



W-0455 – Red Signal Overrun at Ballston-MU Station - January 17, 2026

Document Purpose

This WMSC written report on WMATA Metrorail's safety event investigation and review of Metrorail's findings in accordance with the WMSC Program Standard, in conjunction with the attached Metrorail investigation report that has undergone WMSC staff review, feedback, and Metrorail revision, describes the investigation activities, identifies factors causing or contributing to the accident, and sets forth ongoing, additional, or upcoming corrective actions and further oversight work (such as inspections and audits) as necessary or appropriate. The WMSC's ongoing oversight during the investigative process, including safety event reporting and verification, participation in investigative interviews, data review, consistent communication with the Metrorail investigations team, and feedback on Metrorail's reports leads to further improvements prior to consideration of the reports by WMSC Commissioners for adoption. The WMSC's safety event investigation oversight assures the sufficiency and thoroughness of Metrorail's investigations. The WMSC Commissioners are considering these documents (the WMSC review and Metrorail's investigation report) as a unified item for adoption at the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission meeting on October 6, 2026.

WMSC staff recommend adoption of this investigation.

Safety event summary:

On January 17, 2026, at 7:00 p.m., a radio rail traffic controller (RTC) authorized Train 940 to proceed under a permissive block to no closer than 10 feet from red signal K04-08 in approach to Ballston-MU Station on track 2. Trains were single tracking between Ballston-MU Station and East Falls Church Station due to maintenance on track 1. The train operator misunderstood the radio RTC's instructions and repeated back that they had a permissive block to the 8-car marker at Ballston Station, which the radio RTC did not correct.

Two minutes later, Train 940, operating in manual mode, passed red signal K04-08, which caused a visual Advanced Information Management System (AIMS) alert in the control center. The radio RTC contacted the operator to confirm the train's location and the red signal overrun. After confirming the incident at Ballston-MU Station, the radio RTC immediately stopped Train 939, which was traveling in the opposite direction on track 2, facing Train 940, preventing a potential head-on collision. The two trains came within 700 feet of each other.

The control center dispatched rail operations supervisors (ROS), the Emergency Response Team (ERT), and Signals Maintenance personnel, and notified the Safety Information Official (SIO).

The lead car of Train 940 passed over switch point 3B, which was lying in the reverse position. The wheels of the second car in the consist were stuck in switch point 3B. At 7:25 p.m., rescue Train 742 was dispatched from Virginia Square-GMU Station to transfer all 147 customers from Train 940.

A rail operations supervisor took over operations of Train 940 and was given permission to move the train off the switch point a total of 15 feet at 8:51 p.m. ERT was then able to clamp switch 3B in the normal position to allow train 940 to be removed from service in accordance with Metrorail policy.

ERT repaired the dents on switch point 3B and normal service resumed at 10:30 p.m.



No injuries were reported.

The train operator of Train 940 was removed from service in accordance with Metrorail policy. WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Program determined that they complied with the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program Policy.

The probable cause was the failure of both the radio RTC and the train operator to follow the communication procedures in MOR section 12.4.3. Additionally, the train operator did not fully understand the radio RTC's instructions because they were unfamiliar with the term "permissive block" but proceeded to move the train instead of requesting clarification.

Investigation W-0455 led to specific recommended corrective actions (RCA), including:

- The train operator completed re-instruction training, and a rail operations supervisor conducted weekly ride-alongs with the train operator for a month to ensure operational compliance.
- The radio RTC completed re-instruction training.
- Uniform Rules Compliance Program (URCP) compliance oversight – Communication.
- Control center radio protocol reinforcement.
- Control center radio repeat-back and positive identification reinforcement.



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Department of Safety
Office of Safety Investigations

FINAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION A&I E26255

Date of Event:	January 17, 2026
Type of Event:	O-8: Red Signal Overrun
Incident Time:	19:02 Hours
Location:	Ballston Station, Track 2
Time and How received by Safety:	19:04 Hours, Safety Information Official (SIO)
Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC) Notification Time:	20:00 Hours
Responding Safety Officers:	WMATA: Office of Safety Investigations (OSI) WMSC: None Other: None
Rail Vehicle:	Train ID 940 L7570x71-7259x58-7591x90-7607x06T
Injuries:	None
Damage:	Some light dents on switch 3B point
Emergency Responders:	None
Safety Universal Data System (SUDS) Number	20260117#134675MX

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Drafted By: SAFE 704 - 03/09/2026
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 - 03/21/2026
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 04/19/2026

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Ballston-MU Station – Red Signal Overrun

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIMS	Advanced Information Management System
ARS	Audio Recording System
CAP	Corrective Action Plan
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
CMNT	Office of Car Maintenance
CMOR	Office of the Chief Fleet Officer
ER	Event Recorder
FT	Foul Time
IIT	Incident Investigation Team
I/A	Incidents/Accidents
MICC	Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center
MOR	Metrorail Operating Rulebook
MTPD	Metro Transit Police Department
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
OSC	On-Scene Commander
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
RTC	Rail Traffic Controller
RTRA	Office of Rail Transportation
RVO	Rail Vehicle Operator
SAFE	Department of Safety
SUDS	Safety Universal Data System
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WMSC	Washington Metrorail Safety Commission
WSAD	Warning and Strobe Alarm Device

Executive Summary

**Note that all times listed are approximate and may contain minor variations due to differences between systems of record. **

On Saturday, January 17, 2026, at 19:00 hours, a Radio Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) instructed Train ID 940, an eight-car, 7000 series train (L7570x71-7259x58-7591x90-7606x06T), that they had a permissive block no closer than 10 feet of red signal K04-08 on approach to Ballston-MU Station on track 2. The train was operated by a newly certified Rail Vehicle Operator (RVO) in manual mode. Single track operations were established at Ballston-MU Station due to edge light replacement and maintenance on track 1. The RVO misunderstood the Radio RTC's instructions and gave a wrong repeat back which was then acknowledged by the Radio RTC.

Two minutes later, Train ID 940 overran K04-08 red signal causing the Advanced Information Management System (AIMS) to send an alert to the Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center (MICC). This prompted the Radio RTC to inquire about Train ID 940's location and requested confirmation of a red signal overrun. Once the Radio RTC confirmed the red signal overrun incident at Ballston-MU Station, they immediately stopped Train ID 939. Train ID 939 was traveling in the opposite direction on the same track 2 and had authorization to berth on the platform at Ballston-MU Station.

The MICC dispatched the Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD), Rail Operations Supervisors (ROs), Emergency Response Team (ERT), notified the Safety Information Official (SIO), and Signals Maintenance personnel. A Safety Investigator responded to the incident and assessed the scene and gathered information from the site.

A rescue train, Train ID 742, was transported from Virginia Square Station to the scene and all customers, including one disabled, were safely transferred from the train involved.

In adherence to Office of Rail Transportation (RTRA) Standard Operating Procedure 102-01-02, which outlines the protocol for removing an employee from service for involvement in an operational safety event, the Radio RTC dispatched a ROS to relieve the RVO from duty for post-incident testing.

In accordance with the Office of the Chief Fleet Officer – Rail, Standard Operating Procedure 102.04, and Operations Administrative Policy 102.06, the Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center initiated the removal of Train ID 940 from service for Incident Investigations Team investigation procedures.

As a result of this incident, there were no injuries reported; however, there were some dents reported on one switch point.

The probable cause of the red signal overrun event at Ballston-MU Station on January 17, 2026, was the result of the Radio RTC and the RVO not following established communications procedures detailed in the MOR section 12.4.3. Specifically, the RVO did not fully understand the instructions given by the Radio RTC but proceeded with moving the train. A contributing factor was the RVO's lack of experience and not understanding what a permissive block was.

Incident Site

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Ballston-MU Station is an underground station with direct tracks fixation. This station has a split platform and features interlocking at inbound end. The incident happened on track 2 inbound end of the station before reaching the platform.

Field Sketch/Schematics




Image 1: The red arrow indicates the location of the incident. The above depiction is not to scale.

Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this accident investigation and candid self-evaluation is to collect and analyze available facts, determine the probable cause(s) of the incident, identify contributing factors, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Investigative Methods

The investigative methodologies included the following:

- Physical Site Assessment and document review
- Formal Interviews – Safety interviewed two individuals as part of this investigation. The interviews included persons present at, during, and after the incident, those directly involved in the response process, and representatives from the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC). Safety interviewed the following individuals:
 - RVO
 - Radio RTC
- Documentation Review – Collection of relevant work history information and process documentation contained in WMATA systems of record. These records include:
 - Metrorail Operating Rulebook (MOR)

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- National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
 - RVO Training Procedures & Records
 - RVO Certification Records
 - 30-Day Work History
 - Office Rail Transportation(RTRA) – Investigation Data
 - Office of the Chief Fleet Officer – Incident Investigation Team Investigation Data
 - Office of Car Maintenance - Rail Fleet Investigation Data
 - Metro Integrated Command and Communications Center – Investigation Data
 - Communications and Signaling – Investigation Data
 - Maximo Data
- System Data Recording Review – Collection of information contained in Metro Data Recording Systems. This data includes:
 - Audio Recording System (ARS) playback
 - Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)
 - System Performance On-Time Summary (SPOTS)
 - Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)
 - Oracle Report

Investigation

On Saturday, January 17, 2026, due to station edge light replacement and maintenance at Ballston-MU Station on track 1, single tracking operations were established on track 2. This impacted on the normal traffic flow.

At 18:55 hours, the Audio Recording System (ARS) revealed that the Radio RTC requested Train ID 940 to delay two minutes at each station from Clarendon Station to Virginia Square Station. At 19:00 hours, while waiting at Virginia Square Station on track 2, the Radio RTC advised Train ID 940, an eight-car, 7000 series train (L7570x71-7259x58-7591x90-7606x06T), that they had a permissive block no closer than 10 feet of red signal K04-08 on approach to Ballston-MU Station. The train was operated by a recently certified RVO in manual mode.

ARS revealed that the RVO repeated that they had a permissive block on red signal, eight-car marker, and stop at Ballston-MU Station. The Radio RTC acknowledged their repeat back without correcting the RVO.

Two minutes later, at 19:02 hours, ARS revealed that the Radio RTC contacted Train ID 940 and asked about their location and requested confirmation if they passed the red signal. Train ID 940 confirmed passing K04-08 signal red and stopped at K2 277+00. Once the Radio RTC confirmed the red signal overrun incident, they immediately stopped Train ID 939 from entering Ballston-MU Station because Train ID 939 was traveling from East Walls Church Station in the opposite direction and had authorization to berth on the platform on track 2 at Ballston-MU Station. A crossover route was already set for Train ID 939 to service Ballston-MU Station and clear the interlocking while Train ID 940 held at K04-08 signal red.

To minimize the customers' wait time, a four-shuttle bus bridge was established between East Falls Church Station and Virginia Square Station.

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MICC dispatched MTPD, ROSSs, ERT, notified the SIO, and Signals Maintenance personnel. Signaling Maintenance personnel inspected the switches or other signaling components for damage.

Signals Maintenance personnel, Safety Investigator, and ERT assessed and inspected the incident scene. It revealed that the lead car passed over the switch (SW) 3B point, but the following car trucks sat on the SW-3B point and the train wheels were stuck in the SW-3B point that was lying in a Reverse position for Train ID 939 crossover move. The Radio RTC requested whether they could move Train ID 940 to the station platform and make it easy for customers to exit the train. Signals Maintenance personnel deemed it unsafe to move the train forward. At 19:25 hours, ARS revealed that the Radio RTC instructed ROS #1 to depart Virginia Square Station with the rescue train, Train ID 742, and had an absolute block no closer than two feet to Train ID 940 and requested a customer head count from the RVO of Train ID 940.

The RVO of Train ID 940 reported 147 customers including one customer with a disability. However, the customer could transfer to the rescue train with no additional assistance. At 19:41 hours, ROS #1 teamed up with the RVO of Train ID 940 and transferred all 147 customers safely to the rescue train. The customers were returned to Virginia Square Station. ERT arrived on scene and waited for Safety Investigator's arrival to start working on removing the train.

At 20:01 hours, a Safety Investigator responded to the incident, assessed the scene, and gathered information from the site. This allowed Signals Maintenance personnel to crank SW-3B back in Normal position and permitted the train to move 15 feet towards Virginia Square Station. The RVO was removed from service following the red signal overrun. A Rail Operations Supervisor (ROS) took over the train operations.

As Train ID 940 was offloaded, the Signals Maintenance personnel assessed the integrity of the wayside infrastructures. The assessment revealed that Train ID 940 entered the interlocking in normal traffic flow while switch (SW) 3B was laying in Reverse position. The SW-3B point had some dents; however, the electrical and mechanical integrity and functionality of that machine was not impacted. All the signaling apparatus tests and safety recertifications tests were performed successfully on SW-3B and all other switch machines within the interlocking. Additionally, signals were tested successfully by setting up traffic routes.

Once Train ID 940 cleared switches SW-3B and SW-1B, Signals Maintenance personnel proceeded with their testing. All switches passed the ½ gauge, 1/8 and ¼ gauge tests. They also performed switches cutout tests. Signals Maintenance concluded their tests by setting routes to get lunars on each and all of the signals within interlocking. From crossover to straight through move, each signal went to red over aspect to lunar or flashing lunar, indicating crossover.

The dents recorded on SW-3B point were addressed by the ERT crew by shaving off the dents and polishing the switch.

At 21:15 hours, the Radio RTC gave the ROS an absolute block to Clarendon Station, track two and instructed them to contact Ops. 2 once there to continue the transport to New Carrollton Yard. At 21:52 hours, the ROS contacted the New Carrollton Terminal Supervisor to advise they were transported Train ID 740, an eight car consist into New Carrollton Yard.

At 22:15 hours, all personnel and equipment cleared the roadway at Ballston-MU Station, but Signals Maintenance remained for observation and interlocking support as the single tracking continued. At 22:30 hours, Signals Maintenance returned the interlocking back to service.

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Chronological Event Timeline

A review of ARS playback, i.e., phone and radio communications, revealed the following timeline:

Time	Description
18:55:11 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed the RVO of Train ID 940 to hold two minutes at Clarendon Station and Virginia Square Station, then hold at Virginia Square Station due to two trains passing through the single tracking area. <u>RVO</u> : Acknowledged and repeated hold for 2 minutes at Clarendon and Virginia Square. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio, Ops4]
19:00:55 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Advised Train ID 940 that they had a permissive block no closer than 10 feet of red signal K04-08. Advised that a train was moving through the single-tracking area. <u>RVO</u> : Repeated they have a permissive block on red signal, 8-car marker stop, Ballston Station. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged the message. [Radio, Ops 4]
19:02:50 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Requested the RVO's train location. <u>RVO</u> : Advised at chain marker (CM) K2 277+00. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Requested confirmation if they passed red signal K04-08. <u>RVO</u> : Confirmed that they passed the red signal. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Advised the RVO that their permissive block was no closer than 10 feet of the red signal. [Radio, Ops 4]
19:03:54 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Advised Train ID 939 to properly berth at Ballston Station on track 2 and make announcements to customers. Train ID 939: No Response. [Radio, Ops 4]
19:04:01 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Advised Train ID 939 that signal K04-06 red. Train ID 939: Reported that it looked like Train ID 940 was on the platform. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Requested confirmation if they were already on the platform. Train ID 939: Confirmed. [Radio, Ops 4]
19:04:42 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Attempted to contact ROS #1 and requested for their location. ROS #1: Advised that they were located at Virginia Square Station. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Advised them to stand by track 2 because they needed them to respond to the red signal overrun incident. [Radio, Ops 4]
19:05:01 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Requested confirmation again if Train ID 940 was on the platform. Train ID 939: Responded "I am in the tunnel; however, it looks like it is on the platform." <u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed to announce to customers and key up in reverse towards Vienna. Train ID 939: Acknowledged. [Radio, Ops 4]
19:07:57 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Contacted Train ID 940 requested to provide how many cars were on the platform. Train ID 940: Advised zero cars on the platform. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Requested confirmation that there were no cars on the platform. Train ID 940: Confirmed no cars on the platform, however, they were located at chain marker K2 277+00. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Repeated back as K2 270. Train ID 940: Confirmed it. [Radio, Ops 4]
19:09:36 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Requested confirmation that they were standing at CM K2 225.

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	<u>Train ID 940</u> : Made corrections that they were located at CM K2 277+00. [Radio, Ops 4]
19:11:26 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Contacted ROS #2 and instructed them to landline Rail 2. <u>ROS #2</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio, Ops 4]
19:12:17 hours	<u>Signals Maintenance</u> : Advised the Radio RTC that three Signals Maintenance personnel were on the scene for the red signal overrun inspections and requesting a foul time to do so. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged the message and asked for chain markers. <u>Signals Maintenance</u> : Advised CM K1, K2 277+00 to K1, K2 274+00. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio, Ops 4]
19:16:07 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Advised Signals Maintenance to inspect switches 1B and 3B on track 2. <u>Signals Maintenance</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio, Ops 4]
19:21:07 hours	<u>Signals Maintenance</u> : Advised the Radio RTC that they completed their wayside inspections and found SW-3B was laying in the Reverse position and was trailed. Also, railroad ties were obstructed in the switch area. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged the message and asked for Signals Maintenance recommendation.
19:22:07 hours	<u>ROS #1</u> : Advised the Radio RTC that they were located at Virginia Square Station by Train ID 942. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed ROS #1 to confirm that Train ID 942 was clear of customers. Once verified, the train would be used as a rescue train at Ballston-MU Station to get Train ID 940 customers transferred. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Advised that Train ID 942 was clear of customers and heading to lead car. [Radio, Ops 4]
19:23:51 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed Train ID 940 to perform head count of customers aboard on the train. <u>Train ID 940</u> : Acknowledged the message. [Radio, Ops 4]
19:25:33 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Requested confirmation from ROS #1 if they were operating Train ID 942 which became Train ID 742. <u>ROS #1</u> : Confirmed.
19:25:43 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed ROS #1 to proceed to Ballston-MU for rescue operation and not closer than two feet to Train ID 940. <u>ROS #1</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio, Ops 4]
19:26:48 hours	<u>Train ID 940</u> : Advised the Radio RTC there were 147 customers on the train. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged and asked whether there were any customers with a disability on the train. <u>Train ID 940</u> : Advised one customer with a disability. [Radio, Ops 4]
19:27:12 hours	<u>ROS #2</u> : Advised the Radio RTC that they arrived at Ballston-MU Station. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged the message and instructed them to stand by platform track 2. [Radio, Ops 4]
19:28:51 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Asked if Train ID 940 was close to the platform to allow it to properly berth and offload customers. <u>ROS #2</u> : Estimated the distance from the lead car to the platform was about 300 feet and they had Signals Maintenance working on it and waiting on them. [Radio, Ops 4]
19:29:23 hours	<u>RTRA Supervisor</u> : Contacted the Ops. 4 Button RTC to inform them that the train could not be moved until ATC said it was safe to move because the train could be derailed with a trailed switch. Tell the Radio RTC to slow down.

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	<u>Button RTC</u> : Responded they were unaware of those instructions and would speak to the Radio RTC. [Phone Ops. 4]
19:30:27 hours	<u>ROS #2</u> : Advised the Radio RTC that Signals Maintenance personnel were investigating the incident and were looking for a way to move the train forward to the platform. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged the message. [Radio, Ops 4]
19:32:27 hours	<u>ROS #1</u> : Advised the Radio RTC that they brought rescue Train ID 742 two feet to Train ID 940 and keyed down. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged the message and confirmed if both trains were 2 feet apart. <u>ROS #1</u> : Confirmed and advised that customers would be able to crossover. [Radio, Ops 4]
19:33:22 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed ROS #1 to confirm that both trains were keyed down and start the rescue operation. <u>ROS #1</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio, Ops 4]
19:34:27 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Attempted to contact Train ID 940 and inquired about whether there were any customers in a wheelchair aboard the train. <u>Train ID 940</u> : Advised that there were no customers using wheelchairs or walkers on the train. [Radio, Ops 4]
19:37:25 hours	<u>ROS #2</u> : Advised the Radio RTC that Signals Maintenance personnel deemed unsafe condition to move the train because train might derail if moved. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio, Ops 4]
19:41:52 hours	<u>ROS #1</u> : Advised Radio RTC that all the customers transferred to rescue train. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio, Ops 4]
19:43:58 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Attempted to contact ERT and asked if they were on- scene yet. <u>ERT</u> : Acknowledged being on the scene. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed them to stand by for foul time protection. <u>ERT</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio, Ops 4]
19:45:37 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Permitted absolute block to Train ID 742, the rescue train to Virginia Square Station and held there due to another train ahead of them. <u>ROS #1</u> : Acknowledged.[Radio, Ops 4]
19:52:44 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed ROS #2 to concur with ERT to get foul time permission to access the roadway <u>ROS #2</u> : Acknowledged.[Radio, Ops 4]
19:53:51 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Granted foul time to ERT and ROS #2 to access the roadway and inspect the incident. <u>ERT</u> : Acknowledged.[Radio, Ops 4]
19:57:47 hours	<u>ROS #2</u> : Advised Radio RTC that they had safely boarded the train with RVO of Train ID 940. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged.
20:09:18 hours	<u>ERT</u> : Advised Radio RTC that the lead 7570 car passed the switch point but the second to the lead car was sitting on top of the switch point. And the switch was still in Reverse position. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged.[Radio, Ops 4]
20:15:46 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Made a blanket announcement that red signal overrun occurred at Ballston-MU Station that caused track 1 and 2 out of service. Orange Lines and Silver Lines trains were turning back from East Falls Church Station and at Virginia Square Station.[Radio, Ops 4]
20:22:41 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Attempted to contact ERT to determine whether they were ready to relinquish their foul time.

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	<u>ERT</u> : Advised that they were safely on the platform. However, they were waiting on SAFE to conduct their investigation.[Radio, Ops 4]
20:50:49 hours	<u>ERT</u> : Advised Radio RTC that SAFE had conclude their safety inspections and ERT requested permission to move the train about 15 feet towards New Carrollton and locate the switch point. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Requested confirmation from ERT if they wanted to move the train. <u>ERT</u> : Confirmed. [Radio, Ops 4]
20:51:29 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Attempted to contact ROS #2 and instruct them to key up on the New Carrollton end and stand by for an absolute block. <u>ROS #2</u> : Acknowledged.[Radio, Ops 4]
20:51:56 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed Informed ROS #2 that they had an absolute block to the turnback, coast to carwash, no more than 15 feet, to move the train off the switch point. <u>ROS #2</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio, Ops 4]
20:52:51 hours	<u>ERT</u> : Advised personnel were cranking the switch to a normal position. [Radio Ops.4]
20:56:20 hours	<u>ERT</u> : Informed the Radio RTC that the switch was cranked and clamped in a normal position and inquired where they wanted to train to go, clear 08 signal or go to the platform. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Instructed ERT to standby.
21:01:21 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Gave Train ID 740 an absolute block no closer to 10 feet of turnback to clear 08 signal, and advised using coast to carwash until completely out of the interlocking. <u>Train ID 740</u> : Gave a repeat back. [Radio Ops. 4]
21:15:00 hours	<u>Radio RTC</u> : Gave Train ID 740 an absolute to Clarendon Station, track 2 eight car marker and they'll talk to Ops. 2 there. <u>Train ID 740</u> : Acknowledged. [Radio Ops. 2]
21:17:54 hours	<u>Train ID 740</u> : Contacted the Ops. 2 Radio RTC to advise they were moving on an absolute block in approaching to Clarendon Station, with eight cars and transporting to New Carrollton Yard. <u>Radio RTC</u> : Acknowledged transmission and advised Train ID 740 they would crossing over from two to one at Clarendon Station. [Radio Ops. 2]
21:52:11 hour	<u>Train ID 740</u> : Contacted the New Carrollton Terminal Supervisor to advise they had eight cars and was attempting to go in New Carrollton Yard. <u>Terminal Supervisor</u> : Gave a repeat back and instructed to contact the Tower. [Radio NC YD]

Note: Times above may vary from other systems' timelines based on clock settings.

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Advanced Information Management System (AIMS)




Image 2: Depicts Train ID 940 on approach to K04-08 signal red on track 2 while the route was already set for oncoming train to crossover.




Image 2: Depicts Train ID 940 and Train 939 approximately 700 feet apart.

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Operations

Rail Transportation

Brief Description

At approximately 07:02pm, RVO of Train ID 940 overran K04-08 signal red track #2 Ballston Station in the single tracking area. RVO notified the MICC of the incident. All personnel concerned were notified, and no injuries were reported. RVO was removed from service and transported for post-incident testing by ROS.

Key Employees Involved & Employee Statements:

RVO – Stated “on track 2 leaving Virginia Square Station I ran a red signal before approaching Ballston Station while stationary in the tunnel with 0 speed commands, I was given a permissive block to move the train to the station (Ballston) pass the red signal when I passed the red signal I visually saw the train ahead of me track 2 and the controller asked me where I was, I stopped the train and stated the chain marker that was closest to me and held my position.”

Post Incident Testing & Employee History:

RVO was hired on October 13, 2015, and certified as an RVO on December 4, 2025. They Passed TVOIM: 87% MOR: 82% Previous Safety Violations: None

SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT TIMELINE:

- 19:02pm: Train ID 940 had a red signal over run track two Ballston K04-08 single tracking area. All concerned personnel notified.
- 19:05pm: Service was suspended between Virginia Square and East Falls Church. Orange Line Trains will turn back at Virginia Square towards New Carrollton, and East Falls Church to Vienna. Silver Line trains will turn back at Clarendon towards Largo
- 19:12pm: Train ID 939 track two on approach to Ballston was instructed to reverse ends in the direction of Vienna. Train ID 939 established new service plan. Silver and Orange turned at East Falls.
- 19:13pm: ERT 698 notified. ETA 25 minutes.
- 19:21pm: ATC 2379 confirmed Train ID 940 trailed switch K04-08.
- 19:25pm: Train ID 942 was instructed to offload customers at Virginia Square track two. Was instructed to re-block to ID 742 to perform customer recovery. Train was given instructions absolute block to perform safety stops to down train.
- 19:26pm: RVO on ID 742 reported all 147 customers aboard and one ADA customer.
- 19:36pm: ERT 698 arrives on scene.
- 19:42pm: RVO on ID 742 reported all 147 customers and ADA customers safely aboard rescue train.
- 19:44pm: ERT 698 on scene.
- 19:48pm: All customers from incident train #742 were safely offloaded at Virginia Square. No medical attention required.

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- 19:54pm: ERT 698 and Unit 37 were given foul time track two K04-08.
- 19:57pm: Unit 37 board train 740 staying with RVO for post incident.
- 20:10pm: ERT 698 updated MICC rail first set of trucks on train ID 740 passed switch and second set of trucks was on the switch point.
- 20:17pm: The first shuttle bus arrived at Ballston. This ended the longest customer delay.
- 20:17pm: Bus bridge implemented ending Train 939 customer delay.
- 20:52pm: Train ID 740 was given permission to move with absolute block track two 15 FT off of the switch.
- 20:56pm: ERT 698 cranked and clamped K04 3B in a normal
- 21:08pm: Bus service has been established with four buses in rotation between East Falls Church and Virginia Square
- 21:16pm: Train ID 740 was given an absolute block to Virginia square track two non-revenue. ID 740 was non-revenue in route to New Carrollton yard
- 22:05pm: ATC and TRST completed their inspection and repair and restored the interlocking to service. Normal service restored.
- 22:08pm: ERT 698 reported switches unclamped and back in service at Ballston K04-08 and relinquished foul time. Normal service resumed
- 22:20pm: Train ID 950 serviced Virginia Square in the direction of New Carrollton, ending the longest line delay.

SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS & PENDING ISSUES:

- RVO was given a permissive block no closer than 10ft. to K04-08 signal red.
- RVO did not give the MICC a 100% repeat back and the RTC did not correct them.
- RVO passed K04-08 red signal without permission in the single tracking area.
- RVO notified the MICC when asked, that they did pass red signal K04-08

Fleet

Office of the Chief Fleet Officer – Incident Investigation Team Investigation Data

IIT completed the VMDS, ER data, and NVR Video downloads and analysis and presented below:

Based on the NVR Video and ER data, Train ID940, Cars L- 7570/71, 7259/58, 7591/90, 7607/06 departed from Virginia Sq- GMU (K03), Track #2, in the direction of Ballston Station (K04). Lead car 7570 ER data confirm that prior to the

overrun red signal at K04-08, the train lost speed commands, and it was placed in stop and proceed mode during the incident. Train Overran the red signal at a speed of 11.8Mph. with the Master Controller in “Coast” position. The

emergency brakes were not initiated. After running the red signal, train ID 940 continued towards Ballston and stopped 50 ft prior to entering the platform. All videos are now available on SharePoint.


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Based on VMDS and ER data, there was no fault with the train that contributed to the cause of this incident. The train performed as designed. See the ER Graph lead car 7570 and the timeline of events.

ER Graph Lead Car 7570



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See timeline of Events below:

Time	Description of Events	Master Controller	Train Speed	Regulated Speed	Limiting Speed	Distance to Ballston platform limits.
19:00:17	Train ID 940 departed Virginia Sq-GMU (K03), track #2, in manual mode with the Master Controller in the P5 Power position, Limiting and Regulated speed limits set to 40MPH respectfully.	P5	0MPH	40 MPH	40MPH	2,374 feet.
19:00:21	Master Controller is moved from "P5" to "P1-P4" Power Position, train speed 11.4MPH, after departing Virginia Sq (K03).	P1-P4	11.4MPH	40 MPH	40MPH	2.332 feet.
19:00:41	Train limiting speed limit decreased to 28 MPH, overspeed alarm is detected, train speed is 30MPH, LCU applied B4 rate. Brake sequence initiated.	B4	30.8MPH	40 MPH	28MPH	1,672 feet.
19:00:43	Train Regulated speed limit decreased to 28 MPH, train speed is 29.8MPH.	B4	29.8MPH	28 MPH	28 MPH	1,579 feet.
19:00:45	Master Controller is moved to "B1-B3",	B1-B3	25MPH	28 MPH	28 MPH	1,479 ft
19:00:55	Train limiting speed limit decreased to 15MPH, Overspeed alarm continues, LCU applied "B4" rate. Master Controller remains in "Coast".	Coast	21 MPH	15 MPH	15 MPH	1,197 feet.
19:00:56	Master Controller is moved to "B1-B3", LCU remain train at "B4" position. Over speed alarm continues.	B1-B3	20.9 MPH	28 MPH	25 MPH	1,170 feet.
19:01:00	Master Controller moved to "P1-P4". Train speed 9.8 Mph.	P1-P4	9.8 MPH	15 MPH	15 MPH	1,066 feet.
19:01:12	Train loses speed commands. LCU applied "B4". Master controller in	Cost	14 MPH	0 MPH	0 MPH	863.49 feet.

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Time	Description of Events	Master Controller	Train Speed	Regulated Speed	Limiting Speed	Distance to Ballston platform limits.
	"Coast". Train speed 14.2MPH					
19:01:20	Train comes to completed stop. Master Controller in "B5". The train is 395 feet from the K0408 signal.	B5	0 MPH	0 MPH	0 MPH	801 feet.
19:01:28	Stop and Proceed mode is initiated. Limiting and regulated speed remain at 0Mph.	B5	0 MPH	0 MPH	1 MPH	801 feet.
19:01:28	Master Controller is placed in "P1-P4". Train continues to move toward Ballston station track #2.	P1-P4	0 MPH	0 MPH	0 MPH	801 feet
19:01:54	Train passes the K0408 signal at a speed of 11.8Mph. Master Controller position in Coast. The video confirmed signal showed red.	Coast	11.8 MPH	0 MPH	1 MPH	359feet.
19:02:20	The train comes to a complete stop . Overrun the red signal by 309 ft.	B5	0 MPH	40 Mph	40 MPH	50 feet
19:23:56	Train ID 940 Key down.	B5	0 MPH	0 MPH	0 MPH	50 ft

Infrastructure

Communications and Signaling

Communications and Signals Maintenance

Communications and Signals (COSI) Maintenance – Managerial Incident Report

"At approximately 19:00 hours I was notified by the RWIC at K04 that there was a red over run on track 2. ATCM #1 and ATCM #2 were also on site for single tracking support. After getting foul time from Central we entered the roadway and found switch 3B had been trailed. Switch 1A,1B were in the normal position and 3A,3B were in the reverse position. Relay logic indicated interlocking had been set up for a cross over move, but the train did a straight through 8 to 6 move. This resulted in switch 3B being trailed. With Track Dept and Safety onsite the train was moved out of the interlocking, and we were able to inspect our equipment. Switch 3B appeared to have escaped damage except for damage to the point, which was ground down by Track. We performed switch and track circuit inspections which both passed. We also tested the signal

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system which also operated correctly. Interlocking was then returned to service at 22:30. ATCM #1 and ATCM #2 remain on site.”

Communications and Signal Engineering

[See Appendix C for Signal Engineering Investigation Report - Oracle](#)

Safety and Readiness

Safety

Technical Training and Development

Rail Operations Quality Training

[See Appendix D](#)

Technical Training

[See Appendix D](#)

Interview Findings and Written Statements

As part of the investigation launched into the event, Safety interviewed two people. The interviews identified the following key findings associated with this event. The findings detailed below include reported information from involved personnel and may conflict with other data sources contained in the report.

The RVO stated,

- Stated that they have been a RVO for five weeks only.
- Stated that they struggled with repeat back.
- Stated that they were not familiarized with the expression “Permissive block”.
- Stated that they were on their second-round trip and did not experience a permissive block instruction from the Radio RTC on their first trip.

The RTC stated,

- Newly certified RTC
- They do not use to give permissive block procedure to RVOs
- The permissive block procedure was working with other RVO on the day leading up to the incident
- They use the incident as lessons learned and stop giving permissive block procedure to RVO

Weather

On Saturday, January 17, 2026, at the time of the incident, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) recorded the temperature as 38°F, with cloudy skies, winds of 7 mph, and 45% humidity. Weather was not a contributing factor in this incident (Weather source: NOAA) – Location: Arlington, VA.

Related Rules and Procedures

Metrorail Operating Rulebook

3.1 Passing a Stop Signal

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- 3.1.1** Rail Traffic Controllers or Office of Rail Transportation Supervisors shall advise Rail Vehicle Operators when they are approaching red signals that are positioned just beyond the station platforms.
- 3.1.2** Rail Traffic Controller or Interlocking Operator shall give permission to pass a red signal after the switch has been clamped for the required move. Once this has been verified, the Rail Vehicle Operator will be given permission to pass the red signal at a speed no greater than five (5) mph
- 3.1.3** Rail vehicles shall be allowed to move on red signals with permission from the Rail Traffic Controller and in accordance with respective Operating Modes without clamping switches provided the following conditions are met:
- a. The signal is not associated with pocket track or turnout switch,
 - b. Verbal confirmation that the signal is lunar, and the switches are normal on the opposing track, and
 - c. Rail 1, 2, or 3 has approved the move

Human Factors

Fatigue

Signs and Symptoms of Fatigue

On Friday, January 17, 2026, at 19:00 hours, the RVO operated Train ID 940 and overran K04-08 red signal causing AIMS to send an alert to the MICC. SAFE evaluated signs and symptoms of fatigue that may have been present at the time of the incident. No signs or symptoms of fatigue were detected from the available data. Video of the incident was reviewed for signs of RVO's fatigue. No signs or symptoms of fatigue were evident from the video. The RVO reported feeling fully alert at the time of the incident. The RVO reported experiencing no symptoms of fatigue in the time leading up to the incident.

Fatigue Risk

SAFE evaluated incident data for fatigue risk factors. Risk factors for fatigue were present. The incident time of day did not suggest an increased risk of fatigue-related impairment. RVO reported keeping a regular sleep schedule in the days leading up to the incident. The RVO worked Day Shift in the days leading up to the incident. The RVO was awake for seven hours and thirty-one minutes at the time of the incident. The RVO reported seven hours and fifty-four minutes of sleep in the 24 hours preceding the incident. The off-duty period was 11 hours and thirty-nine minutes, which provides an opportunity for 7-9 hours of sleep. This was more than the RVO's usual workday sleep duration. The RVO reported no issues with sleep. The employee worked Day Shift in the days leading up to the incident.

Circadian Considerations

The incident occurred at 19:00 hours, which is outside the typical circadian low period (usually between 02:00 and 06:00 hours), this suggests low probability of fatigue due to circadian rhythm alone.

Work Schedule and Overtime

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The RVO's work schedule did not alternate between day and night work in the week leading up to the incident.

Sleep and Awake Data

RVO:


- Sleep duration (prior to incident): 7.83 hours in last 24 hours.
- Time awake at time of incident: 7.53 hours.

Biomathematical Fatigue Modeling (SAFTE-FAST WebSFC)

A bio-mathematical fatigue modelling application (SAFTE-FAST WebSFC) was used to further evaluate potential fatigue risks based on the employee's work schedule, self-reported sleep the day prior to the incident, and reported habitual sleep patterns.

RVO:

- Estimated performance effectiveness: 98.5 (Well rested, low fatigue risk).
- Sleep debt: 3.42 hours (Normal variation, manageable).
- Karolinska Sleepiness Scale (KSS): 1.7 (Extremely alert).
- 1. Samn-Perelli Fatigue Scale (SP): 1.5 (Fully alert, wide awake).



Karolinska Sleepiness Scale (KSS) subjective measure of sleepiness to help assess an individual's level of drowsiness or alertness.

Samn-Perelli Fatigue Scale (SP) assesses how fatigued a person feels before and during a task. Modeling analysis output shows estimated performance effectiveness during the incident work shift and for the week leading up to the work shift, based on the employee work and reported sleep schedule. Estimates were based on the Train Operator's work schedule, reported sleep from the day preceding the incident, and reported habitual sleep durations (7 hours a day). Bold portions of the modeled curve show work (in black) and sleep times (in blue). Effectiveness is shown on the vertical axis, with colored fields in the chart background signifying ranges of effectiveness scores including high effectiveness (>90%) in green, and low effectiveness (<65%) in red. Time is shown on the horizontal axis. Markers for work and sleep times are shown in the lanes above the time of day on the horizontal axis.

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Post-Incident Toxicology Testing

WMATA's Drug and Alcohol Program determined that the RVO complied with the Drug and Alcohol Policy and Testing Program Policy 7.7.3/7.

Findings

- RVO was given a permissive block no closer than 10 feet to K04-08 signal red.
- RVO did not give Radio RTC a correct radio repeat back, but the Radio RTC did not correct them.
- There was single tracking at Ballston Station on track 2 due to station edge light replacement on track 1.
- Train ID 940 passed K04-08 signal red without prior authorization from the Radio RTC.
- RVO reported the incident when asked whether they passed K04-08 signal red.
- RVO reported not being familiarized with the phrase "permissive block".

Immediate Mitigation to Prevent Recurrence

- In adherence to RTRA Standard Operating Procedure 102-01-02, which outlines the protocol for removing an employee from service for involvement in an operational safety event, the Radio RTC dispatched a ROS to relieve the RVO from duty for post-incident testing.
- In accordance with the Office of the Chief Fleet Officer – Rail, Standard Operating Procedure 102.04, and Operations Administrative Policy 102.06, the MICC initiated the removal of Train ID 940 from service for Incident Investigations Team investigation procedures.
- Service was halted at Ballston-MU Station

Probable Cause Statement

The probable cause of the red signal overrun event at Ballston-MU Station on January 17, 2026, was the result of the Radio RTC and the RVO not following established communications procedures detailed in the MOR section 12.4.3. Specifically, the RVO did not know fully understand the instructions given by the Radio RTC but proceeded with moving the train. A contributing factor was the RVO's lack of experience and not understanding what a permissive block was.

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Recommended Corrective Actions

Corrective Action Code	Description	Responsible Party	Estimated Completion Date
134675_SAFECAPS_RTRA_001	The RVO completed re-instruction training with ROQT.	RTRA SRC	Completed
134675_SAFECAPS_RTRA_001	A Rail Operations Supervisor conducted ride-along with the RVO for a month, once a week for operational compliance.	RTRA SRC	Completed
134675_SAFECAPS_MICC_001	The Radio RTC completed re-instruction training.	MICC - SRC	Completed
134675_SAFECAPS_MICC_002	Uniform Rules Compliance Program (URCP) compliance oversight – Communication	MICC - SRC	Ongoing
134675_SAFECAPS_MICC_003	Radio protocol reinforcement	MICC - SRC	Completed
134675_SAFECAPS_MICC_004	Radio repeat-back and positive identification reinforcement	MICC- SRC	Completed

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Appendices

Appendix A – Interview Summaries

The below narratives summarize the incident and represent the statements made by the involved individual. As such, times and details may present a conflict with the data contained in systems of record.

Department

Rail Vehicle Operator(RVO)

The RVO is a Metro employee with 10 years of service and 01 month of experience as an RVO. The RVO holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 2 certification that expires in July 2026.

During the formal interview, the RVO stated that they have been operating alone only for five weeks. They admitted that they were struggling with repeat back and communication during their training.

The RVO stated they did not hear the full radio transmission with instructions from Radio RTC ; however, they repeated back what they thought was said which they assumed what correct repeat back because they did not hear any rejection from Radio RTC.

Prior to receiving unsolicited instructions from Radio RTC, Train ID 940 lost the speed commands. When Radio RTC gave them a permissive block no closer than 10 feet to K04-08 signal red , an expression that they stated not being familiar , they assumed to proceed to eight-car marker to Ballston-MU Station.

The RVO stated that they were on their second-round trip of their shift, and they did not experience any loss of the speed commands or required permissive block during their first trip throughout the Ballston-MU Station.

While moving , RVO admitted verifying only the first switch point which is SW-1B and assumed the second switch SW-3B to be aligned in the same position (Normal). They had verified red signal before proceeding and what stopped them from travelling to eight-car marker was the headlights of Train ID 939 facing them on the same track from the tunnel on other end of the station.

They assisted in transferring the customers in a rescue train.

Rail Traffic Controller (RTC)

The RTC is a Metro employee with 09 years of service and 03 months of experience as an RTC. The RTC holds a Roadway Worker Protection (RWP) Level 4 certification that expires in January 2026.

During the formal interview, the RTC stated that the single-tracking had been ongoing at Ballston-MU Station for a week. The RTC stated that they gave other RVO same instructions of permissive block no closer than ten feet to red signals. However, they gave same instructions to RVO of Train 940, but they did not process the instructions correctly and kept repeating red signal to Ballston-MU Station.

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Before the incident, they instructed Train ID 940 to give them two minutes at each station because of the established single-tracking at Ballston-MU. Once Train ID 940 arrived at Virginia Square Station , they instructed them to proceed no closer than 10 feet to red signal K04-08. But the RVO appeared not to process the instructions.

The RTC stated that this incident would be lessons learned for them, and they would use it to stop giving permissive block to RVOs to prevent it from happening again.

Appendix B – RTRA Managerial Incident Investigation Report

	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority	
Office of Rail Transportation: Managerial Incident Investigation Report		
Incident Status: PRELIMINARY		
GENERAL INCIDENT INFORMATION		
Incident Type:	Red Signal Overrun	Delay (Minutes): 46-minute Passenger Delay
Incident Date:	Saturday, January 17, 2026	Vehicles Involved: L-7606-7590-7258-7571 ID 940
Incident Time:	07:02pm	First Reported By: [REDACTED]
Location:	Ballston / Track #2	
BRIEF DESCRIPTION:		
At approximately 07:02pm, RVO [REDACTED] train ID 940 overran K04-08 signal red track #2 Ballston in the single tracking area. RVO [REDACTED] notified the MICC of the incident. All concerned personnel notified, and no injuries reported. RVO [REDACTED] was removed from service and transported for post-incident testing by ROS [REDACTED]		
Key Employees Involved & Employee Statements:		
1. Rail Vehicle Operator [REDACTED] – Stated "on track 2 leaving Virginia Sq I ran a red signal before approaching Ballston Station while stationary in the tunnel with 0 speed commands, I was given a permissive block to move the train to the station (Ballston) pass. the red signal when passed the red signal visually seeing the train ahead of me track 2 the controller asked me where was I. I stopped the train and stated the train marker that was closets to me and held my position."		
Post Incident Testing & Employee History:		
Rail Vehicle Operator: [REDACTED]		
Hire Date: October 13 th , 2015		
Certified Rail Vehicle Operator Date: December 4 th , 2025, (Pass) TVOIM: 87% MOR: 82%		
Previous Safety Violations: None		
Office of Rail Transportation: Managerial Incident Investigation Report		Page 1 of 3

Image 3: RTRA Managerial Incident Investigation Report.

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Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority



Office of Rail Transportation: Managerial Incident Investigation Report

SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT TIMELINE:

- 19:02pm: Train ID 940 had a red signal over run track two Ballston K04-08 single tracking area. All concerned personnel notified.
- 19:05pm: Service was suspended between Virginia Square and East Falls Church. Orange Line Trains will turn back at Virginia Square towards New Carrollton, and East Falls Church to Vienna. Silver Line trains will turn back at Clarendon towards Largo.
- 19:12pm: Train ID 939 track two on approach to Ballston was instructed to reverse ends in the direction of Vienna. Train ID 939 established new service plan. Silver and Orange turned at East Falls.
- 19:13pm: ERT [REDACTED] notified. ETA 25 minutes.
- 19:21pm: ATC [REDACTED] confirmed Train ID 940 trailed switch K04-08.
- 19:25pm: Train ID 942 was instructed to off load customers at Virginia Square track two. Was instructed to re-blocked to ID 742 to perform customer recovery. Train was given instructions absolute block to perform safety stops to down train.
- 19:26pm: RVO on ID 742 reported all 147 customers aboard and one ADA customer.
- 19:36pm: ERT [REDACTED] arrives on scene.
- 19:42pm: RVO on ID 742 reported all 147 customers and ADA customer safely aboard rescue train.
- 19:44pm: ERT [REDACTED] on scene.
- 19:48pm: All customers from incident train #742 were safely offloaded at Virginia Square. No medical attention required.
- 19:54pm: ERT [REDACTED] and Unit [REDACTED] was given foul time track two K04-08.
- 19:57pm: Unit [REDACTED] board train 740 staying with RVO for post incident.
- 20:10pm: ERT [REDACTED] updated MICC rail first set of trucks on train ID 740 passed switch and second set of trucks was on the switch point.
- 20:17pm: The first shuttle bus arrived at Ballston. This ended the longest customer delay.
- 20:17pm: Bus bridge implemented ending Train 939 customer delay.
- 20:52pm: Train ID 740 was given permission to move with absolute block track two 15 FT off of the switch.
- 20:56pm: ERT [REDACTED] cranked and clamped K04 3B in a normal
- 21:08pm: Bus service has been established with four buses in rotation between East Falls Church and Virginia Square
- 21:16pm: Train ID 740 was given an absolute block to Virginia square track two non-revenue. ID 740 was non-revenue in route to New Carrollton yard
- 22:05pm: ATC and TRST completed their inspection and repair and restored the interlocking to service. Normal service restored.
- 22:08pm: ERT [REDACTED] reported switches unclamped and back in service at Ballston K04-08 and relinquished foul time. Normal service resumed
- 22:20pm: Train ID 950 serviced Virginia Square in the direction of New Carrollton ending the longest line delay.

SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS & PENDING ISSUES:

- RVO [REDACTED] was given a permissive block no closer than 10ft. K04-08 signal red.
- RVO [REDACTED] did not give the MICC a 100% repeat back and the RTC did not correct him.
- RVO [REDACTED] passed K04-08 signal red without permission in the single tracking area.
- RVO [REDACTED] notified the MICC when asked, that he did pass red signal K04-08.

Image 4: RTRA Managerial Incident Investigation Report ,continued...



**Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority**
Office of Rail Transportation: Managerial Incident Investigation Report




CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

SMS: 20260117#134675MX

Mandatory reinstruction training with ROQT.

Additional information will be provided upon completion of the investigation.

INCIDENT PHOTOS: ATTACH ANY SIGNIFICANT PHOTOS BASED ON THE INITIAL INCIDENT INVESTIGATION.



Report Prepared
by:

██████████ New Carrollton Assistant Superintendent

1/17/2026

Report Reviewed
by:

Image 5: RTRA Managerial Incident Investigation Report , ended.

INVESTIGATION REPORT

	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority	
	INVESTIGATION REPORT	Incident Analysis Report E26255 - 2026011

Incident Title: K04-08 Red Signal Overrun

Incident Date/Time: 2026 Jan 17 – 19:02

Incident Location: K04/Ballston Station

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

A review of the AIM data indicates that Route 6-4 was initially properly established, and Signal 6 displayed a clear aspect. At 18:58:09, Train 940 was operating in manual mode and was located at K03.

At 19:00:17, Train 639 occupied Track Circuits K2-278 and K2-276 while approaching Signal 6. Train 639 accepted Signal 6 and proceeded through the crossover toward Track 1. At this time, Switch 3 remained in the reverse position, and the route was approach locked for the following train, Train 939, which was on approach for the crossover move.

At 19:00:55, Train 940 began advancing toward K04, occupying Track Circuit K2-262. The train continued toward Signal 8, which was displaying a stop aspect, and occupied Track Circuit K2-271 (outside Signal 8) at 19:01:52.

At 19:02:10, Train 940 overran Signal 8 and entered Track Circuit 1BT. As a result of this signal overrun, the vital logic forced Signal 6 to stop. Despite this enforcement, Train 940 did not stop and continued into Track Circuit 3BT at 19:02:17.

At 19:02:27, Train 940 proceeded further, trailing Switch 3B resulting in an out-of-correspondence condition and occupying Track Circuit K2-276, which is located beyond Signal 6. The train subsequently passed the insulated joint (IJ) associated with Signal 6.

In summary, Train 940 overran Signal 8 and continued beyond multiple fouling limits, including passing the insulated joint at Signal 6, resulting in an overrun violation of signal and switch compromise.

ORIGINAL
Approved: 01/26/2026

INFR-COSI-ATC- E26255 - 2026011 -0.0-01262026-YS
Page 2 of 5
INFR-COSI-ATCE-E26255 - 2026011-K04-0.1-01262026-YS

Image 7: COSI – Signal Engineering Investigation Report(Cont.)

Incident Date: 01/17/2026 Time: 19:02 hours
Final Report- Red Signal Overrun
E26255

Drafted By: SAFE 704 - 03/09/2026
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 - 03/21/2026
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 04/19/2026

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INVESTIGATION REPORT

Incident Analysis Report E26255 - 2026011

COSI-SIGNAL ENGINEERING	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority	Detailed Incident Analysis							
		Report Num:		[E26255 - 2026011]					
		Requestor:		[REDACTED]					
		Date:		2026 Jan 26					
		From:		[REDACTED]					
To:		[REDACTED]							
Reported Data:		Time:		18.55.00 to 21.07.00		Train ID		940	
Description:		K04/Ballston K04-08 Red Signal Overrun		Interlocking Control:		[Central/Remote]			
Requested Analysis: Investigate Incident									
INITIAL STATE AS OF: [18:55:00]									
Name	STATE	AUTO	NAME	STATE	AUTO	NAME	STATE	AUTO	
Signal K04-06	CLEAR	NO	K2-262	Vacant	-	1BT	Vacant	-	
Signal K04-08	STOP	NO	K2-265	Vacant	-	3BT	Vacant	-	
Signal K04-04	STOP	NO	K2-268	Vacant	-	K2-276	Vacant	-	
Signal K04-02	STOP	NO	K2-271	Vacant	-	Switch 1	Normal	-	
Switch 3	Reverse	-	Approach 6	Locked	-	-	Normal	-	
RECORDED EVENT DATA									
TIME	LOCATION	STATUS/ CONTROL	AIMS DESCRIPTION			COMMENTS			
18:58:09	K03	STATUS	Train Number Input 2 940			Train 940 at K03 Platform Track 2			
18:58:09	K03	STATUS	Track 2 Train in ATO Automatic						
18:59:03	K04	STATUS	Track circuit K2-278 Occupied			Train 639 proceeds to cross over on the Sig 6 to Signal 4 Route with the Sig 6 cleared and approached locked in the initial state at 18:55:00			
18:59:25	K04	STATUS	Track circuit K2-276 Occupied						
19:00:17	K04	STATUS	Track circuit 3BT Occupied						
19:00:17	K04	STATUS	Signal state 6 stop						
19:00:26	K04	STATUS	Approach 6 unlocked						
19:00:35	K04	STATUS	Track Circuit K2-278 Vacant						
19:00:36	K04	STATUS	Track Circuit K2-276 Vacant						
19:00:39	K04	STATUS	Track Circuit 3BT Vacant						
19:00:50	K04	STATUS	Signal State 6 Clear			Train 939 on approach for a cross over on Sig 6 to Sig 4 Route			
19:00:50	K04	STATUS	Approach 6 Locked						


ORIGINAL
Approved: 01/26/2026INFR-COSI-ATC- E26255 - 2026011 -0.0-01262026-YS
Page 3 of 5
INFR-COSI-ATCE-E26255 - 2026011-K04-0.1-01262026-YS

Image 8: COSI – Signal Engineering Investigation Report(Cont.)

Incident Date: 01/17/2026 Time: 19:02 hours
Final Report- Red Signal Overrun
E26255Drafted By: SAFE 704 - 03/09/2026
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 - 03/21/2026
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 04/19/2026

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19:00:55	K04	STATUS	Track Circuit K2-262 Occupied	Train 940 proceeds toward K04 Sig 8. Signal 8 is at a Stop
19:01:04	K03	STATUS	Track Circuit K2-265 Occupied	
19:01:20	K04	STATUS	Track Circuit K2-268Occupied	
19:01:52	K04	STATUS	Track Circuit K2-271 Occupied	
19:01:58	K04	STATUS	Track Circuit K2-262 Vacant	
19:02:10	K04	STATUS	Signal State 6 Stop	Train 940 overrun Sig 8. The overrun circuit forced Sig 6 to a stop
19:02:10	K04	STATUS	Track Circuit 1BT Occupied	
19:02:15	K04	STATUS	Track Circuit K2-265 Vacant	
19:02:17	K04	STATUS	Track Circuit 3BT Occupied	Train 940 proceeded to the approach circuit outside of Sig 6 forcing the switch point which was sitting in reverse
19:02:25	K04	STATUS	Switch Position 3 Out Of Correspondance	
19:02:27	K04	STATUS	Track Circuit K2-276 Occupied	



ORIGINAL
Approved: 01/26/2026

INFR-COSI-ATC- E26255 - 2026011 -0.0-01262026-YS

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INFR-COSI-ATCE-E26255 - 2026011-K04-0.1-01262026-YS

Image 9: COSI – Signal Engineering Investigation Report(Cont.)

Incident Date: 01/17/2026 Time: 19:02 hours
Final Report- Red Signal Overrun
E26255

Drafted By: SAFE 704 - 03/09/2026
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 - 03/21/2026
Approved By: SAFE 707 - 04/19/2026

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	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority	
	INVESTIGATION REPORT	Incident Analysis Report E26255 - 2026011

Circuit Power Failure: Yes ☐ No ☐	Processor Failure: Yes ☐ No ☐	Power Transfer: Yes ☐ No ☐
---	---	--

DISTRIBUTION LIST				
•	COSI Executive Leadership (			)
•	Signal Engineering Sr Director (			)
•	Signal Engineering Managers (			)
•	Signal Maintenance Personnel (			)
•	MICC Personnel (			)
•	SAFE Personnel (			)

ORIGINAL
Approved: 01/26/2026

INFR-COSI-ATC- E26255 - 2026011 -0.0-01262026-Y5
Page 5 of 5
INFR-COSI-ATCE-E26255 - 2026011-K04-0.1-01262026-Y5

Image 10: COSI – Signal Engineering Investigation Report(Ended.)

Incident Date: 01/17/2026 Time: 19:02 hours
Final Report- Red Signal Overrun
E26255

Drafted By: SAFE 704 - 03/09/2026
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 - 03/21/2026
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 04/19/2026

Appendix D – COSI Maintenance Managerial Incident Investigation Report

At approximately 19:00 I was notified by the RWIC at K04 [REDACTED] that there was a red over run on track 2. ATCM [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were also on site for single tracking support. After getting foul time from Central we entered the roadway and found switch 3B had been trailed. Switch 1A,1B were in the normal position and 3A,3B were in the reverse position. Relay logic indicated interlocking had been set up for a cross over move, but the train did a straight through 8 to 6 move. This resulted in the switch 3B being trailed.

With Track Dept and Safety onsite the train was moved out of the interlocking, and we were able to inspect our equipment. Switch 3B appeared to have escaped damage except for damage to the point, which was ground down by Track. We performed switch and track circuit inspections which both passed. We also tested the signal system which also operated correctly. Interlocking was then returned to service at 22:30. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] remain on site.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Digitally signed
[REDACTED]
Date: 2026.01.18
02:18:07 -05'00'

Image 11: COSI – Signal Maintenance Managerial Incident Investigation Report

Incident Date: 01/17/2026 Time: 19:02 hours
Final Report- Red Signal Overrun
E26255

Drafted By: SAFE 704 - 03/09/2026
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 - 03/21/2026
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 04/19/2026

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"Trailed Switch" Response checklist

WMSC requires investigation and testing with-in 48 hours of incident

Date: 1-17-26

Location: KO 4

Switch Machine # 3B

1. Post Incident Inspection (Pictures)

- ☒ Record/document all pertinent information in logbook.
- ☒ Record/document weather conditions. *under ground*
- Conduct thorough inspection/assessment of incident area.
- Record/document position of switch(es). *7A, 7B - Rev 1A, 1B - Normal*
- ☒ Switch points (damaged), switch rods (bent, damaged), obstruction (point opening), layout, track components
- ☒ Record/document condition of associated signals including aspects (lunar, red).
- ☒ Record/document position of relays associated with incident area (HGR, NWPR, RWPR, NWCR, RWCR, etc.) *see attached*
- ☒ Record/document Local Control Panel Indications.
- ☒ Perform Interlocking Inspection (ATC-3003).

2. Required Testing Post Inspection

- ☒ Switch Obstruction (ATC-2006.12, PMI ATC-1007, 1008)
- ☒ Track Circuit Testing (ATC-2006.11, PMI ATC-1012, 1012C)
- ☒ Signal Lighting Test (ATC-2006.10)
- ☒ Switch Detector and Route Locking Test (ATC-1003), if required *under*
- ☒ Switch Indication Locking Test (ATC-1009), if required
- ☒ Confirm LCP/Tower board are operational per design specifications

3. Required Documentation

- ☒ ATCM Incident Time Line Report
- Post Inspection Testing data sheets
- Switch Obstruction data sheet
- ☒ Track Circuit data sheet(s)
- ☒ Signal Lighting Tests results - *passed*
- ☒ Switch Detector and Route Locking data sheet (if required)
- ☒ Switch Indication Locking Test data sheet (if required)
- ☒ AIMS ROCC report (if available)
- ☒ Event Recorder report (if available)

4. SAFE additional documentation

- ☒ Switch obstruction data sheets for previous calendar year
- ☒ Interlocking data sheets for previous 3 months

 1-17-20
ATCM Supervisor

Image 12: COSI – Signal Maintenance Trailed Switch Inspection Checklist

Incident Date: 01/17/2026 Time: 19:02 hours
Final Report- Red Signal Overrun
E26255

Drafted By: SAFE 704 - 03/09/2026
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 - 03/21/2026
Approved By: SAFE 707 - 04/19/2026

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ATC-1000 1007B							Date: 1/17/2026											
M3 Monthly Switch Inspection							Location Name: K04											
							Work order #: 2011166											
Switch No.	1. Exterior Inspections			2. Interior Inspections			3. Switch Obstruction											
	Layout Condition	Machine Condition	Track Department Involvement	Motor Compartment	Circuit Controller Compartment	Gear Box Compartment	Hand Crank Operation						Power Obst.					
							Far Point			Near Point			Near Point			Far Point		
							3.5	3.7	3.8	3.9	3.15	3.17	3.18	3.19	3.23	3.24	3.26	3.27
3B	P	P	Y	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
3A	P	P	Y	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P

P=pass/F=Fail

Note repair or general condition

Switch No.	3. Switch Obstruction		4. Point Detector Verification										5. Switch Hand Crank Cut-out										6. Finish and Area Check			
	Point Opening		Far Point					Near Point																		
	Normal	Reverse	3.29	3.29	4.2	4.7	4.8	4.9	4.13	4.15	4.20	4.21	4.22	4.24	5.2	5.3	5.4	5.5	5.7	5.9	5.10	6.1	6.2	6.3	6.4	
3B	S	P	S	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	
3A	S	P	S	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	

P=pass/F=Fail

Note repair or general condition

Test Equipment (Model/Serial Number/Calibration Due) :

Remarks: Tracked Switch Investigation switch 3B

Signature: [Redacted]

Technician, Emp No & Date: [Redacted] 1/17/2026

Supervisor Approval, Emp No & Date: [Redacted] 1-17-26

Compliance Supervisor Review, Emp No & Date:

Image 15: COSI – Signal Maintenance After Incident Switches 3A & 3B Inspection Datasheet

Incident Date: 01/17/2026 Time: 19:02 hours
Final Report- Red Signal Overrun
E26255

Drafted By: SAFE 704 - 03/09/2026
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 - 03/21/2026
Approved By: SAFE 707 - 04/19/2026



Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Maintenance and Material Management System
Work Order Details

Page 1 of 2
MXAZP

Work Order #: 20111166
Type: CM

20111166

Status: CLOSE
01/20/2026 10:40

Work Description: K04 Red signal overrun #8 TRK 2
Job Plan Description:

Work Information									
Asset: ATCKD43B SWITCH 3B, M3, US&S, LH, K04				Owning Office: ATCS-TSSM-KRFO			Parent:		
Asset Tag:				Maintenance Office: ATCS-TSSM-SWSH			Create Date: 01/17/2026 19:10		
Asset S/N: U470700605				Labor Group: ATCSD4K99			Actual Start: 01/18/2026 02:19		
Location: 7438 K04, BALLSTON MU, STATION, PLATFORM 1, ROOM 115, TRAIN CONTROL ROOM (K04 IB FT)				Crew:			Actual Comp: 01/18/2026 22:53		
Work Location:				Lead: [REDACTED]			Item: M57530001		
Failure Class: ATCS001 SWITCH MACHINES				GL Account: WMATA-02-33530-50499270-042-*****-OPR**					
Problem Code: 0041 SPECIAL INSPECTION				Supervisor:			Target Start:		
Requested By: [REDACTED]				Requestor Phone: 21797			Target Comp:		
Chain Mark Start:				Chain Mark End:			Scheduled Start:		
Create-Mileage: 0.0				Complete-Mileage: 0.0					
Task IDs									
Task ID									
10 Recovered Trained switch 3B									
247 1-17-26									
At approximately 19:00 I was notified by the RIWIC at K04 [REDACTED] that there was a red over run on track 2. ATCM [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were also on site for single tracking support. After getting foul time from Central we entered the roadway and found switch 3B had been trained. Switch 1A,1B were in the normal position and 3A,3B were in the reverse position. Relay logic indicated interlocking had been set up for a cross over move, but the train did a straight through 8 to 6 move. This resulted in the switch 3B being trained. With Track Dept and Safety onsite the train was moved out of the interlocking, and we were able to inspect our equipment. Switch 3B appeared to have escaped damage except for damage to the point, which was ground down by Track. We performed switch and track circuit inspections which both passed. We also tested the signal system which also operated correctly. Interlocking was then returned to service at 22:30. ATC [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] remain on site.									
Component: Work Accompl: Reason: Status: CLOSE Position: Warranty?: N									
Actual Labor									
Task ID	Labor	Start Date	End Date	Start Time	End Time	Approved?	Regular Hours	Premium Hours	Line Cost
10	[REDACTED]	01/17/2026	01/17/2026	19:00	23:00	Y	00:00	04:00	\$334.69
10	[REDACTED]	01/17/2026	01/17/2026	19:00	23:00	Y	00:00	04:00	\$270.34
10	[REDACTED]	01/17/2026	01/17/2026	19:00	23:00	Y	00:00	04:00	\$277.10
10	[REDACTED]	01/17/2026	01/17/2026	19:00	23:00	Y	00:00	04:00	\$282.48
10	[REDACTED]	01/17/2026	01/17/2026	19:00	23:00	Y	00:00	04:00	\$266.40
10	[REDACTED]	01/17/2026	01/17/2026	19:00	23:00	Y	00:00	04:00	\$306.69
WT_plust_woprint.rptdesign 01/27/2026 22:39									

Image 16: COSI – Signal Maintenance Incident Response Team Maximo Labor Reporting

Incident Date: 01/17/2026 Time: 19:02 hours
Final Report- Red Signal Overrun
E26255

Drafted By: SAFE 704 - 03/09/2026
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 - 03/21/2026
Approved By: SAFE 707 – 04/19/2026

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Appendix E – RVO Training Records



Rail Transportation Certification Status

Updated at: 01/18/2026 07:03:29 PM

Total # of Employees

List of Employees and their Required Certification Status

Employee ID	Employee Name	Empl. Status (PS)	Position Description	Division	Program	General Status	ELM Certificate Status	Certification Expiration Date	Trapeze Certificate Date
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	A	Train Operator	New Carrollton	1001 - Train Operations	Completed	Completed	12/31/2027	12/4/2027

List of ELM Certificates and their status

Employee ID	Program ID	Program Name	Status	Certification Expiration Date
[REDACTED]	1001	Certification of Qualification-Rail Vehicle Operations	Completed	12/31/2027

Trapeze Skill Records

Employee ID	From Date	To Date	Mod Date	Mod By
[REDACTED]	20251204	20271204	2025121	[REDACTED]

List of ELM Courses and their status

Employee ID	Course Code	Course Long Name	Course Category	Enrollment Date	Completion Date	Score	Status
[REDACTED]	OPQMTOPT	Practical Test - Train Operat...	Practical Test	12/4/2025	12/4/2025		Complete
[REDACTED]	OPTOMOR	MOR Test - Train Operator	Written Test	10/23/2025	10/23/2025	82	Complete
[REDACTED]	OPTOTVOIM	TVOIM Test - Train Operator	Written Test 2	10/23/2025	10/23/2025	87	Complete

Trapeze Work Details

Empl. ID	LDate	Work Name	Work Type Cate...
[REDACTED]	20260117	390511-1	Fixed
[REDACTED]	20260116	390511	Fixed
[REDACTED]	20260112	390511	Fixed
[REDACTED]	20260111	390511	Fixed
[REDACTED]	20260110	390511	Fixed
[REDACTED]	20260109	390511	Fixed
[REDACTED]	20260108	390511	Fixed

Legend

-  Scheduled for Recertification

Buttons:

- Show All
- Show operators with mismatched Trapeze and ELM dates
- Show expiring certificate by month and pay period
- Current Status
- Work Details
- Recertification Schedule Stat
- Scheduling Guide
- Recertification Results
- Practical Test Results...
- Practical Test Results (Initials)
- Practical Test Overall Metrics
- Recertification Overall Metrics
- Today's Status
- Partial Recertification...

Image 17:RTRA - RVO Training & Certification

Incident Date: 01/17/2026 Time: 19:02 hours
Final Report- Red Signal Overrun
E26255

Drafted By: SAFE 704 - 03/09/2026
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 - 03/21/2026
Approved By: SAFE 707 - 04/19/2026

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Rail Training Request Form

Use this Form for Reinstruction and Return to Duty

Please Print/Type all Information

Employee Name:	Employee Number:	Division:	Assigned Days:	Last Day Worked:
[REDACTED]	021725	D99	T/W	01/17/2026
RTD Date:	Incident Date:	Incident Type:		
01/22/26	01/17/2025	Red Signal Overrun (Mainline)		
MOR Rule/Violation:	Post Incident (Y/N):	Date Cleared Medical:		
MOR 3.3 Signals Requiring a Stop	Yes	01/22/26		
Last MICC/Train Certification Date:	RWP Expiration Date:			
12/04/25	July 26			
Requestor's (Name):				
Clevbernard Bennett				
Brief Synopsis of Incident or Reason Out				
RVO [REDACTED] train ID 940, overran K04-08 signal Red track #2 Ballston in the single tracking area				

Area Below for Rail Training Personnel Use Only

Date Reported: 2-5-2026	Number of Days Trained 1	Location of Training CTF
<u>Instruction Provided:</u> Classroom : Discussion and Review: RVO was given a copy of the Switching from Automatic to Manual procedures, and from Manual back to Automatic. MOR Single Tracking Rule 8.17.13, Passing Red Signal 3.1 thru 3.4.3 with emphasis on Rule 3.3, Rule 12.4 Radio Transmission & Reception Procedures with emphasis placed on Rule 12.4.3. Simulator : RVO performed one round trip from K08 to D13 in Mode 2 and one round trip from D13 to K08 Mode 1 RVO was given the following mainline simulations: Workers on roadway (AMF simulation), PSS not illuminating, Doors failed to open.		
Trainee:	Signature:	Date:
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	2-5-2026
Instructor:	Signature:	Date:
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	2-5-2026
Rail Training Manager:	Signature:	Date:
Shan [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	2/6/2026
Trainee's Manager:	Signature:	Date:
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	2/6/2026

This form must be emailed to [REDACTED] immediately upon employees' notification to report to Rail Training.

*Insert N/A to all non-applicable fields

Image 18: RTRA - After Incident RVO Re-instruction Document

Incident Date: 01/17/2026 Time: 19:02 hours
Final Report- Red Signal Overrun
E26255

Drafted By: SAFE 704 - 03/09/2026
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 - 03/21/2026
Approved By: SAFE 707 - 04/19/2026

Appendix F – Scene Photographs



Image 19: Train ID 940's Second Truck Sitting On Top of the Switch 3B Point

Incident Date: 01/17/2026 Time: 19:02 hours
Final Report- Red Signal Overrun
E26255

Drafted By: SAFE 704 - 03/09/2026
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 - 03/21/2026
Approved By: SAFE 707 - 04/19/2026

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Jan 17, 2026 20:34:22
Arlington County
Virginia

Image 20: Depicts Switch 3B's Point Open in Reverse

Incident Date: 01/17/2026 Time: 19:02 hours
Final Report- Red Signal Overrun
E26255

Drafted By: SAFE 704 - 03/09/2026
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 - 03/21/2026
Approved By: SAFE 707 - 04/19/2026

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


Incident Date: 01/17/2026 Time: 19:02 hours
Final Report- Red Signal Overrun
E26255

Drafted By: SAFE 704 - 03/09/2026
Reviewed By: SAFE 703 - 03/21/2026
Approved By: SAFE 707 - 04/19/2026

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Appendix G – Why-Tree Analysis



Incident Date: 01/17/2026 Time: 19:02 hours
 Final Report- Red Signal Overrun
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