesign

04/25/2023 12:19

Figure 29 Maximo Work Orders Pg-4

Incident Date: 4/15/2023 Time: 10:28 hours
 Final Report – Collision Rev. 1
 E23253

Drafted By: SAFE 706 – 06/02/2023
 Reviewed By: SAFE 71 – 06/14/2023
 Approved By: SAFE 71 – 06/14/2023



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Maintenance and Material Management System
Work Order Details

Page 1 of 2
MX76PROD

Work Order #: 17809112
Type: CM



Status: CLOSE
04/17/2023 11:59

Work Description: Person Struck By A Train, 0/0, C08, PUB, JUMP, 458
Job Plan Description:

Work Information			
Asset: R3083	3083, RAIL CAR, BREDA, 3000 AC, B CAR	Owning Office: CMNT-CMNT-CMNT	Parent:
Asset Tag: R3083		Maintenance Office: CMNT-GRBT-INSP	Create Date: 04/15/2023 15:21
Asset S/N: 3083		Labor Group: CMNT	Actual Start: 04/15/2023 15:23
Location: 1437	E99, GREENBELT YARD	Crew:	Actual Comp: 04/16/2023 13:24
Work Location: 1213	C99, ALEXANDRIA YARD	Lead:	Item: L18060002
Failure Class: CMNT003	CAR BODY	GL Account: WMATA-02-33392-50499160-041-*****-OPR	
Problem Code: 2423	N/A CODE (BODY SYSTEM)	Supervisor: E002287	Target Start:
Requested By:		Requestor Phone: 7036672858	Target Comp:
Chain Mark Start:		Chain Mark End:	Scheduled Start:
Create-Mileage: 2693879.0		Complete-Mileage: 2694036.0	

Task ID
10 UNDERCAR INSPECTED, NO DAMAGED FOUND

Task ID
20 PERFORMED BRAKE RATES TEST WITH PTU. ALL BRAKE RATES ARE WITHIN SPECS.

Component	GROUP: 2K/3K/6K/7K	Work Accomp: INSPECTED	Reason: NO TROUBLE FOUND	Status: CLOSE	Position: 232	Warranty?: N
000-300-B01 CAR BODY: UNDER CAR STRUCTURE						
FRONT TRUCK:						
B5- 69.8						
B4- 52.8						
B3- 47.7						
B2- 40.4						
B1- 21.9						
COAST- 0						
SNOW- 6.71						
EMER- 70.8						
REAR TRUCK:						
B5- 70.7						
B4- 53.4						
B3- 48.8						
B2- 42.3						
B1- 22.3						
COAST- 0						
SNOW- 7.11						
EMER- 72.2						

WT_plust_woprint.rptdesign 04/25/2023 12:21

Figure 30 Maximo Work Order Pg-5

Appendix I – After Action Review

AAR	2023-07 Interagency
Incident	Pentagon City Station Person Struck by Train
Incident Date	April 15, 2023,
Location	Pentagon City Station
Scope of AAR	Incident report of a train-person collision until the restoration of regular operations.
WMATA Core Capabilities	Operational Communications, Operation Coordination, Public Information and Warning
Participants	WMATA, ACFD, WMSC
Point of Contact	
Incident Response Summary	On Saturday, April 15, 2023, at approximately 10:24 AM, the Pentagon City Station platform cameras captured a person entering Track 1 from the platform and proceeding into the tunnel. At approximately 10:28 AM, Train ID 458 Train Operator notified the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) that their train had made contact with the person on the roadway before entering Pentagon City Station, Track 1. The Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Supervisor, appointed by the ROCC, assumed control of the incident scene, and took on the role of Metro Incident Commander (MIC). As the MIC, they assumed responsibility for coordinating the response of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA). The RTRA supervisor confirmed that power was de-energized on Track 1, applied the incident train handbrakes, and ensured that the train was free of customers by conducting a walk-through inspection. Subsequently, ROCC de-energized power on Track 2 and instructed Train ID 406 Train Operator to hold at Pentagon City Station, Track 2. Arlington County Fire Department (ACFD) and Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) arrived on the scene. An efficient and well-structured Unified Command (UC) hierarchy was promptly established. The ACFD facilitated the prompt installation of Warning Strobe and Alarm Devices, conducted hot sticking, and confirmed no signs of life before initiating the recovery phase to stabilize the situation. Cleanup and rigorous track inspection protocols were subsequently executed, and the entire process was concluded at approximately 4:09 PM. At approximately 4:20 PM, comprehensive accountability measures were conducted for both personnel and equipment. The incident site was declared clear for the resumption of normal service, with power restoration taking place.
Strengths	Operational Coordination
Needs Improvement	Operational Communications

For Official Use Only

Page 2 of 6

Figure 31 After Action Review (AAR) Pg 2

Incident Observations

Lessons Learned / Needs Improvement

Core Capability	Operational Communications
Observation	The assessment revealed operational communication gaps resulting in miscommunication issues, including insufficient radio infrastructure and response personnel bypassing the command structure. Despite these setbacks, the inter-agency response to the incident was effective overall.
Recommendation	To improve interoperability and connectivity in the field during response operations, it is recommended to implement the talk-around feature. This is due to the frequent radio issues encountered during operations. It is essential to incorporate the talk-around feature into the Incident Management Framework (IMF) training to address the communication gaps that may arise due to the quality of the radio reception throughout the metro rail system. However, talk-around radio channels on WMATA's system shall be recorded before implementation to serve as a verifiable and dependable record, facilitate investigations, enhance training and evaluation processes, provide support in emergency situations, and ensure adherence to regulatory requirements. Additionally, it is recommended to establish a single radio channel for incident operations to improve communication efficiency. Furthermore, it has been advised that split platform stations should be closed during serious incidents due to the challenges associated with performing single-tracking operations or having trains bypass the station.

Strengths

Core Capability	Operational Coordination
Observation	An effective Unified Command structure was established using the Incident Command System (ICS).
Recommendation	A Hotwash is a post-incident review that involves all relevant counterparts to identify areas of improvement, develop solutions to gaps, and recognize positive outcomes. It is recommended that the Hotwash be conducted via Microsoft Teams meeting or any other suitable means. In addition, it may be beneficial to coordinate with the responding fire services and conduct the Hotwash at the Jurisdictional Incident Commander (IC) firehouse.

Core Capability	Public Information and Warning
Observation	Metrobus and Metrorail collaborated to provide the public with accurate information on operational service during the emergency incidents. Metro Alerts subscribers were notified of delays, service changes, and detours. Metrobus staff effectively engaged with customers.
Recommendation	N/A

For Official Use Only

Page 3 of 6

Figure 32 After Action Review (AAR) Pg 3

AAR Information

Data Sources	AAR meeting, responder interviews.
AAR Meeting	Friday, May 5, 2023
AAR Meeting Participants	WMATA, ACFD, WMSC
AAR Review Team	

Conclusion

The collective response of WMATA personnel and ACFD was deemed effective in achieving the intended outcome, maintaining compliance with established safety protocols, and promoting inter-agency coordination. As is standard practice, such emergency responses necessitate a UC structure. In this particular case, the incident and subsequent AAR presented an opportunity for WMATA to foster and fortify relationships with our jurisdictional partners. The AAR successfully met its objectives by conducting a joint analysis of the event, documenting the identified findings, and outlining specific improvement plans to further refine our response efforts to emergency incidents, with the ultimate aim of ensuring the safety of our passengers and colleagues throughout the entirety of the WMATA system.

Figure 33 After Action Review Pg 4

Appendix J – Why-Tree Analysis

